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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation investigates the underground world of Japan’s increasingly 
popular host club scene, where mostly young, working-class men “sell” romance, love, 
and sometimes sex to indulge their female clients’ fantasy, often for exorbitant sums of 
money. I explore this commercialization of feelings, emotions, and romantic relationships 
— what I call ‘affect economy’— in the context of Japan’s recent socioeconomic 
restructuring, a reaction to globalization that is reshaping the nation’s labor and 
commodity forms. Based on ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in Tokyo between 2003 
and 2005, I argue that selfhood, lifestyles, and social relationships have become 
commodifiable at the intersection of Japan’s postindustrial consumer culture and 
neoliberal globalization. My dissertation aims to provide a fine-grained ethnographic 
portrait of how hosts and their clients mutually seduce one another to foster a 
commodified form of romance whereby both sides seek alternative lives and cultivate 
their desirable selves —potentially successful entrepreneurial men and sexually attractive 
women—while it simultaneously underscores gender subordination, social inequality, 
and the exploitative nature of the affect economy in Japan. I illuminate how mutual 
seduction between hosts and their clients intertwines with Japan’s neoliberal 
policymaking and governance that similarly capitalizes on and mobilizes individual 
hopes, dreams, and self-motivations to satisfy both their own and national interests. In 
turn, I theorize seduction as a form of power that entails suggestive speech and bodily 
acts to entice the other person(s) into acting for both the seducer’s and the seducee(s)’ 
ends. Seduction is, I argue, neither a mere sexual temptation nor a sinful deception, but a 
ubiquitous yet unstructured tactic that institutions and individuals alike employ to 
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manipulate the other and shape power dynamics. The art of seduction is, thus, a form of 
social governance-at-a-distance and also a pivot of speculative accumulation of capital.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This is an ethnographic study about affect —feelings, emotions, desires, and 
intimacy— and its commodification in Japan. Affect, which is rooted in the body and 
scripted through social interaction, is a vehicle for self-expression and interpersonal 
communication. It has increasingly become commercialized as a means of evoking 
excitement, pleasure, and a sense of ‘freedom’ in postindustrial consumer culture, and 
has accelerated in the wake of Japan’s recent neoliberal restructuring and market 
deregulation. As part of my study, I investigate Japan’s increasingly popular host club 
scene, where working class men “sell” romance, love, and sex to their female clients, for 
often exorbitant sums of money. In the club, hosts and their clients mutually seduce one 
another—fostering a commodified form of romance—whereby both sides seek 
alternative lives and perform and cultivate their desirable selves. I argue that the 
commodification of romance manifests and magnifies what I call an ‘affect economy’ in 
Japan’s socio-historical conjuncture of postindustrial consumer culture and neoliberal 
globalization.  
Affect economy is the term I use to refer to the so-called service industry and by 
extension postindustrial socioeconomy that capitalizes on affect in order to entice 
individuals into acting for both their own and various institutional or collective ends. It is 
not, however, merely capitalist manipulation of the mass or state governance of 
individual affect. Rather, it is a form of cultural politics within which individuals, as well 
as social institutions, strategize their speech and bodily acts and stir another’s emotions, 
desires, and psychology for advantageous trade in sexual, romantic, business, political, 
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and other social settings. Thus, I define an affect economy both narrowly and broadly: an 
affect economy is a form of highly personalized market transaction and also a market 
exchange in general that takes advantage of affect for persuasion and a better deal. As 
such, the affect economy in a broad sense crisscrosses the body, the social, and the 
political economy is a dynamic means, script, and process that social actors play out from 
their own positionality.  
The affect economy mirrors global economic trends. In their influential book 
Multitudes (2004), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim that the global economy has, 
over the last two decades, shifted from industrial, or material, labor to immaterial labor—
labor that “creates immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, communication, 
a relationship, or an emotional response” (108). Admitting that material labor still 
comprises a quantitative majority of the world’s labor forces, however, they contend that 
qualitatively the world economy is moving toward immaterial labor—commonly known 
as the information age and new economy. For them, “affective labor” is a principle form 
which “produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, 
excitement, or passion” and shapes social life itself (108). Such affective labor is 
observed in today’s formal and informal service industry, including but not limited to: 
tourism, sexual amusement, counseling, self-help seminars, aesthetic and relaxation 
salons, nannies, maid, and so on (Cruikshank 1993; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004; 
Eng 2006; Joseph 2002). 
Indeed, neither the affect economy nor affective labor —the production of affect 
for market exchange— is entirely new. The so-called culture industry, which includes 
image, information, and knowledge, for example, has long utilized affective labor to 
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appeal to consumer’s aesthetics and sensuality, and has become very influential, 
particularly in late-capitalist societies (Baudrillard 1994; Haug 1986; Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1972). It is now largely established, and widely circulated, via the expansion of 
global consumerism (Mazzarella 2003). While such industries based on mass production 
and consumption still distinguish between the affect producer and recipient, personalized 
service industries such as the host club, where both service providers and recipients 
mutually attempt to appeal to one another’s aesthetics and sensuality to foster an intimate 
relationship, blur conventional binaries such as service providers and recipients, 
production and consumption, and the consuming and consumed subjects. The end result 
is that producer and consumer alike are drawn into the affect economy in the name of 
personal choice and responsibility and in the neoliberal market logic of self-
entrepreneurship and self-fulfillment. The affect economy is thus closely linked with 
recent neoliberal globalization.  
In the host club, both hosts and their clients “work” on their appearance, skills of 
seduction and persuasion, and flair for the dramatic so as to optimize their monetary and 
affective exchanges, i.e., their hard-earned self-fulfillment. Here, ‘work’ becomes a 
means and process of self-making, and is evaluated by its marketability and desirability. 
The self is given credit for his/her work metonymically. In other words, money and 
affect—romantic love, attentiveness, caring—become tokens for both successful work 
and the entrepreneurial self, the self that is simultaneously the object and subject of the 
work. Thus, inherited and/or acquired skills, knowledge, and sensibility consist of his/her 
desirability and market value, i.e., human capital that engenders only through market 
exchange in Japan’s affect economy. By the same token, human capital becomes 
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inseparable from the individual (Gordon 1991). The affect economy in Japan that is built 
upon postindustrial consumer culture and fueled by neoliberal market logic encompasses 
both production and consumption as two sides of the same coin: a means of fashioning 
the desirable self and enhancing one’s human capital. 
This highly personalized business activity is, I argue, gaining rapidly amid 
Japan’s socioeconomic restructuring. Over the past decade, the Japanese government has 
moved to privatize the nation’s public-state sectors by injecting neoliberal market 
imperatives —individual creativity, knowledge production, entrepreneurship, competition 
for self-actualization, and personal freedom and responsibility. While heavily promoting 
restructuring (kōzōkaikaku), deregulation (kiseikanwa), and privatization (min’eika), the 
former Koizumi administration proposed to create over two to three million new jobs 
within five years by expanding service-based industries such as housekeeping, 
child/elderly care, beauty and health care, entertainment and amusement, and so on 
(Shimada 2004). This kind of commodification of hitherto public assets and the 
‘intimate’ private sphere, Harvey asserts, is a feature of the neoliberal project and it is 
spreading globally (Harvey 2005: 160).  
As I argue throughout my project, the host club is not just another example of 
Japan’s ephemeral, fad-driven subculture, but a constitutive element of Japan’s affect 
economy—an economy rooted in postindustrial consumerism and neoliberal 
globalization. The first host club establishment, in fact, opened in the mid-1960s, in 
Tokyo, where it remained relatively unknown to the public until the business suddenly 
began to draw media attention in the mid-1990s. This occurred for a number of reasons 
which I explain further in this chapter, but it is revealing that scholarly recognition of the 
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affect economy in Japan has closely paralleled the rapid business success of the host club, 
especially since Japan’s neoliberal socioeconomic restructuring was first put into force in 
the 1990s. Studying how Japan’s affect economy has evolved, I argue that Japan’s 
postindustrial consumer culture, which has expanded enormously since the 1970s and 
increasingly places value on individual choice, self-fashioning, and personal ‘freedom’ 
against social constraints, has contingently paved the road for neoliberal restructuring and 
the rationale for individual creativity, self-actualization, result-oriented competition, and 
personal freedom and responsibility.  
Scholarship on the genealogy of neoliberalism often treats neoliberalism as a 
continuum of 18th century Liberalism and traces the historical trajectory of Western 
politico-economic cultural hegemony (e.g., Brown 2003; Duggan 2003). In this dominant 
model, neoliberalism emerges as an economic doctrine in postwar West Germany and the 
1960s U.S. Chicago School (Brown 2003; Lemke 2001; Ong 2006). Aligned with the 
popular understanding of neoiberalism is the association with U.S.-centered politico-
economic principles couched in the rhetoric of so-called ‘small government’ and ‘free 
markets’ (Brown 2003; Ong 2006). Neoliberalism is often equated with economic 
globalization, largely disseminated through supranational organizations such as the Word 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Some scholars have problematized this blanket historicization and focused on the 
socio-historical specificity that shapes different market forms and their relation to the 
state (Clark 2004; Lemke 2001). Nonetheless, the study of neoliberal genealogy is still 
largely limited to Western contexts (Burchell 1996; Dean 1999; Ong 2006). Scholars who 
study non-Western contexts struggle with how to conceptualize historical transformation 
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in relation to neoliberal reformation on a global scale  (Hoffmann et. al. 2006). My 
approach to neoliberalism by way of affect economics is particularly useful in non-
Western socio-historical milieu such as Japan’s, where liberalism has been selectively 
imported and articulated, but has not taken root in such a systematic way as in the West. 
As I argue, Japan’s case foils the dominant Euro-American model of neoliberalism and 
highlights potentially multiple forms and origins. 
Neoliberalism is not merely a politico-economic principle; it has underlying 
implications and logics, as well as its social effect. Marxist scholars, for instance, have 
criticized neoliberalism as a class ideology for upward distribution of social resources 
and a covert depoliticizing of structural inequalities on national and global scales (Brown 
2003; Harvey 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). Foucauldian scholars have argued 
that neoliberalism is a political rationality that creates docile subjects who believe in 
“freedom” and thereby willingly govern themselves to become rational and responsible 
(Burchell 1996; Gordon 1991; Lemke 2001). These scholars have revealed that 
neoliberalism is not an ontological reality, but a constitutivist project that attempts to 
create new norms and rationalities (Brown 2003; Butchell 1996: 22; Dean 1999; Lemke 
2002: 55). Nonetheless, they have largely missed how individual social actors, as well as 
politico-economic institutions, actually engage in the process of making of and/or 
struggling with new norms and rationalities.  
In my project, I analyze how individual actors, who take advantage of an affect 
economy, imagine the implications of Japan’s neoliberal reformation, strategize their 
performances, and act out neoliberal values and ethics from their own positionality. Male 
hosts, who typically have minimal education and poor job prospects, for instance, 
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devalue Japan’s conventionally hegemonic salaryman model and idealize the hosting 
business for its flexible work style, result-oriented wage system, and opportunity for 
unhindered success. On the other hand, female clients fantasize romantic excitement as a 
means to realize a fashionable lifestyle, entrepreneurial self, and personal ‘freedom.’ 
Thus, both men’s and women’s narratives and practices are closely aligned with the 
neoliberal restructuring that has questioned Japan’s existing social model and structure. 
This has occurred at the same time that the government has promoted highly personalized 
service industries and emphasized entrepreneurship, competition, and personal ‘freedom’ 
as new ethics. Indeed, both individuals and politico-economic institutions similarly 
engage in and act out the process of neoliberal reformation. Neoliberalism is then a social 
ethos and practice that shapes (and is shaped by) discursive speech and bodily acts 
critical of the status quo and seeks alternatives for ‘freedom,’ that is, freedom from 
conventional norms and ethics, but not necessarily to transcendence.  
This practice is closely related to subjectivity formation because it is embedded in 
and derived from the frustrations, struggles, desires, and fantasies of the practitioners, 
who are socially situated in gendered, sexualized, and class-marked terms. The end game 
of their neoliberal practice —critique of the status quo for ‘freedom’— lies in self-
fashioning as desirable selves. As I will detail in later chapters, hosts, for example, 
denigrate salarymen and sex workers and differentiate themselves so as to identify 
themselves as self-motivated entrepreneurs, whereas female clients undermine their 
faceless mother figure symbolism and selflessly devoting wife stereotype so that they can 
self-narrate as individual and self-fulfilled women. As such, neoliberalism is not just 
about self-positioning in relation to existing social norms, practices, and identity 
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categories, but also about self-fashioning, carrying a feeling of desirability, achieving a 
sense of fulfillment, and a passion for ‘freedom.’ Action and affect is thus at the core of 
neoliberal practice, and neoliberal subjectivity formation is simultaneously the visceral 
and rational, the self and the other, and the personal and social that engenders through the 
practitioner’s speech and bodily acts and affective experiences.  
The duality of neoliberal practice—self-positioning and self-fashioning—is not 
limited to individual social actors. The Japanese government is no exception. The 
Koizumi administration fiercely problematized Japan’s conformist structure in 
bureaucracy, employment, and education and put ‘restructuring without mercy’ (seiiki 
naki kaikaku) into force in order to improve Japan’s global competitiveness. Here, the 
governmental neoliberal practice also aims at constructing alternative ethics, practices, 
and systems so as to create a desirable national identity in the global economy. Thus, 
discursive neoliberal practices that crisscross individual aspirations, national agendas, 
and global trends are not different kinds of practices; they rather have different degrees of 
effect due to their unequal social, political, and geographic postitionality. In this respect, 
Japan’s host club scene is a relevant lens to analyze and observe how the affect economy 
is taking shape in the era of neoliberal globalization. 
Japan’s host club scene provides a unique and complex picture of the neoliberal 
practices that gendered, sexualized, and class-marked individuals participate in and 
interact—ones that the nation-state and global economy similarly engage in. 
Functionally, it opens a window to observe and analyze: 1) How affect economy such as 
host club business is built upon postindustrial consumer culture and fueled by neoliberal 
reformation in Japan; 2) the social situation in which neoliberal practices have become 
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thinkable and practicable; and 3) how individual actors engage in neoliberal practices and 
why they perform and cultivate ambivalent identities.  
My ultimate goal lies in rethinking conventional academic practices that have 
largely overlooked affect as something bodily, subjective, and unobservable. In 
particular, academic criticism, which is an often language-centered and/or visual-oriented 
study of observable objects of social phenomena, I argue, has reinforced the Western 
modernist tradition of hierarchical binary systems. That is, bifurcating the mind/body, the 
rationality/irrationality, the objective/subjective, and the visual/other sensory organs, and 
valuing the former as soley reliable and legitimate sites for observation and scholarly 
writing. Even scholars who critically analyze modernity as a social mechanism tend to 
employ the conventional approaches to problematize and/or deconstruct it. Nonetheless, 
they also unintentionally reproduce the Western modernist practice of seeing, thinking, 
and writing. Thus, my study that aims to illustrate how individuals and institutions 
maneuver their ends through affect is not only about the affect economy per se, but it 
addresses the issue of modernity and academic criticism itself. 
 
Literature Review  
To further discuss the concepts and practices of the affect economy, I will review 
three bodies of literature on neoliberalism (genealogy of neoliberalism and neoliberal 
governmentality), the affect economy, and gender politics in Japan. By doing so, I will 
discuss three interrelated issues. The first, neoliberal situation, examines the question of 
what makes neoliberalism thinkable and practicable and suggests a conceptual and 
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theoretical issue at stake: neoliberalism cannot be discussed in lieu of socio-historically 
specific local contexts, i.e., existing social norms, actors, and their desires.  
The second issue is that of the methodology of studying neoliberal 
governmentality and affect economy. I argue that existing scholarship on neoliberalism 
tends to focus on how it is discursively operated as a whole based on language-centered 
analysis of economic doctrine, political campaigns, and cultural policy. Similarly, the 
study of affect economy has a tendency to use binary frames such as economics and 
emotions, exploitation and democracy, and instrumentality and affectivity. Instead of 
totalizing and bifurcating such framing, I propose the art of seduction —the deployment 
of suggestive bodily and speech acts to entice the other into acting for the seducer’s end, 
as well as the seducee’s— as a useful tool to analyze how neoliberal governance and the 
affect economy is put into action and what kinds of social effects the action causes.  
The third topic concerns neoliberal subjects who tend to regard themselves as 
self-autonomous but in truth are governed through regulated choices, guided conducts, 
and social norms, i.e., neoliberal governance. I intend to further the discussion—the 
neoliberal subject as the subjugated— by asking not whether they are docile so much as 
cleverly performing subjection as a guise for subversive enactments that collectively pry 
open the gates to social transformation.  
 
Genealogy of Neoliberalism  
 In an article titled “Notes on the Anthropology of Neoliberalism,” Lisa Hoffman 
et al. contend that while “ever more anthropological studies are concerned with 
neoliberalism, there have been few steps made toward an anthropology of neoliberalism” 
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in terms of a conceptual and methodological contribution as a discipline (2006: 9). In 
their critique, they raise three interrelated questions: 1) How can anthropologists write 
against the dominant conservative libertarian tradition that maintains liberalism-
neoliberalism patrimony? 2) How can we grapple with similar, yet not quite the same 
features of historical transformations and socioeconomic reforms often associated with 
neoliberalism? 3) What conceptual and methodological tools are appropriate and useful 
for an anthropology of neoliberalism? (Hoffman et al 2006: 10) 
In this section, I will elaborate on the notion of what I call “neoliberal situation” 
by borrowing Appadurai’s concept of the “commodity situation.” In his edited volume, 
Social Lives of Things (1986), Appadurai proposes to analyze socio-historical situations 
in which any ‘things’ become exchangeable for some other things and how the 
exchangeability becomes socially relevant (13). As discussed above, neoliberalism is not 
so much about the typology of economic doctrines that permeate and materialize 
everyday lives, but about the social situations and ethos in which existing social values 
and practices are maneuvered into certain neoliberal ethics such as entrepreneurship, 
result-oriented competition, and personal freedom and responsibility. In short, 
neoliberalism is a way of making new values and ethics thinkable and practicable, i.e., 
socially relevant, and the neoliberal situation is a social practice, context, and phase that 
enables it. In this way, neoliberalism is not a timelessly singular economic doctrine or 
imperialist device, but is situated in the tempo-spatial trajectory of the past, present, and 
future of both local and global contexts. In these contexts, values and telos are imagined, 
practiced, and articulated.  
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Challenging scholarship in anthropology and other social sciences concerning 
neoliberal globalization as U.S. imperialism, Occidentalism, and homogenization, recent 
work has treated neoliberalism as a social ethos that results from a complex cultural 
translation process arbitrated in socio-historically specific local contexts (e.g., Hoffmann 
2004; Ong 2006; Song 2006). This approach opens a new venue in which to examine 
neoliberal situation. However, studies on neoliberalism, as John Clarke points out, still 
tend to treat state policy and political campaigns as if “they translate immediately and 
unproblematically into practice” in local contexts (Clarke 2004: 44). I particularly argue 
that the existing scholarship largely overlooks individual experience and interpersonal 
negotiations. 
The concept of neoliberal situation directly speaks to the first two questions raised 
by Hoffman et al. Instead of projecting the hegemonic libertarian tradition or localizing 
socio-historical transformation, the analysis of neoliberal situation requires local 
sensibility, but allows us to examine crisscrossing tempo-spatial conjunctures that lie at 
the heart of neoliberalism.  
As such, one way an anthropology of neoliberalism can grapple with neoliberal 
globalization is by tracing the social situations and ethos that allow individuals and 
institutions to criticize the status quo and constitute their own ‘liberal’ identities in the 
multiple scaling of the local, national, transnational, regional, and global. From there, 
anthropologists can theorize the cultural logics and politics of the process and further 
discuss cultural specificity, human agency, and social transformation, among other 
potential issues and debates.  
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Neoliberal Governmentality 
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of neoliberal governmentality, yet focusing on how 
it is put into (inter)action, in this section I will discuss what I call “the art of seduction” as 
a conceptual and methodological tool. In so doing, I intend to highlight action itself, 
interpersonal relations, and non-linguistic centered analysis that Foucauldian power-
knowledge-governance overlooks.  
Foucault defines governmentality as ‘the conduct of conduct,’ meaning that ‘to 
conduct’ is to lead, direct, guide, or affect the conduct of some person(s) with some sort 
of calculation (Dean 1999: 10-11; Gordon 1991: 2). In this conduct multiple authorities 
and agencies employ a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, derived from 
desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, in order to seek to act upon oneself and 
another’s conduct for his/her own ends (Dean 1999: 11). Such conducts accompany a 
“diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects, and outcomes” (Ibid). This 
dynamic definition is useful for an anthropology of neoliberalism. Foucault, however, 
focuses mainly on the mechanisms and rationalities in the political domain, and 
overlooks the activities, actors, and interpersonal relations that involve some form of 
control or guidance (Foucault 1981: 226 in Lemke 2002: 54-55; Gordon 1991: 3). This is 
because he equates knowledge with practice by treating the power-knowledge-
governance as the process of “systematization and ‘rationalization’ of a pragmatics of 
guidance, ” that is, inscription onto the individual body (Lemke 2002: 54-55; also see 
Butler 1990: 129).  
Indeed, “practices don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality” (Foucault 
1991: 79 in Lemke 2002: 54-55). Nonetheless, practices don’t exist without the 
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practitioners. I propose the art of seduction as a conceptual and analytical tool in order to 
draw attention to the actors and their interpersonal conducts instead of presuming the 
individual and the body as the docile object of language-based political rationalities. The 
Art of Seduction, for instance, claims that seduction is a kind of strategic game in real 
life, where a seducer uses “pleasure as bait, playing on people’s emotions, stirring desire 
and confusion, inducing psychological surrender” (Greene 2001: xxi). While seduction is 
oftentimes associated with sexual temptation, the scheme —the use of allusive utterances 
and gestures to capitalize on or dally with a person’s affect so as to entice him/her into 
acting for one’s end— is utilized in a wide range of business, social, and political 
maneuvers, including but not limiting to advertising, marketing, and political campaigns. 
Individuals also take advantage of it for favorable turns and exemptions. Thus, seduction 
is not an inscription practice, but a ubiquitous strategic game that institutions and 
individuals participate in and by so doing (re)shape the power dynamics from their own 
standpoint.  
By no means do all individuals and institutions play the strategic games equally 
because of asymmetric distribution of socioeconomic and cultural resources. Here, 
Foucault’s notion of domination is useful: Domination is a particular type of stable and 
hierarchical power relationship that goes beyond the strategic games (Lemke 2002: 53). 
The hierarchy is shaped, however, not by different operational systems, but rather uneven 
degrees of maneuvering and extensions of its effect. Bruno Latour reinforces this point, 
stating, “the ‘macro-actor’ is not different in kind from the ‘micro-actor,’ but is merely 
one who has a longer and more reliable ‘chain of command’—that is to say, assembled 
into longer and more dispersed networks of persons, things and techniques” (Rose 1999: 
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5). From this perspective, seduction is, I argue, a conduct of conduct and a central locus 
of neoliberal governmentality, which requires social actors, whose capability of 
criticizing the status quo and acting for ‘freedom,’ have different ranges of maneuvering 
room and effect based on the size of institutions, as well as gender, sexuality, class, and 
other forms of social classification categories.  
The art of seduction converges different interests, desires, and beliefs through 
mutual seduction and interpersonal negotiations. It entails at least two parties to interact; 
otherwise it doesn’t work regardless of the seducer’s intention and rationality. In other 
words, the seducee has to be persuaded or enticed for continuous seduction. As such, the 
art of seduction is never a complete state, but an ongoing process that yields 
indeterminate and contingent consequences. It creates a discrepancy between rationality 
and action, the different ends of two parties, and teleology and effect, where reorientation 
of conduct and discursive subversion collectively pry open for social transformations. 
This is where anthropologists can focus on in order to critically examine and reframe the 
questions associated with neoliberalism.  
 
Affect Economy 
In order to discuss how seduction has become an aptitude and source of human 
capital for sexual, business, and social maneuvers in the affect economy, I will detail the 
intersection between postmodern consumer culture and neoliberal restructuring in terms 
of subjectivity formation. While affect —aesthetics, sensibilities, and emotions— has 
recently drawn attention as a tool to analyze postmodern consumer culture, late-capitalist 
forms of labor, and neoliberal subjectivity, existing scholarship on this topic tends to 
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separate production and consumption. I intend to debunk the artificial boundary that 
exists between production and consumption by demonstrating how the self and one’s 
labor for sale interweaves the binary and creates a dual sense of subjectivity, that is, 
being simultaneously the entrepreneurial subject and the sign object in the new 
millennium neoliberal capitalism.  By doing so, I aim to reexamine the western tradition 
of subjectivity—either autonomous or subjugated subjects— and explore the potential 
consequences of the dual sense of selfhood —the subject and object of millennium 
capitalism—in the interactive transmission of affect and negotiation.  
Incorporating sensibility into the Marxist analysis of the culture industry and 
consumerism, Wolfgang Haug theorizes commodity aesthetics as a form of manipulation 
of the masses. According to Haug, commodity aesthetics that consists of two kinds of 
beauty —appearance that appeals to the senses and sensuality that stimulates the 
onlooker’s desire to possess and the impulse to buy— has become more important than 
the commodity itself to sell (Haug 1986: xx). In other words, appearance and sensuality is 
the instrument of accumulating capital and “whoever controls the product’s appearance 
can control the fascinated public by appealing to them sensually” (Haug 1986: 17). This 
is because, Haug explains, capitalism is rooted in an illusionary world mold in which 
only the aesthetic objects but also human agency to make the object sensually appealing 
shapes a nuanced form of controlling power (Haug 1986: 47). Under this model, Haug 
reveals two important points: manipulation entails aesthetic sensibility and skills to 
appeal to an audience, and it is only effective when it meets the audience’s interests. 
Aligned with Haug’s view, Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004) have 
theorized immaterial labor that has become a central characteristic in the global economy 
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since the 1990s. Particularly in dominant postindustrial nations, the mode of production 
has shifted to less tangible forms of capitalist accumulation such as information, 
communication, and emotion. In this postindustrial economy, affective labor that 
produces and manipulates feelings, emotions, and intimate relationships in an 
information-intensive economy comes to embed economic values. While Hardt and Negri 
assert that the affective labor creates not only the emotionality but also the social life 
itself (2004: 108), their highly theoretical work does not take into account the actual 
social interactions and lives that the affective labor produces. Correspondingly, their 
theorization on the democratization aspects of the affect economy is less convincing and 
problematic.  
Notwithstanding these studies, empirical studies of immaterial or affective labor 
in the form of emotion work, care work, and sex work have been done. Drawing from a 
Marxist analysis of labor, for example, Arlie Hochschild explores the commercialization 
of human feeling in her book The Managed Heart (1983) and introduces the concept of 
emotional labor, differentiated from physical labor in the classic sense. On top of the 
alienation attendent with physical labor, Hochschild argues that emotional labor, which 
requires emotional management from the likes of service providers such as shop clerks, 
flight attendants, and social works, doubly alienates the laborer. While Hochschild’s 
work focuses on flight attendants who have one-time encounters with their service 
recipients, sex related workers oftentimes have repeat customers and the multiple 
encounters, complicating the relationship between service providers and recipients. For 
example, Denis Brennan’s What’s Love Got to Do with It? (2004) explores the 
relationship between Dominican female prostitutes and European male customers and 
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highlights the instrumentality of romance that the prostitutes perform for their economic 
livelihood. Although her detailed ethnographic study teases out the performative aspects 
of romance, her idea of performance is limited to its economic instrumentality and does 
little with performativity per se. Brennan merely reinscribes the dichotomy between 
performance and the reality, commercial and true romance, and economic and emotional 
motives without unmasking the social reality of gender, sexuality, and romance as 
performatively constituted through repetitive acts and signification practices.  
A service-based industry entailing mutual seduction such as found in the host club 
further complicates the seducer/seducee binary and blurs the above dichotomies. Such 
asymmetric, yet mutual interactions make a person simultaneously the subject and the 
object of the seductive process. This can be understood in the Foucauldian terms of 
subject and subjection, but I add a new dimension to the discussion by focusing on the 
performative or strategic subjection of individuals. As part of that effort I will shed light 
on the power of subjection in the affect economy by concentrating on neoliberal class 
struggle among male hosts and the gender politics of female clients. As I learned through 
direct observation, subjugation does not necessarily mean the docile reinforcement of the 
status quo; rather, it is a more complicated weave of individual self-practices—as both 
the subject and the subjugated, depending on positionality—that embodies the exercise of 
‘freedom’. These embodiments and enactments are dramatized every night in Japan’s 
host clubs. On a larger scale, seduction has the power to (re)shape the status quo, ethics, 
and dominant form of ideologies to an extent underappreciated by many anthropologists.    
 
Gender Politics in Japan  
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 Subtle embodiments and enactments are particularly important to study in regards 
to gender relationships in Japan, where organized women’s movements and overt social 
conflicts have been often avoided (Borovoy 2005; Kelsky 2001; Ogasawara 1998). Some 
anthropological studies have highlighted covert power negotiations between Japanese 
women and men and challenged stereotypical images of Japanese women as passive, 
submissive, and dependent. Studying the life cycle of Japanese women, for example, 
Takie Lebra (1984) has argued that Japanese men depend on their wives for housework, 
household finances, and their psychological well-being. Such dependence makes the wife 
and her work indispensable. Similarly, Iwao Sumiko (1993) asserts that men’s formal 
superiority is coupled with women’s informal dominance in the Japanese household. 
According to Iwao, women, who are marginalized in such fields of policymaking and 
business management, have less responsibility in the public sphere and more free time 
than their male counterparts who must spend long hours at work. While Japanese men, 
particularly middle-class salarymen, have been exalted in Japan’s mass-production based 
economy, Iwao asserts that they are “the ones to be pitied” today because of their 
dependency on Japanese women. Iwao states, “The Confucian ethic of the three 
obediences formerly binding women could be rewritten today as the three obediences for 
men: Obedience to mothers when young, companies when adult, and wives when retired” 
(1993: 7). While Lebra and Iwao’s claims put into question the stereotypical image of the 
subordinated Japanese woman, they take gender as an identity category into little account 
and neglect how such a category is socio-historically constituted and what it takes 
individuals to be a man and a woman. As a result, they unintentionally reproduce such 
 
 20 
dichotomies as men and women, formal and informal, and public and domestic, and 
naturalize gender attributes within a binary frame.  
 Yuko Ogasawara (1998) makes a similar claim but denaturalizes the taken-for-
granted differences attributed to gender by expanding the analysis of superior-subordinate 
gender relations from the household level to the workplace level. In the workplace, she 
claims that Japanese salaried men’s formal superiority relies on office ladies (OLs, or 
female office workers) and the presumption that a boss is not a boss without 
subordinates. This dialectic power dynamic is, Ogasawara argues, derived from neither 
biological sex differences nor behavioral patterns but constituted by company policies 
and social expectations that set separate career paths for men and women in Japan. Men, 
who are assigned more responsible work and evaluated by their performance, strive to 
perform well for their career success, whereas women, who are merely expected to 
support their male colleagues with secretarial work and quit their jobs upon marriage, 
care less about their occupational success (Ogasawara 1998: 164). As a result, salaried 
men must cultivate serious attitudes, rational judgment, and self-control, while women, 
who usually do not do so, look irresponsible, irrational, and careless. Instead of taking 
gender difference at face value, Ogasawara thus reveals that gender is a system, where 
men and women are subject to different sociocultural constraints that condition their 
existence, whereupon they act differently (Ibid: 164). 
Based on discussions of resistance by James Scott and Paul Willis, Ogasawara 
asserts that Japanese OLs do not organize social or labor movements but rather 
“collectively” pressure men as a group without directly confronting them. For example, 
they deploy methods of resistance such as circulating negative rumors, uncooperative 
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attitudes, and feigned ignorance in order to keep the meaning of their acts ambiguous and 
the actors anonymous but effectively voicing their defiance (Ogasawara 1998: 157). The 
uncooperative attitudes of OLs, she contends, disturb their male colleague’s performance 
and promotion and therefore cause men to appreciate their work and listen to their subtle 
voices. This covert power negotiation is, however, double-edged. Ogasawara points out 
that such forms of resistance naturalizes irrational and childish behavior ascribed to be 
peculiar to females and legitimizes asymmetrical gender roles.  
In his analysis, Ogasawara carefully unfolds how gender traits and stratification 
are systematically determined by the discriminatory Japanese corporate scheme. 
Nonetheless, her analytical scope is limited to gender dynamics within the foreclosed 
corporate space. Because of that, her argument leans toward a functionalist orientation, 
an integrated whole, i.e., the corporate system, where discriminatory practices, gender 
stratification, and resistance harmoniously function together and sustain the system in a 
state of equilibrium. In addition, while Ogasawa’s account demonstrates how the gender 
system functions based on observable behaviors and practices, it pays scant attention to 
individual desire and the processes that men and women come to realize gender norms 
and corporate ideology.  
 The work of Anne Allison (1994), on the other hand, bridges this gap and 
illustrates how Japanese corporate practices and ideology shape salaried men’s desire and 
behavioral patterns. Examining company-paid nighttime entertainment at hostess clubs, 
where young, attractive hostesses help their male clients relax and assure their masculine 
identity, Allison argues that such entertainment is institutionalized in the service of 
channeling masculine energy into work and the construction of corporate masculinity. 
 
 22 
Challenging the static view of gender differences and attributions, Allison demonstrates 
how men’s sexual desires and work ethics are managed by the corporate ideology and 
work ethic that underscores hard work as a Japanese work style and the means for self-
fulfillment and economic success. Nonetheless, Allison highlights how Japan’s nightlife 
activities are normalized as a custom rather than industrial policy; as a result, it becomes 
harder to recognize and resist the actual corporate ideology. Thus, Allison’s work 
uncovers the process whereby masculinity, particularly hegemonic corporate masculinity 
in Japan, symbolically and ritualistically comes into being through male-bonding and 
socialization practices.  
Despite her efforts to challenge the conventional functionalist orientation, her top-
down presumption that ideology pervades desires, practices, and sociality ensnares her 
argument in what she tries to challenge. On group membership she states, “The rituals 
and routines indulged in by various groups in Japan are not … functional equivalents. 
They all reflect and encourage group attachment, but there are variations in how they do 
so, with what constitution of ‘group,’ and with what implications for the individual 
members within those groups” (Ibid: 156 emphasis added). Although Allison 
acknowledges individual and group variations in desires and social practices and 
complicates the functionalist claim on society as an integrated whole, her theorization of 
corporate masculinity based on Lacanian psychoanalysis of subjectivity and Marxist 
notions of fetishism remains in the legacy of functionalism. She argues that ideology 
“make[s] a subject not feel subjected” and in turn subsumes human agency and the 
potentially transformative force underneath the hegemonic ideology (Ibid: 201). Thus, 
according to Allison, Japan’s corporate system results in sustaining harmony.  
 
 23 
In other words, Allison’s theorization of corporate masculinity and subjectivity 
relegates subjects as a merely fictional construct of the dominant ideology, and neglects 
individual rearticulation of the ideology, dysfunctional aspects of social norms, and 
transnational flows of images, commodities, and capital beyond the cultural hegemony 
within Japan.   
 Combining gender, race, and the transnational flow of images, commodities, and 
capital, Karen Kelsky (2001) addresses the transgressive and transformative potential of 
Japanese women’s internationalist narratives, particularly the narratives that young, 
educated, and ambitious Japanese women romanticize and yearn for in the West. More 
often than not, these are embodied by white males, who are held up as a modern, 
cosmopolitan, and liberal icons in comparison to Japan, or Japanese men, who are viewed 
negatively as traditional, nationalistic, and patriarchal symbols. Aligning existing 
scholarship on Japanese women, Kelsky stresses that their lack of formal superiority and 
responsibility affords Japanese women the flexibility and mobility to go abroad and 
pursue their romantic and career pursuits. Such nonconformist desires and aspirations 
threaten Japan’s male-centered society and potentially transform it (Kelsky 2001: 4). 
Focusing on the trope that internationalist women wittily deploy cultural signifiers of the 
West and the East, in particular Japan, to reverse and reject gender stratification in Japan, 
Kelsky thus argues that they engage in projects of resistance (Ibid).  
Nonetheless, Kelsky warns that internationalist women’s resistance, which works 
within the logic of fetishism in late-capitalist Japan, is also “a deeply compromised one 
politically” (Kelsky 2001: 4). She writes, “[D]esiring ‘liberation’ and believing they lack 
it, they have fetishized the West … to fill the lack. But the referent of a fetish is always 
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illusory and this fetishization forecloses real political engagement” (Ibid: 222 emphasis 
added). Kelsky’s seemingly discrepant claim of internationalist women’s narratives —a 
form of resistance but nonpolitical engagement — probably roots in her attempt to avoid 
the functionalist legacy, yet risks being caught by liberal identity politics, that is, 
organized movements based on an identity groups, in this case women, who have clear 
rationalizations and intended goals. Kelsky writes, “the fantasy West has come to 
proliferate as a decontextualized mediated image, an empty signifier that is infinitely 
manipulatable but ultimately politically empty as a feminist emancipatory mechanism. 
Internationalist desires derived from its fantasy image give birth to no social movement ” 
(Ibid: 224 emphasis added).  
Kelsky eloquently challenges the stereotypical image of Japan as a closed society 
and Japanese women as conformists by showing how individual women deploy 
internationalist narratives to potentially subvert hegemonic Japanese patriarchy. 
However, she also spoils non-conformist and subversive narratives and practices as a 
private activity and therefore merely non-political manipulation of empty signifiers. In 
spite of her efforts to complicate the picture of Japanese society and women with some 
rebellious aspects and their effect, she unintentionally reinforces the conventional 
private/public, individual/social, and fiction/reality binary. Acknowledging 
anthropologist Mariko Tamanoi, who contests that “Japanese must be looked for not in 
Western-style political/legal ‘stimulant[s] to profound social change’ but in individual 
women’s ‘everyday social practices’,” Kelsky finally turns to the “unwilled” effects of 
Japanese women’s internationalist narratives and practices in her conclusion (Tamanoi 
1990: 26-27 in Kelsky 2001: 224). However, she never fully develops the political 
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implication of the “unwilled” effect nor does she thoroughly question the “woman” as a 
uniform identity category in order to argue for organized feminist movements.  
Contrary to Kelsky’s approach to popular culture, Jennifer Robertson (1998) 
stresses that popular culture can be a political site of change where an ambivalent subtext 
is created, fantasized, and shared, in what she calls a “politics of ambivalence.” In her 
analysis of female actors playing “male” gender roles in Japan’s all female revue, 
Takarazuka, she argues that the female cross-dressing body embodies androgynous 
bodily traits of the “masculine” and the “feminine” and potentially destabilizes the 
essentialized sex differences and fixity in femininity and masculinity (Robertson 1998: 
87). Thus, Robertson questions normative sex, gender, and sexuality coordinates, and 
interprets sex as the physical, gender as socio-historical conventions, and sexuality as a 
domain of desire and erotic pleasure, as well as the hegemonic construction of 
reproductive heterosexuality (Ibid: 17). In so doing, she highlights the politics of 
ambivalence as a means to effectively dissociate gender from sex and raise awareness of 
the arbitrariness of the feminine and masculine conventions and its performative 
construct. “The key to liberation,” Robertson asserts, “involves not a change of sex but a 
new gender identity, and by extension, a transformation in gender ideology” (Ibid: 17; 
87). As such, what is political here is not about a wholesale subversion or transcendence 
of the sex and gender system, but how to disturb the pervasively fixed coupling of the 
female body with their assigned gender roles and identity within Japan’s marriage and 
family system.  
The politics of ambivalence is, according to Robertson, not only the means to 
destabilize the dominant text of opposing binaries in sex, gender, and heterosexuality but 
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also a disguise to avoid social surveillance. Robertson demonstrates how non-normative 
Japanese women, who fantasize same-sax love, strategically deploy androgyny to 
“conveniently circumvent the issue of erotic desire and parried allegations of ‘abnormal’ 
sexuality” (Ibid: 71). Robertson pays close attention to subtext that superficially aligns 
with the ideological text of binary heterosexual convention, yet actually diverges from it 
and creates a tension that becomes a transformative force. Thus, she intends to move 
beyond the either/or dichotomy (e.g., masculinity or femininity, text or subtext, public or 
private, and so on) to the both/and ambivalence (e.g., androgyny, bricolage of multiple 
texts, and body politics), where messiness, inconsistency, and contradiction impact on 
nonlinear and non-progressive historical transformations.  
Robertson also incorporates the body into her textual analysis and examines how 
individuals create bodies capable of being read or understood in more than one way. Her 
analysis, however, largely reduces the body to a text, i.e., a two-dimensional matter as 
she cites Butler’s work on signification practices and states that androgyny refers to a 
“surface politics of the body” (Butler 1990: 136 in Robertson 1998: 47). For both Butler 
and Robertson, what matters is the subversive possibility of “gender markers — clothes, 
cosmetics, gestures, speech patterns, and so on — in a way that both challenges the 
stability of a sex-gender system premised on a male (masculine)/female (femininity) 
dichotomy and also retains the components of that dichotomy” (Ibid: 47-48). In short, 
their notion of body politics centers on subversive signification practices and the creation 
of counter texts; nonetheless, it diminishes the complexity and dynamism of bodily acts 
and interaction, which is by no means limited to the surface visibility, to the two-
dimensional still picture-like text (see Massumi 2002: 3-4). Thus, the surface politics of 
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the body overlooks how gender signification and identity is imbued with constantly 
shifting subjectivity formation, day-to-day interactions, and transmission of affects that 
are always in motion.  
Dorinne Kondo (1990) challenges this cultural matrix that subtracts motion from 
everyday experience of subjectivities and takes into consideration how moving, acting, 
speaking, etc., embodies multiple selves. For example, she illustrates how an artisan at a 
small confection store in Tokyo displays his masculine narratives and performance 
through his refined craftsmanship in front of his feminine audience, who are part-time 
workers that pay respect. At the same time, his masculine identity is undermined in 
Japan’s economic transformation toward ever-larger scale corporate businesses, which 
guarantee their employees stable wages and welfare security. As such, the artisan’s self-
identity is not fixed but determined in a relational context where subjectivity positions 
continually are shifting. (Ibid: 46). Kondo argues that the self is neither coherent nor 
bounded, but crafted multiply in specific social settings and contexts. She in turn 
problematizes the western linguistic and historical convention that assumes the individual 
as the coherently bounded and autonomous self, and deessentializes the identity category 
such as the Japanese, the woman, and the individual self. 
Kondo challenges not only the western tradition of unified identity categories but 
also the notion of individualism and the transcendental model of resistance, which is built 
upon dualism such as self and society, personal and political, and freedom and repression. 
Unlike Kelsky and Robertson’s textual analysis of narratives and the body surface, which 
complicates the coupling process but remains tied to the binary framework, Kondo 
criticizes the binarism itself that roots in the legacy of the Cartesian mind/body sprit and 
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Sossure’s one-to-one signifier/signified coupling. She argues that the binarism forecloses 
open-ended possibilities for play, subversion, and change (Kondo 1990: 224-225). As the 
case of the artisan’s multiple subjectivities exemplifies, there is no utopian space of 
resistance to transcend the constantly shifting socio-historical contexts even though 
selves strategically deploy signifiers. Thus, Kondo proposes to reconceptualize the self 
and reconsider the nature of power and resistance rather than simply comply with the 
prevailing western model of the subject, resistance, and liberal politics (Ibid: 307). 
Resistance is not mere reproduction of social relations within a closed system as 
Ogasawara and Wills theorize (Ogasawara 1998; Willis 1977). It is not an illusionary 
private activity, either (Kelsky 2001). It, as Kondo stresses, grounded in and derived from 
the specific nexus of power and meaning (Ibid: 301).  
Kondo’s critical accounts on multiple selfhood also reveals that scholars are not 
free either from shifting theoretical paradigms in academia and historical convention in 
the west. Along with the so-called “linguistic turn,” the functionalist orientation — the 
symbolic and ritualistic representation of the integrated whole — has yielded its path to 
the postmodern and poststructuralist paradigm — multiple truths and discursive 
construction of identity categories including the self, gender, and society. To which 
Kondo alerts scholars who are still vested in the western conceptual convention of the 
unified subject, binary opposites, and transcendental resistance. Which is not to say that 
Kondo’s own ethnography, which is situated at a particular historical moment and 
cultural context, is exempt from historical transformation. As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter 2, selves are no longer determined by context, as Kondo has argued, but rather 
expected to produce and manipulate the context itself in today’s Japan, where the 
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neoliberalism of individual creativity, entrepreneurship, and freedom is promoted. Such 
selves —what I call “affective selves”— are not merely multiple selves but also creative 
selves who produce affective settings and deploy the art of seduction to attain what they 
want and assure their self-importance, as desirable neoliberal subjects.  
The affective selves are imbued with Japan’s neoliberal situation and new notion 
of subjectivity within a globalizing affect economy—the economy that capitalizes on 
affect to entice individuals into acting for both their own and various institutional or 
collective ends. In the following section, I will review the literature on the affect 
economy and situate my project.    
By illustrating commodified romance in Tokyo host clubs, in the following 
section I will demonstrate how neoliberal situation, the art of seduction, and subjectivity 
formation in the affect economy has emerged in contemporary Japan. By doing so, I will 
show how the host club scene manifests and magnifies socio-historical transformation in 
commodity situation, lifestyles and work styles, and subjectivity formation.  
 
Of Japan’s Host Club 
In the teeming center of Tokyo lies the Kabuki-chō red-light district, the largest in 
Asia. The majority of Japan’s host clubs (called hosuto kurabu in Japanese) are located 
here. In lavishly decorated spaces, female customers—housewives, office ladies, 
hostesses, and sex workers—pursue a fantasy of “freedom” and romance. Many simply 
want escape from the constraints and stress in their day-to-day lives; others seek 
intimacy, including sexual encounters. Their young male hosts (who typically have a 
limited education and come from lower class backgrounds) are motivated to “sell” 
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romance, love, and sex for more tangible returns—money. Both hosts and their clients 
mutually seduce one another and in the process foster a commodified form of romance 
whereby they simultaneously attempt to satisfy their fantasies and desires and cultivate 
their desirable selves: occupationally successful men and sexually attractive women.  
Not long ago, host clubs were practically unheard of in Japan, and far less known 
about than hostess clubs and geisha entertainment establishments (Allison 1994). In the 
last decade, however, concentrated media exposure has cleared much of the mystery that 
once surrounded the host club, which has its origins in the mid-1960s. It was during this 
robust economic period in Japan that the first host club opened as a dance hall close by 
the Tokyo Station. Mostly upper-class matrons and wealthy widows stopped by and 
enjoyed themselves on the way back home from shopping at department stores. The male 
dancers in the club called were called “hosts.” Over their comparatively long history, the 
host club has been a highly exclusive establishment and has remained largely unknown to 
the Japanese public until recently.1 This was partially because women secretly visited the 
club to avoid ruining their family and social reputations, as associating with hosts was 
viewed as disrespectful or promiscuous behavior. At the time, hosts were called “otoko 
mekake” (male mistress or “lover”) and socially stigmatized as gigolos –men who “sell” 
themselves to women for a living.  
As a result of news reports and other media attention in the last decade, however, 
the Japanese public has become intimately familiar with the host club enterprise. A 
plethora of TV dramas, hidden camera exposés, magazine articles, and comic book 
                                                
1 While there are a few establishments where cross-dressed female hosts entertain, I focus 
exclusively on the recent development of josei senyō hosuto kurabu (host clubs for 
women only) since the number of such clubs is rapidly increasing and receiving 
sensational treatment in the media. 
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serials have exposed the inner workings of the business and highlighted the excesses of 
Japanese women, who are typically represented as wantonly spending thousands of 
dollars on bottles of champagne and other items, often making their lucky hosts 
millionaires. Indeed, many hosts themselves today enjoy household name recognition and 
a few are genuine celebrities in Japan. For example, Reiji, a former host and now a host 
club owner in Roppongi, Tokyo’s famous upscale neighborhood, has been featured in 
Forbes magazine and appears regularly on Japanese TV variety shows as a love counselor 
and commentator. (Like Madonna, he is known throughout Japan by his first name.)  
In tandem with the increased media attention, the hosting business has flourished 
in the last decade despite Japan’s lackluster economy. While mostly found in big cities 
like Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, recently host clubs have sprung up all over Japan, with 
an estimated 200 clubs and over 5,000 hosts plying an increasingly lucrative trade within 
Tokyo’s Kabuki-chō entertainment district alone.2 Why did this little-known subculture 
suddenly emerge so prominently? While the host club phenomenon is sometimes viewed 
as just another example of Japan’s fad-driven, trendy culture, I maintain that it manifests 
and magnifies the convergent gender, sexual, and class coordinates of subjectivity 
formation at the nexus of postmodern consumer culture and neoliberal restructuring. 
Starting in the 1980s, during the period of Japan’s so-called bubble economy, 
significant numbers of single women were hired in newly developing financial, service, 
and leisure industries. With their newfound disposable incomes, Japanese women have, 
over the last two decades, greatly diversified their lifestyles and pursued greater self-
                                                
2 Accurate official numbers are not available. Unofficial estimates suggest that the 
number of host clubs in Kabuki-chō is 200, employing 5,000 hosts; figures based on 
Nakatani (2001: 98), Sakai (2001: 151), as well as information obtained via interviews. 
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fulfillment, including romantic and sexual satisfaction (Kelsky 2001; Ogura 2003; Sakai 
2003; Ueno 2004). They have increasingly avoided the confines of Japan’s marriage and 
family system for jibun no jinsei, “a life of one’s own.” Such attitudes are manifested in 
the recent trends toward late marriage, declining birthrates, and higher divorce rates in 
Japan.3 This trend is significant in comparison to the social norms applied to women of 
previous generations, whose life values and self-worthiness were and are often 
inseparable from their expected roles as mothers and caregivers in (extended) families 
(Borovoy 2005; Long 1995). Along this line, their sexuality was restricted to conjugal 
(and reproductive) sex, and women who engaged in extramarital affairs or “sex work,” 
were denigrated as either “promiscuous” or “commercial” women (Allison 1994).  
Naturally, the Japanese media has picked up on and promoted the changing 
attitudes of today’s Japanese women. In the realm of advertising, the individual rather 
than the nuclear family has become the iconic unit of consumption and heterosexual 
romance, rather than marriage per se, is promoted as an ideal tool for expressing 
womanhood. This shift in emphasis occurred in the early 1990s, coinciding with Japan’s 
so-called ren’ai būmu (romance boom). The ren’ai būmu relentlessly promotes romance 
as a means of beautifying everyday life and cultivating aisareru (“desirable” and/or 
“lovable”) women through self-expression involving fashion, hairstyle, body care, 
communication skill, and the overall presentation of the self. A book genre called ren’ai 
                                                
3 One of the ways that women attempt to avoid the system is postponing or avoiding 
marriage and having fewer children. The average age of first marriage, for example, rose 
from 24.4 in 1960 to 27.4 in 2003 (National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research). Meanwhile, the fertility rate dropped from 2.16 in 1971 to 1.29 children per 
couple in 2003, a record low.   
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ron (discussion on romance) and women’s fashion magazines have continued to fuel the 
boom.  
Latent in this discourse, moreover, is the incitement to married women to pursue 
the same goals in order to maintain or recuperate their youth, beauty, and feminine 
attractiveness, even when they exceed the spousal relationship. Married women are to 
seek romance too —and to seek it outside marriage if their husbands cannot oblige.  
In this context, where Japanese women’s changing attitudes have coincided with 
the romance boom, as I argue in Chapter 2, heterosexual romance has become a 
technology to lure both single and married women to pursue new ways of fashioning 
selves and lifestyles. Aesthetic salons, self-help seminars, fortune telling, Interntet match 
making, erotic novels, female-oriented pornography and other market niches have all 
expanded to satisfy this quest women have for discovering their ideal selves through 
romance. The host club is one such niche. Thus, as Wolfgang Haug has argued, the 
capitalist market appeals to the romantic and sexual sensuality of aesthetics, well-being, 
and excitement in order to sell products, image, and information, i.e., the commodity 
aesthetics. In this respect, romance is not a sacred private matter, but it is commodifiable. 
As I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, however, female consumers are not merely 
passive recipients of consumer commodities and commodified sensuous experience. 
Through consumption, they manifest their criticisms against the social constraints such as 
Japan’s marriage and family system and distance themselves from the other women who 
are caught in the status quo. They also actively enact for ‘freedom’ by performing and 
cultivating their desirable selves. Thus, they engage in neoliberalism. As such, the host 
club space is situated simultaneously in the market-driven consumer culture and 
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neoliberal practices. It is more than just skin deep: the host club, I argue, is deeply woven 
into the fabric of Japan’s socioeconomic transformation, including neoliberal 
restructuring and class formation.  
The prolonged economic stagnation that followed the bursting of Japan’s bubble 
economy in the early 1990s forced the former Koizumi administration to carry out major 
socio-economic restructuring in order to safeguard the nation’s global competitiveness 
(Allison 2006; Yoda 2000). The reformation in turn fractured the lifetime employment 
and seniority system, which had long protected the salaried man in mass-manufacturing 
based core industries in Japan’s postwar economy. Instead, newly created business fields 
such as information technology, financial investment, and the so-called service industry 
have become heavily promoted by government policies, and entrepreneurial creativity, 
self-motivation, and results-oriented competition have been increasingly emphasized. 
Such a highly competitive environment has yielded an emerging class-consciousness, 
popularly expressed in such terms as “kachi/make gumi” (the winners’/losers’ groups) 
and “serebu” (the celebrity-like or nouveau riche), largely overwriting Japan’s 
predominant middle-class consciousness known as “chūryu ishiki” (Kelly 2002; Sato 
2000; Yamada 2004).  
The content of the emerging class-consciousness is, however, gendered. For 
example, a popular term, make inu, translated directly as “loser dog,” has recently 
emerged in Japan to describe women over 30 who have yet to be married but still 
stubbornly cling to office jobs with no future for promotion. The implication is that no 
matter how successful these women may be in their professional careers, because they 
have miserably failed to achieve their most important “mission” as women—being 
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desired and “chosen” by men to marry and procreate—they will always be a loser in 
Japan (Sakai 2003). Thus, Japanese men are largely classified based on their occupational 
success, whereas Japanese women are evaluated by their desirability. This social 
valuation system reinforces romance as a way to attest to women’s desirability and also 
to yield business opportunities.  
Amidst this socioeconomic restructuring, the host club has attracted not only 
Japanese women but also increasing numbers of young, working-class men who have 
little education and poor job prospects, and middle-class men who do not fit into Japan’s 
corporate system. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, hosts, much like their female 
clients, actively engage in neoliberal criticisms in pursuit of ‘freedom’ via host clubbing. 
They criticize both the conventionally hegemonic salarymen and the stigmatized “male 
mistress” so as to justify and perform and construct themselves as desirable 
entrepreneurial male citizens under the terms of Japan’s neoliberal reformation. They also 
fuel Japan’s postindustrial consumer culture by commodifying themselves and their 
affective labor. Hosts work on their appearance and attempt to acquire and polish their 
skills and sensibilities for seduction in order to enhance their seductive power, i.e., 
human capital, as the vehicle to accumulate money and social recognition as successful 
entrepreneurs. Although Haug separates the aesthetic product and its producer, the host is 
simultaneously the commodity itself as well as the producer/salesman. Hosts often 
describe themselves as such when they say, “Hosuto wa jibun ga shohin” (For the host, 
the self is the commodity). 
Thus, the host club is both a site and an element that consists of Japan’s affect 
economy and is fueled by dint of the market-driven consumer culture and neoliberalism. 
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By itself, the neoliberal situation in Japan has not been solely determined by U.S. 
imperialism or Occidentalism, but embedded in the socio-historical trajectory of 
changing attitudes of Japanese women, expansion of new market niches, and the deep 
funk of the Japanese-style corporate system. At this conjuncture, both male hosts and 
female clients engage in the art of seduction at the level of interpersonal relations 
involving economic transaction, as well as of neoliberal governance. In the frame of 
neoliberal governmentality, they become the entrepreneurs of themselves who cultivate 
their desirable selves and accumulate their human capital. Nonetheless, their self-
entrepreneurship underscores a gendered and class-marked social valuation system. 
 
Sites, Methodology, and Self-Reflection 
I conducted field research in Tokyo between 2003 and 2005 at several host clubs 
over the course of sixteen months. I employed participant observation, in-depth 
interviews with hosts and their clients, and representation and textual analysis of Japan’s 
romance boom and host club development in the mass media, e.g., TV programs, popular 
books, magazines, and newspaper articles. I also conducted archival research at the 
National Diet Library of Japan in order to examine how ideal femininity, gender 
relationships, and women’s self-identity have historically transformed in relation to 
Japan’s socioeconomic transformation from an industrial to the postindustrial society. I 
focused on a women’s fashion magazine, an.an, which has been popular and influential 
since its first publication in 1970. I examined back issues and analyzed articles on 
idealized womanhood and selfhood, women’s lifestyles, and romantic relationships.   
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For my doctoral research, I received the dissertation fellowship grant from the 
Japan Foundation. The grant covered most of my living expenses in Tokyo. It, however, 
wasn’t enough to fund my visits to the host clubs as a client. For my participant 
observation as a female client at host clubs, I took advantage of first timer’s special deals. 
Most host clubs have a special rate for the first-time visitors. Usually, it is between 5000-
10,000 yen (50-100 US dollars) for two hours or so. It covers the table charge, a bottle of 
shōchū wheat liquor, and bottles of water. A variety of hosts will introduce themselves to 
new potential clients, setting the stage for possible repeat visits. I began my research by 
visiting five host clubs for one time in Kabuki-chō and two clubs in a Tokyo’s upscale 
neighborhood, Roppongi, I tried to observe similarities and differences in atmosphere, 
price range, and the type of clientele and hosts.  
I eventually settled on and conducted most of my ethnographic research at one 
club, Fantasy (not real name), located in Kabuki-chō. It is one of the largest and best-
known host clubs in Japan, fed largely through free advertising from TV and radio 
broadcasting and magazine and newspaper articles on the club and the hosts working 
there. Club Fantasy is also one of the most prestigious host clubs in Japan. The club 
owner, who used to be a so-called “number one” host in back 1960s, opened his own club 
in the early 1970s. Since then the owner has opened two more host clubs in Kabuki-chō. 
Because of its long history, business success, and name value, Fantasy enjoys a 
reverential status in the host club marketplace. When hosts go to other bars and host clubs 
in Kabuki-chō and introduce themselves as hosts at Fantasy, they usually elicit respectful 
greetings. When a woman patronizes other host clubs and tells a host working there that 
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she visits club Fantasy as well, the host often remarks, “Kaku ga chigau” (The club is in 
a class by itself).  
I was a patron at Fantasy every night for a total of four months (July 2003 and 
between October and December 2004) except for nights when the club was too busy and 
the manager asked me not come.4 Fantasy’s  niche lies in the diverse ages and 
backgrounds of its hosts and customers compared to newly established host clubs. The 
club is also one of a few which has two shifts: an earlier “business-hour” shift between 
7:30 p.m. and 1 a.m. and the customary “regular” hours between 1 a.m. and dawn. The 
majority of hosts in Fantasy who work the earlier hours are typically in the early 20s to 
mid-30s age range, but also include men in their 60s who have been employed in the 
hosting business most of their life. They serve female customers such as company 
owners, landlords, wealthy widows, upper-middle class housewives, office workers, 
nurses, and so on, most of whom are in their late 20s to early 40s but also include women 
in their 60s. In contrast, hosts who work the later hours are mainly in their 20s, serving 
predominantly young hostesses and sex workers. Despite the differences in their 
occupations, ages, and marital status, female clients enjoy flirting with their male hosts.  
I was only permitted to conduct my research during the early hours. This is 
because, as I will describe later, Japan’s Entertainment and Amusement Law 
(Fūzokueigyō Torishimari Hō) bans business transactions after 1 a.m. that involve 
“intimate” services and physical proximity to host club businesses in order to “maintain a 
healthy living environment.” In the club, I was allowed to stay in the corner, where hosts 
                                                
4 I also conducted a one-month interview research at a host club in a Tokyo’s upscale 
neighborhood, Roppongi, to make an area comparison to Kabuki-chō, known as its 
sleaziness. 
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rested and waited for their clients for the night’s visits. I usually went to the club around 
6:30 p.m., when the lower ranking hosts started work and stayed on until 1 a.m. I 
interviewed voluntary interviewees, mostly one-on-one and occasionally in semi-formed 
group conversation. As hosts became more comfortable with me, they began to invite me 
to their table and “after hour activities.” At the table, I was permitted to interview their 
clients and also observe their interactions. Some hosts and their clients also invited me to 
restaurants, karaoke bars, and other host clubs after normal business hours. This allowed 
me to observe their interactions more closely. In so doing, I became a “friend” and an 
“interlocutor” of some female clients. I met these women alone and had in-depth 
interviews outside the host club. Through my ethnographic research I was able to observe 
inside and outside the host club setting and also to hear stories from both hosts and their 
clients that are oftentimes discrepant.  
In my interviews with hosts, I mainly asked them about their socioeconomic 
backgrounds, motivations to become hosts, difficulties they had encountered, life goals, 
business techniques, and relationships with their clients. In particular, I asked them to 
describe their methods for seducing women into having romantic relationships and 
spending money on them. In interviews with the female clients, I asked questions about 
marital and occupational background, their reasons for visiting the host club, the meaning 
of hostclubbing for them, and their relationships with their hosts. I also inquired how they 
“fall for” their hosts (or hostclubbing) and what it meant to spend money at the host club 
for them. Interviewing hosts and their clients, as well as sometimes their helper hosts, I 
tried to patch together their narratives in order to ascertain how those with different 
interests and goals communicate and negotiate with one another to optimize individual 
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fulfillment. In my observations, I carefully studied hosts’ stylized speech and body acts 
such as seductive movements, body touching, and suggestive word usage in order to 
understand how they dramatize the scene and their clients’ reactions to it. In short, 
throughout my interview and participant observation research, I tried to figure out the 
ways in which social actors such as hosts and their clients carry on the art of seduction, 
and the effects of their cooperative interactions. 
My positionality as a Japanese woman researcher who had been studying in the 
United States simultaneously put me in the position of being a cultural insider and 
outsider, and also a seducer and seducee. Although I had studied feminist scholarship and 
queer theory and become critical about patriarchal heterosexual norms, as a female 
researcher I unintentionally reproduced gender roles such as feminine-audience-of-
masculine-display and narratives, female-dependence-upon-paternalistic-support, and a 
potential-female-client-of-the-host-club. When I transcribed taped interviews, I realized 
that I often giggled and my tone of voice tended to be high. While interviewing, I 
intended to create a relaxed, comfortable environment for the interviewees so as to 
enhance productive research. I admit, however, that the “comfortable environment” was 
inevitably gendered and that my intentions and efforts reinforced socially expected 
gender characteristics of Japanese women. My effort to produce a feeling of ease, for 
instance, was an ‘affective labor’ that I had tried to isolate for study. I did not provide the 
affective labor in exchange for money, however, only for purpose of research 
cooperation. But the way that hosts cooperated was also gendered, too. Despite the fact 
that I was older than some of the hosts I interviewed, I sensed their paternalistic manner 
toward me in general. Some hosts verbalized this, saying “You are such a brave girl to 
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come to this kind of place alone and interview us!” and “You don’t look someone 
familiar to night work. Ask me anything.” Indeed, not only my gender but also my 
“student” status and lack of perceived knowledge and experience in the domain of night 
work unintentionally allow hosts to infantilize me and be paternalistic. 
Nevertheless, subordinated positionality does not mean total surrender to the 
other, i.e., the host. Being a woman showing an interest in the host club scene also made 
me a potential customer. As I will discuss further in Chapter 3, most female clients I 
interviewed had only a general interest in the host club and did not expect to become 
repeater customers or spend great sums of money on their hosts. They highlighted their 
exceptionalism and typically described a friend or acquaintance taking them to the club 
and unexpectedly “falling for” a host. In the same manner, for the hosts, who are familiar 
with women’s narratives, I could be viewed as another case of such exceptionalism. A 
couple hosts asked me what my intention was to conduct research at the host club; they 
told me that there were clients who identified themselves as researchers, journalists, and 
reporters. This potentiality, I suspect, put me in the position of seducer. In this way, my 
unintentional seducer position, along with my intentional affective labor, was complicit 
with the art of seduction. Thus, I was always already imbricated with the affect economy. 
This is a point that I wish to highlight: There is a fluidity and indeterminacy to the art of 
seduction in the affect economy in which social actors are always already situated, 
positioned, and guided beside their agentive, intentional, and strategic acts.  
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Organization of Dissertation 
My dissertation consists of six chapters: Chapter 1, “Introduction,” situates the 
host club phenomenon at the juncture of Japan’s postindustrial consumer culture and 
neoliberal globalization. The Introduction lays out the theoretical stakes, contextualizing 
the project in what I call the ‘affect economy.’ 
Chapter 2, “The Triumph of Romance: Affective Self and the Art of Seduction,” 
traces the historical transformation of socioeconomic change, subjectivity formation, and 
gender reconfiguration in post-industrial Japanese society since the 1970s. Analyzing a 
women’s fashion magazine, I demonstrate how the postmodern condition in Japan, in 
which signs are exchanged and circulated in the form of commodities, has fragmented not 
only gender, class, and national identity but also affect such as romantic feelings, intimate 
relationships, and a sense of well-being. I argue that scripted romance has become 
commoditized as part of Japan’s romance boom since the 1990s.  
In Chapter 3, “Commodified Romance in a Tokyo Host Club,” I situate the 
Kabuki-chō red light district, where majority of the host clubs are located, and establish 
my ethnographic site, the host club Fantasy. I analyze the spatial formation that enables 
monetary and affective exchanges between hosts and their clients to occur and also focus 
on the often fluid and indeterminate interaction between hosts and their clients as they 
resemble intentional speech and body acts manipulated to look spontaneous and 
accidental. In effect, I argue that the indeterminacy blurs the binary between the 
commercial and emotional romance, economic and emotional motives, and fantasy and 
reality.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 ethnographically demonstrate how hosts and their clients seduce 
one another and in the process foster a commodified romance whereby they perform and 
cultivate their desirable selves—potentially successful entrepreneurs and sexually 
attractive women. In particular, Chapter 4, “Neoliberal Class Struggle: Self-Narrated 
Entrepreneur Hosts via Commodifying the Self,” focuses on the ways that hosts engage 
in neoliberal class struggle through commodifying their body/self and self-narration as 
‘desirable’ entrepreneurs. Though hosts are aware of social inequality and their 
exploitative working conditions, they nonetheless help sustain the capitalist market 
system in their quest for success (against the norms of Japan’s rigidly defined work 
culture) and the luxurious lifestyles within the system. I argue that this self-feeding, self-
exploitative endeavor is an effect of the art of seduction, and aim to demonstrate how 
hosts, who attempt to seduce their clients, are seduced into the speculative affect 
economy. 
In Chapter 5, entitled “The Gender Politics of Passivity: Transgressing Norms and 
Self-Fashioning ‘Desirable’ Women,” I focus on female host club customers, particularly 
married women, and examine how they play out and negotiate their desires, familial 
obligations, and social expectations through their hostclubbing. I demonstrate how they 
perform passivity, e.g., playing the role of the ideal mother, in order to ‘safely’ pursue 
their extramarital romance. I argue that their passivity is a merely a guise that reinforces 
yet destabilizes gendered social norms such as the extramarital-relationship-as-male- 
prerogative and desexualized images of married Japanese women. 
In Chapter 6, “Conclusion,” I situate my dissertation project and summarize my 
main queries and arguments. In particular, I link the thematics of the commodification of 
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affect on the one hand and its gender and class implications in terms of subjectivity 
formation on the other by exploring the malleable and perpetual nature of postindustrial 
capitalism. Revisiting my main concept, the art of seduction, I illuminate the importance 
of critically analyzing econo-emotive motives and maneuvers in social life, which I argue 
is rapidly being commodified at the juncture of postindustrial consumerism and 
neoliberal globalization.  
A key goal of my dissertation is to provide a fine-grained ethnographic portrait of 
the ways and the processes that women and men foster erotic intimacy and attempt to 
create alternative lives for themselves, lives which run counter to national agendas and 
global trends. Recent work on transnational tourism and global consumer culture has 
introduced small numbers of women in post-industrial Euro-American countries and 
Japan who pursue romance and have sexual aspirations with Caucasian men and local 
“beach boys” on such resort islands as Hawaii (e.g., Brennan 2004; Kelsky 2001). The 
coupling created by women’s eagerness for erotic intimacy and men’s commodification 
of their sexuality, however, remains unexplored despite its potential subversive aspects 
within patriarchal, heterosexual norms surrounding romantic love, courtship, and 
marriage. Commodified romance in Japan provides a compelling case to comparatively 
understand not only changing notions of womanhood, masculinity, and subjectivity in the 
postindustrial market economy but also the increasing commercialization of erotic 
fantasy and interaction that crisscrosses gender, sexuality, class, and by extension 
race/ethnicity.  
At the same time, my dissertation also engages in the discussion of modern 
romantic love, which has spread throughout the world in the context of globalization, 
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modernity and capitalism, and its attendant forces of individualization (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 1995; Giddens 1992). Despite the intimate interplay of romantic love and 
socioeconomic development, existing literature in anthropology has largely separated 
“true” and “false” love based on emotional and economic ties (Ahearn 2001; Constable 
2003; Rebhun 1999), and dismissed the latter as transient performance or simply an 
instrument to earn money. This tension between the noncommercial and the commercial 
relates to the question widely debated in recent social science studies about market-
centered neoliberal reformation and its globalization, within which cultural difference 
and various aspects of human lives have increasingly become commodities (e.g., Brown 
2003; Burchell et. al. 1991; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; Duggan 2003; Harvey 2005; 
Hochschild 2003). While the commercialization of “private” or “sacred” aspects of 
human lives is largely problematized, in-depth study of actual processes and experiences 
of affective relations and commitments remains understudied in both sexuality studies 
(Babb 2006: 118) and the anthropology of emotions (Luts 1986). My dissertation seeks to 
shed light on this rupture by focusing on the globalizing market economy that capitalizes 
on human sentiment, desire, and intimate relationships, and examining subjectivity 
formations through such an economy within Japan.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE TRIUMPH OF ROMANCE: AFFECTIVE SELF AND THE 
ART OF SEDUCTION 
 
Romance is the backbone of life. I feel that I am in the mode of 
pseudo-death when I don’t have anyone I love. … No matter how 
much history evolves, romance is one of the greatest necessities for 
the human being (Kadota Mitsuyo, a writer). 
 
Romance that brings extraordinariness is a nutritious tablet. The 
feeling of romantic excitement is a vitamin that shines the skin. The 
tears of hardship are calcium that strengthens oneself. … Romance 
must be the best nutrition for the mind and the body (Ogawa Yayoi, 
a comic artist) 
 
Happiness without romantic love is incomplete. It is true only for 
men that worthy occupations complete their happiness. No matter 
how occupationally successful women are, they cannot feel truly 
happy from the bottom of their hearts without boyfriends. The fact 
that there is a man in the world, who loves me, provides 
tremendous mental stability (Umeda Mika, a scenario writer). 
 
 
To understand how Japan’s little-known host club subculture, along with its 
idealization of romance, has emerged so prominently in contemporary Japan one only has 
to scan the headlines of a fairly recent issue of a women’s magazine. The above quotes 
were pulled from a 2005 special issue of a highly popular weekly magazine called an.an,5 
entitled “Romance Supremacy” (Ren’ai Shijōshugi). Like many other magazines aimed at 
young Japanese women, an.an intensively emphasizes romance in its editorial and 
advertorial pages. More than a third of the magazine’s issues focus on romance-related 
themes, with weekly titles such as “Lecture on Romance for the Adult,” “The Way to 
                                                
5 An.an has been always provocative and pioneering in women’s fashion and cosmetic 
trends, lifestyle, and gender relationships since it first published in 1970. In the beginning 
of the 70s, women who stylized their fashions based on an.an are called an.non tribe 
(an’non zoku), along with those whose fashions are based on another popular fashion 
non.no.  
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Polish Your Romantic Skills,” “Secrets of the Beloved Women,” and so forth. Though 
Japanese women’s magazines have long peddled romance to its readers, the abundance of 
romance-inspired themes blaring from magazine covers nowadays is significant 
compared to 1970s and ’80s, when fashion magazines like an.an rarely featured romantic 
themes and imagery. As I will discuss later, until the 1990s, romance in Japan was 
regarded mostly as a fateful encounter or a lighthearted, playful game between a man and 
a woman. Today, romance is a highly marketable commodity, inseparable from Japanese 
women’s self-identity, and closely intertwined with their self-actualization and self-
fulfillment. Indeed, romance is no longer viewed merely as a pleasurable interlude on the 
way to marriage or an accidental gift from above. It is, as an.an surmised, “the nutrition 
of the mind and the body,” “happiness” itself, and “one of the great necessities for the 
human being.” Indeed, for many contemporary Japanese women it is the yardstick by 
which ideal womanhood is measured and expressed. 
The story of how romance became such an iconic expression of Japanese 
femininity and womanhood has its origins in western notions of romantic love, which I 
discuss later, but only in the last decade or so has romance become the driving force 
behind theme parks, high-end restaurants and hotels, Louis Vuitton stores, and host clubs. 
Since the early 1990s, Japan has witnessed one of its most enduring booms, the so-called 
ren’ai būmu (romance boom). Featured in countless magazine and newspaper articles, 
television dramas, movies, and popular books and comics, the ren’ai būmu has coincided 
not only with the phenomenal success of the host club industry but also propelled 
neoliberal-influenced paradigm shifts in women’s lifestyles, self-identity, and gender 
relationships.  
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While the average lifespan of a ‘būmu’ in Japan is typically shorter than a 
firefly’s, the romance boom has showed remarkable staying power. A number of factors 
have contributed to this longevity. Japanese women, who enjoy greater education and 
employment opportunities than ever, have dramatically increased their disposable income 
since the 1980s. At the same time, they have postponed marriage and raised fewer 
children, contributing to the nation’s current demographic crisis. But perhaps most telling 
is Japanese women’s changed attitudes. Many younger Japanese women today no longer 
seek self-fulfillment in the domestic sphere, and avoid or reject traditional marital and 
familial expectations. Instead, they seek a life of their own—jibun no jinsei—and pursue 
a lifestyle that emphasizes greater self-satisfaction compared to previous generations. In 
marked contrast to women whose happiness was considered to be solely found in either 
family life or occupational success, women today feel increasing pressure to succeed in 
marriage, childrearing, occupation, and romance to maximize and complete their 
happiness.  
Attendant to this change in attitude and lifestyle, Japanese women’s expectations 
toward men have also shifted. Not long ago, women sought so-called “sankō” (three 
highs) when prospecting for potential mates: income, educational background, and 
height. These days, women say they seek companionship and want the “3Cs”—
comfortable, communicative, and cooperative—in men (Miller 2003: 54). Japan’s mass 
media and popular culture have highlighted women’s changing attitudes and idealized 
romance as a form of embracing individual ‘freedom’ and ideal womanhood. Trendy TV 
drama series in the early 1990s such as “Tokyo Love Story”, “Tell Me You Love Me” 
(Aishiteru to Ittekure), and 1996’s “Long Vacation” (Rongu Bakēshon) served not only as 
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entertainment but also instruction manuals for women to study and learn the codes of 
romantic situations and settings, as well as fashion, lifestyle, and the effective 
presentation of the self (Lukacs 2007). But it wasn’t until two writers who worked on 
these highly popular dramas, Saimon Fumi and Kitagawa Eriko, as well as other scenario 
writers and essayists, established a book genre called ren’ai ron (discussion on romance) 
in the early 1990s that romance became an essential element of women’s consciousness. 
It was ren’ai ron that actively disseminated the notion of romance as an ideal state in 
relation to womanhood and self-identity. Since then, romance has been relentlessly 
promoted in Japan as a means of beautifying everyday life and cultivating desirable 
selves through fashion, hairstyle, body care, communication skill, lifestyle, and more 
(Takeyama 2005). 
A unique aspect of Japan’s mass mediated representation of romance in the 1990s 
is found in its close linkage with women’s self-growth. The linkage is, I argue, embedded 
in Japan’s neoliberal socioeconomic reformation, which is the product of a number of 
convergent factors. On a macro level, starting in the 1970s, Japan’s economy began to 
shift from industrial to postindustrial, placing increasing emphasis on consumer spending 
and setting the stage for later reform. By the late 1980s, Japan’s so-called “bubble 
economy” had collapsed following a particularly heady period of rampant stock market 
speculation and real estate inflation, which prodded the Japanese government to carry out 
drastic economic deregulation and governmental restructuring. Meanwhile, on the 
political stage, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant political party since 1955, 
lost its majority in Parliament in 1993, giving way to a newly formed coalition 
government. It marked the abrupt end to 55 years of political hegemony and became 
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symbolic of the breakdown of postwar Japan’s politico-economic foundation. The 
resulting administrative and economic reforms have, by fits and starts, reshaped 
socioeconomic norms and reinforced the attitude that every one — including Japanese 
corporations, bureaucracy and individuals — needs to reform.  
Ironically, with its similarly self-empowering message of rejuvenation, the 
‘romance boom’ has come to echo this new, reformed mindset among many Japanese 
women. The title of a 1996 issue of an.an, “It Is the Feeling That I Have to Change That 
Becomes the Energy to Make Women Beautiful and Smart,” for example, stresses the 
influence of romance on self-growth and the creation of a desirable self. It states, “The 
energy of romance first polishes your exterior appearance and wakes up the [woman’s] 
mind within yourself [to grow] as if a budding beauty is coming into full bloom. … 
Regardless of the result or the experience, romance enhances your attractiveness as a 
woman and as a human being without fail” (an.an 1996: 24). Here, romance is 
understood as a magical energy that guarantees to stimulate one’s untapped reserves and 
fully charge both mind and body. In spite of the hype and hyperbole that often 
accompanies women’s fashion magazines, romance has become a process of self-
improvement and a vehicle for self-fulfillment for many women, largely because it 
resonates strongly with Japan’s neoliberal agenda I argue.  
Furthermore, romance in the new millennium Japan has increasingly come to be 
understood in such business or war terms as planning and strategy (senryaku), 
preparation or staging (shikake), and victory (shōri). Such a competitive attitude parallels 
the former Koizumi administration’s goal-oriented slogan of “Reformation Without 
Sanctuary for the Rebirth of Japan,” a rallying cry put forth to bolster the nation’s global 
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economic competitiveness. An.an’s “The Way of Seducing Men” issue (2004), for 
example, insists that romance requires careful planning and bold strategies to effectively 
manipulate men’s minds and win ‘victory’. It metaphorically treats romance as a kind of 
war game and states, “The first step of the battle is to learn about the enemy. ... Carefully 
observe his behavioral patterns and judge what pleases him. Strategize your seductive 
moves and approach him so as to win his heart and become a winner at romance” (an.an 
2004: 12). In this view, romance is understood as a results-oriented battle where 
combatants’ capability in information gathering, strategic planning, and seductive skill is 
tested and validated. Unlike the romance of the 1990s, which underscored women’s 
attractiveness regardless of outcome (an.an 1996: 24), romance in the new millennium is 
set on the goal of winning. This has changed the conventional cause-and-effect 
understanding of fatal encounter found in traditional romantic narratives. For instance, a 
2006 issue of an.an headlined “A Fatal Encounter” claims that not fateful encounters but 
the well-calculated art of seduction turns any sort of meeting into a fateful one. That is to 
say, romance is no longer something that occurs accidentally or a sacred gift from 
religion or fate; it is now something one needs to work on to make happen. The issue 
suggests that a woman exploit existing social scripts that say sharing values and having a 
sense of ease signifies a good match, and therefore will persuade him to believe in their 
relationship as a fateful one).  By purposefully creating common interests and a friendly 
atmosphere based on advance observation and ad-lib performance, an.an insists that a 
woman can manipulate a man’s psychology to believe that she is the ‘fated woman’ 
(unmei no onna) (an.an 2006: 18). In such a way, the magazine argues, she can ‘win’ the 
romance. The art of seduction —systematic observation, strategic moves, and persuasion 
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skills— thus secularizes romance as a man-made product. Hence, romance in the new 
millennium has come down to earth for everybody. By the same token, romance becomes 
a must that individuals are responsible for.  
In this specific socio-historical context at the intersection of Japan’s postindustrial 
consumer culture and neoliberal reformation, immaterial products such as information, 
imagery, and knowledge of romance become socially relevant commodities. Affect — 
feelings, emotions, passions, and desires — is no exception. While affect has tended to be 
viewed as spontaneous and removed from capitalism, Michel Hardt stresses that affective 
labor, that is, the labor that produces a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, and 
excitement, has become “not only directly productive of capital but [also]… one of the 
highest value-producing forms of labor” (Hardt 1999: 90). Indeed, the profitability of 
Japan’s host clubs, where the experience of romance itself has become purchasable, bears 
this notion out. Hardt claims that the increase in affective labor lies in the shift from 
manufacturing-centered industry to the information- and service-based economy in 
advanced capitalist countries such as Japan’s. But while his conceptualization is useful 
for a macro-analysis of the global economic trend, it is less helpful to trace specific socio-
historical situations in which certain affect such as romantic experiences and 
relationships have become commodifiable and how such a commodity becomes socially 
relevant (Appadurai 1986: 13).  
I maintain that it is important to understand the historical transformation in 
Japanese women’s subjectivity formation and gender relationships in order to 
comprehend the ways that affect such as (heterosexual) romance has become 
commodifiable in Japan’s postindustrial consumer culture. In this chapter, I intend to 
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trace this historical trajectory since Japan post-industrialized in the 1970s. In particular, I 
explore how neoliberal subjectivity formation —the construction of a self that is skillful, 
progressive, and competitive— has been made thinkable and practicable since the 
nation’s neoliberal reformation took root in the 1990s. Analyzing an.an’s back issues 
since 1970, I will demonstrate the ways in which Japanese women’s self-identity has 
transformed from the ‘genuine’ self of the 1970s and fragmented multiple selves in the 
1980s to the current form of the neoliberal subject at the turn of the century. I argue that 
Japan’s postindustrial consumer culture has enabled intense fragmentation and 
multiplicity of the self through diversified modes of fashion and lifestyles, and paved the 
road to the neoliberal subject.  
As I will discuss further, the formation of the neoliberal subject is a self-
improvement project that implores subjects to constantly equip themselves with artful 
skills to flexibly adjust to rapidly changing social situations and maximize self-
fulfillment in any given opportunity. Accordingly, the neoliberal subject is both a 
defensive and offensive mechanism for social change as much as it is a performative 
construct. Judith Butler theorizes that gender identity is not the product of biological sex 
difference but the effect of repetitive citations and enactments of socially scripted 
masculine and feminine characteristics (Butler 1990). Similarly, the neoliberal subject is 
the product of acquired skills and the habituation of a multi-talented body quality. 
Nonetheless, mere performativity does not create a neoliberal subject. The subject is 
supposed to be goal-oriented and therefore, manipulative, productive, and successful. 
Drawing from Butler’s concept of ‘performativity’ and Hardt’s notion of ‘affective 
labor,’ I call the neoliberal subject, who is armed with the necessary skills to produce and 
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manipulate affect to fulfill certain desired ends, the ‘affective self.’ In the example of the 
host club, the affective self skillfully takes advantage of social scripts such as fateful 
encounters and ideal femininity as baits in order to affect the other’s psychology and 
action and accomplish one’s goal, whether it is self-growth or winning in audition-like 
competitions. In the new millennium Japan, I argue that the affective self —the 
performative and artful neoliberal subject— has become an ideal women’s subjectivity.  
In order to demonstrate how affective selves come be idealized, I first examine 
how the intense commercialization of self-identity has dramatically altered Japanese 
women’s subjectivity formation and gender relationships, particularly within the so-
called “postmodern condition.” I will then examine the interaction between Japan’s 
postindustrial consumer culture and the nation’s neoliberal reformation in order to 
extrapolate how the political economy and subjectivity formation are mutually 
constitutive. To wit, I argue that individual female consumers, who have learned how to 
exploit the postmodern sign economy, are now motivated to substantiate the sign 
economy in the body and in their communicative interactions. In other words, they are 
encouraged to maneuver the signs (messages, images) and reconstruct an apparently 
‘natural’ self and communication that actually manipulates their social interactions, 
including romantic relationships. As a result, the current state of Japanese women’s self-
identity and conduct of gender relationships in romance is characterized by seemingly 
opposing natures: the highly calculated self and the ‘natural’ selfness (sarigenai 
jibunrashisa), and the seducing subject and the simply beloved woman (aisareru onna). I 
argue that this contradictory subjectivity formation and interaction is both the cause and 
the result of the affective selves. In the end, I attempt to assess some of the aspects 
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underlying postindustrial consumerism and neoliberal restructuring as they manifest the 
affective self and the increased commercialization of affect, particularly romance, in 
Japan’s neoliberal era. 
 
“Genuine” Self: Cute Culture in the 1970s 
Japan’s postwar economic success has been oftentimes described as an “economic 
miracle.” Technological innovation coupled with large investments in industries such as 
automobiles and electronics succeeded in achieving a high economic growth rate. Within 
ten years from the nation’s defeat in the WWII, the Japanese economy had fully 
recovered to the prewar level. Much as it had in the U.S., the privations of life during 
wartime created a pent-up desire for refrigerators, washing machines, and TV sets, which 
were idealized as emblems of progress and the good life. By 1956, the Japanese 
government had proposed a plan aimed at doubling income within ten years, called the 
“Plan to Double Income in 1960”. The plan became a reality and Japan’s GNP reached 
the second highest in the world in 1969. Owning color TVs, air conditioners, and 
automobiles were the new benchmarks for the nation’s prosperity.  
As Japan’s mass industrialization hastened urbanization and the propagation of 
the nuclear family, Japanese corporations hired vast numbers of male workers to work as 
salarymen with guaranteed lifetime employment, insuring built-in social and economic 
stability for generations. Along with Japan’s rapid economic growth, the socioeconomic 
welfare provided by corporations helped create the illusion that the entire Japanese 
population belonged to (or would eventually belong to) the middle class. By the end of 
the 1960s, the so-called “middle-class consciousness” (chūryū ishiki) had emerged 
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(Vogel 1972). Nonetheless, this middle-class consciousness, as some scholars also have 
argued, concealed the actual gap that existed between the haves and the have-nots and 
served to mobilize the national population to achieve the government’s economic 
development objectives (Inoue 2006: 167; Gordon 2002; Ivy 1995; Kelly 1986, 2002).  
Surprisingly, during this period of heady economic expansion, characterized by an 
extreme self-sacrifice to the corporation, a budding leisure industry emerged. Although 
the leisure activities were considered primarily as outlets for overtaxed Japanese workers 
(who were notoriously viewed as ‘economic animals’ in the West), numerous bars, clubs, 
dance halls, pachinko pinball parlors, and bowling alleys opened to meet the demand. It 
was during this period, in 1966, when the first host club opened for business in Tokyo. 
Named Club Ai, meaning “love’, the club was established as a dance hall, which was 
located close to the Tokyo Train Station. The club targeted wealthy widows and wives of 
corporate executives and high government officials who would ostensibly stop by after 
their department shopping for some light entertainment while their husbands enjoyed 
their own nightlife activities at bars and hostess clubs. They soon became popular, and 
led to more host clubs opening in other parts of central Tokyo within a few years. 
Nonetheless, the host club establishment was highly exclusive and remained largely 
invisible to the public. Most female clients secretly visited host clubs during this era. In 
1960s Japan, women were expected to be virgins until marriage, and once married, they 
were expected to be faithful wives and self-devoting mothers (Allison 1996; Borovoy 
2005; Uno 1999). Patronizing host clubs was viewed disparagingly as shameless and 
promiscuous behavior (see Sakai 2003: 57). 
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Despite the rise of the leisure industry, service-based industries were still limited 
in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, however, environmental pollution and the Oil Shock 
placed Japan’s high rate of industrialization and modern technology into question 
(Morris-Suzuki 1994). Gradually, the Japanese economy began to shift its reliance on 
heavy industries to the emerging ‘knowledge-intensive’ or high-tech industries (Morris-
Suzuki 1994: 210). Japan’s transformation from an industrial society to a postindustrial 
‘information society’ followed in step with other industrialized countries such as the 
U.S., where the mode of production shifted from the Fordist model to what David Harvey 
calls the ‘flexible accumulation’ of capital or, simply, the post-Fordist economy (Harvey 
1989). In such a new economy, information and imagery that added signs and meanings 
to commodities created greater surplus value in advertising and marketing. Consumption 
of signs and meanings became directly productive of capital in postindustrial societies 
(Baudrillard 1979; Lazzarato 1996; Hardt 1999).  
At this historical turning point in the shift from a production-centered industrial 
society to a consumer-oriented postindustrial economy, the fashion magazine an.an first 
published in 1970. Established by the French fashion magazine, Elle, an.an began life as 
Elle Japon, introducing cutting-edge fashion, products, and lifestyles from Europe to the 
Asia Pacific region. In many ways, An.an exemplifies how an informational commodity 
depended for its circulation and profitability upon the consumer’s needs and demands. 
Michel Hardt explains that unlike the Fordist model based on the mass production of 
standardized commodities, the postindustrial informational economy entails a constant 
and immediate feedback loop from consumption to production (Hardt 1999: 93). An.an 
validates this by adjusting its content to feed the demands of the Japanese readership. In 
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earlier issues, for example, the magazine was filled with predominantly European 
models, featuring Western style cosmetics and fashions with lessons on how to make 
Japanese women’s faces and outfits look like beautiful and sophisticated Caucasian 
women. The content, however, shifted in the mid ’70s to cover Japanese trends and 
Japanese women’s self-identity, although models were still mostly European white 
women. Along with the content change, the magazine also adopted the magazine’s pet 
name, an.an, as the official magazine name. Indeed, An.an was named after a lovable 
panda bear (an.an 1970: 1).  
An an.an editorial that reflected Japanese popular culture and women’s self-
identity in the 1970s was an article entitled, “I Want to Be Loved by Ken. I am a Cute 
Woman.” The article mirrored Japan’s emergent cute culture in the 1970s, and directly 
translates as follows: 
  
In any age, women who are loved by men are cute women (kawaii 
onna). On a date, I show up at the meeting place earlier [than he 
does] and wait for [Ken]. While waiting, I constantly look around 
and earnestly look for him. When he comes in my sight, I 
delightedly wave my hand toward him and make a big smiling face 
in such a way that it looks as if I loved him single-mindedly. 
Everyone thinks it is cute. … As soon as he approaches me, I 
immediately start to speak to him with one breath as if I couldn’t 
wait to talk to him any longer, and take in a big breath once I finish 
speaking. The gesture seems to be cute [to men]. … I am such a girl 
who lets a man say, “My girlfriend has some childish aspects.” Like 
a small child, I sometimes shed tears when I all of a sudden feel sad. 
… I burst into laughter at the next moment once something pleasant 
occurs to me. It is cute. …If there is unkindness, jealousy, 
untruthfulness, meanness, stubbornness, vanity, … and something 
evil in my mind, I hide them deep inside for the time being. It is 
hard [to be cute] unless I become a good-natured person from the 
bottom of my heart. All women want to be “cute women” who are 
loved. Even a woman who eagerly self-presents as an assertive 
woman and competes against men at work wants to be loved, once 
she falls in love. Nobody is unkind by nature. It may reflect the 
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natural state of the [women’s] real mind. In any case, men like cute 
women (an.an 1974: 57)  
  
 
I quote this lengthy passage in order to assess Japanese women’s notions of ideal 
femininity, self-identity, and conduct in gender relationships in the context of ‘cute 
culture’ and the social environment prevalent in 1970s Japan. While the article is written 
in a female voice, I argue that it reflects male perspectives. It assumes that all women 
want to be cute because they know that men love cute women and they need to be loved 
by men. Being cute here is understood as behaving like innocent children. The childlike 
demeanor is, however, selectively applied. To meet societal expectations, it must impart 
sweetness, innocence, and pleasant surprise, not something selfish, uncontrollable, and 
troublesome. In other words, the tamed childishness—docility and purity—is prerequisite 
in the state of ideal femininity and gender relationships.  
Thus, women’s desire to be cute is defined by the male gaze and projected on 
women’s behavior and self-expression by women themselves. Despite a male-dominated 
understanding of ideal femininity and women’s self-identity, the desire is understood as a 
woman’s “real mind.” In such a way,d the male-centered perspective is naturalized. If it 
is not ‘natural’ to a woman, then the article suggests that she is supposed to hide all 
negative thoughts, emotions, and doubts within herself so that she “becomes” a good-
natured, cute woman. The underlying message is that socially desirable women neither 
compete against men nor show rebelliousness to male-centered Japanese social 
expectations.  
As such, “I” in the article, “I Want to Be Loved by Ken. I am a Cute Woman,” 
attempts to create a distance from those women who are assertive, competitive, and 
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opinionated. While not being specific, those women can be easily associated with 
feminists who heavily criticized Japanese men and patriarchal society during Japan’s 
1970s “women’s lib” (ūmanzu ribu) movements. “I” considers their attitude unkind and 
unreal because they ultimately want to be loved, once they fall in love. In this vein, 
women’s rebellious attitudes are treated as a guise to neglect or hide their ‘real mind’ and 
‘genuine’ self. Women’s self-identification therefore evolves around the conceit of being 
loved without questioning the real mind and genuine self itself. Such an assumption is 
closely intertwined with Japan’s male-centered marriage and family system. Since social 
norms surrounding women’s life goals lay primarily in getting married in their early 
twenties and raising children, their lovable characteristics were the key to finding 
salarymen husbands who supposedly would provide the family with a stable income and 
corporate welfare. Women’s low status in the workplace and in society in general made it 
hard for them to avoid marriage and live alone. Women’s effort to internalize cuteness 
was then, I argue, a strategic move, to both enjoy premarital ‘freedom’ and achieve a 
practical end, i.e., marriage, eventually. In this regard, being cute was not a forceful 
discipline, but rather a discursive embodiment of competing meanings. Cuteness 
reinforced the patriarchal social expectation that feminist movements attempted to 
challenge. At the same time, it undermined the view that ideal femininity is essentially an 
inherited characteristic and gender identity is a mere reflection of the ‘genuine’ self.  
Such subversive potential was significant in 1970s Japan, where maintaining 
and/or recovering “genuine” self-identity was more or less social ethos. Not only 
Japanese women’s gender identity but also Japan’s national identity was believed to be in 
crisis, and bereft of its ‘pure’ past in the wake of postwar industrialization, urbanization, 
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and modernization. Japanese women’s effort to re-fabricate their self-identity by recalling 
childhood and its purity and innocence paralleled the effort to reconstruct the “authentic” 
national identity by recovering lost traditions and Japaneseness. One of the better 
examples of this national effort was an advertisement campaign for Japan National 
Railway, “Discover Japan” (Jisukabā Japan). The campaign urged Japanese people to 
discover the nation’s lost past through traveling (Ivy 1995: 34). Analyzing the advertising 
discourses, Marilyn Ivy reveals the connection between the national and gender 
identities. The campaign mainly targets female consumers to interact with nature and 
tradition so as to “discover themselves as Japanese” (Ivy 1995: 43). As such, both 
national and gender identities became targets to recoup identity in the midst of 
unprecedented change. Ironically, the effort to come to terms with industrial 
modernization is made via the postindustrial economy, e.g., information, advertising, and 
leisure industries. In short, the lost authentic self depends for its recovery upon the 
postindustrial capitalist system, whether it is gender identity or national identity.  
While the “Discover Japan” campaign, along with the popularity of the nihonjin-
ron book genre on Japaneseness, tends to illuminate essentialized Japanese tradition and 
national characteristics, the essentialization itself is a reaction against fragmentation. 
Similarly, I argue, Japanese women’s cute culture also hinges upon such duality, 
simultaneously reinforcing ideal femininity to feed male-centered social fantasy and yet 
destabilizing it as highly stylized art. Thus, the ‘genuine’ self of the 1970s gradually yet 
steadily grows faint, summoning the desire for its maintenance or recovery. The 
fragmentation of self-identity becomes more prominent during Japan’s “bubble 
economy” in the 1980s.  
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Fragmented Self: Sign Economy in the 1980s 
During the 1980s, while Japan’s export-led economy was creating a bubble of 
inflated wealth, a movement toward global free trade and privatization of state-run 
industries was seeding its collapse. Led by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the 
movement sought so-called “small government” in an open, deregulated market 
economy. The rapid increase in transnational flows of information, money, and 
commodities that resulted enabled multinational corporations to seek out cheap raw 
materials and labor anywhere around the world. Japan’s state-led, highly regulated 
economy was caught flat-footed. The Plaza Agreement of 1985 floated the Japanese yen 
on the world currency market and forced export-based companies to seek capital abroad, 
forcing the hollowing out of Japanese industry. Largely as a result, the predominantly 
manufacturing-based domestic economy was grudgingly compelled to further move 
toward a market-centered consumer economy (termed sofutonomikkusu in Japanese) 
encompassing information, finance, and service industries.  
Like other industrialized nations, Japan jumped on the privatization bandwagon. 
Under a new slogan of “Small Government” and “Tax Reform Without a Tax Increase”, 
Japan’s then-prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, cut back funds for social welfare and 
education and began privatizing state-run enterprises in earnest. Japan Railway, for 
example, was privatized in 1987, along with phone giant National Telegram and 
Telephone (NTT) and the Japan Tobacco Bureau.  
At the same time, new markets for consumer goods and services rapidly expanded 
Japan’s domestic consumer market. In the mid 1980s, men’s fashion and hobby 
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magazines, among others, emerged, and the fashion and cosmetic industries expanded 
their product lines to male consumers. In this postindustrial, service-based consumer 
economy, fashion and catalogue magazines such as an.an served not only to advertise 
particular styles of fashion and commodities but also to disseminate ideal lifestyles. As 
understood by ethnographers and other social scientists, a lifestyle is not about social 
status or economic capital per se. It is embodied through self-expression in consumption 
patterns, fashion tastes, and cultivated via cultural sophistication. An outfit one 
purchases, a location where one buys it, and the way one wears it, and the space one has 
access to signifies one’s lifestyle and by equation who one is and what class one belongs 
to. In many respects, lifestyle, masculinity, femininity, and class are signified by 
consumption patterns. In today’s sign economy, the self is a consuming subject 
constituted in the sign of differences. In other words, the consuming subject itself is the 
object of the sign, and the consuming body becomes a site where multiple signs are 
played out. In this way, the self is constructed of a chain of signs and inevitably 
fragmented.  
Japanese women’s involvement in the sign economy was hastened in the 1980s as 
increasing numbers of young women were hired in newly developed service industries. 
Both the labor and consumer markets celebrated the new “women’s era,” the era women 
were “empowered” as consumer subjects (Inoue 2006: 173). Along with their increased 
spending power and social status within the context of Japan’s postindustrial 
consumerism, Japanese women became more selective when choosing their mates. The 
aforementioned “three highs” (sankō) —income, educational degree, and height— were 
blocks to be checked when evaluating husbands (Inoue 2996: 173; Miller 2003; Ogura 
 
 64 
2003). Women’s qualified entry into the labor and consumer market affected the 
reconfiguration of ideal femininity, gender identity, and the conventional (gendered) 
division of labor.  
Matsuda Seiko, an influential singer and actress who became famous for her 
cuteness, well illustrates the dynamics of Japan’s sign economy. Since her debut in 1980, 
Seiko has embodied cute culture in Japan with her blend of cute and childish 
demeanors—baby face, innocent smile, high-pitched tone of voice, and very thin 
(seemingly undeveloped child-like) body. What is significant about her, however, is that 
she no longer attempts to internalize her cuteness, but rather performs it as a sign to toy 
with. Ogura Chikako, a feminist scholar who studies Seiko, reveals that romance in the 
singer’s songs is treated as a game of two signs, a “girl” and a “boy,” played by Seiko 
and her shy boyfriend in urban and resort settings. Neither mature masculine men nor 
sexually aggressive young males are chosen to play the game with her; her partners are 
shy “boys” in the sense they are embarrassed to behave like men (Ogura 1989: 207). 
Seiko then attempts to enjoy the game of romance by taking initiative and maintaining 
control of the relationship. In the lyrics to her hit song “Secret Garden,” for example, 
Seiko admonishes her boyfriend that he doesn’t know how to seduce her: “[Did you ask 
me,] ‘Can I kiss you?’ Gosh, I am embarrassed, you don’t know how to create [a 
romantic] mood [do you?]… If you want to seduce me, just hold me tight under the new 
moon.” In another hit song, “Kiss in the Heaven,” Seiko confesses her manipulative 
ways: “Because I wanted to let him say ‘I love you,’ I looked still into his eyes; I am a 
little bit of a bad girl who is [actually] seducing him and pausing as if I were seduced” 
(Ogura 1989: 202). Seiko is, as Ogura argues, a metonym for a cute “girl” who is aware 
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of her performative and manipulative self in the game of romance (Ibid: 209). Thus, 
gender identity is here a role to perform and romance is a game that consists of various 
signs such as codes of romantic mood, seductive gestures, and calculated timings.     
 An.an disseminates similar messages during the 1980s: ideal femininity is a 
performance and romance is a strategic game. An.an’s “Special Issue on Date Plan” 
(1983), for example, carries a subsection entitled, “Dating Techniques that Please Men,” 
and stresses the importance of skillful “use of all sorts of women’s weapons (buki) —
depending, tantalizing, and crying— to tickle men’s minds and succeed in seducing men” 
(an.an 1983: 65). The article advises readers to practice different approaches to men in 
different age groups. Finding a common interest is a way to ‘naturally’ seduce the same-
aged male, and for the older man, the article insists that it is better for a woman to be a 
burikko (fake child) and pretend as if she is dependent upon him because he likes to be 
relied upon (an.an 1983: 65). Since an older man is also weak for a woman’s tears, the 
article advises that a woman take advantage of that and win his heart (Ibid). Here, ideal 
femininity is variable depending upon the audience and therefore doesn’t have to (and 
can’t) be genuine. It is a merely a calculated performance and tactic to seduce men.  
Unlike the 1970s an.an article that presumes men as the dominant subjects who 
define ideal femininity, men in the 1980s articles are no longer such subjects. They are 
made to matter as objectified subjects in the sign economy. More pointedly, they are 
objectified as a target in the game of romance and then reconstructed as subjects whom 
women’s romantic fantasies and desires are projected upon. In contrast, women are 
represented as practical, dominant players who are capable of subtly enticing men to 
seduce them. Put differently, as Seiko’s lyrics and the an.an article stress, in a new form 
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of romance women are encouraged to intentionally perform ideal femininity and covertly 
control the gender relationship in such a way that men appear to be charge of seducing 
and loving them, even when they aren’t. Such pretense allows women to perform their 
socially expected role of being loved by men, yet their agentive play liberates them from 
the merely objectified cute woman who passively waits. The sign economy deconstructed 
the conventionally essentialized self-identity, femininity, and gender relationships in 
patriarchal terms, and enabled women’s agency such that romantic fantasy and desire, as 
well as women’s and men’s subjectivities, are ever objectified as signs. In brief, women’s 
agency is always already objectified in the sign economy, the economy that fuels late-
capitalist consumerism.  
Within the sign economy, class mobility and national identity also become 
matters of signs and styles. Compared to the prewar period when there was less 
movement between social strata, class mobility in the late 1980s was realized by semiotic 
capacity of consumption (Inoue 2006: 200-201). Owning such brand-named commodities 
as Louis Vuitton bags, Feragamo shoes, and Helmes scarves, for example, signifies that 
the owner belongs to the upper class. Miyako Inoue succinctly states, “the idea of 
‘moving up’ started deferring not so much to actual material social relations between 
classes, but to itself as a sign of a sign without reality (Ibid: 201). Class mobility in turn 
apparently becomes something available to everyone. (I will discuss this further in 
Chapter 3). The loss of integrity is also observed in Japan’s national identity in the 1980s. 
It is evidently clear comparing the Japan National Railway’s advertisement campaign in 
the 1980s, “Exotic Japan,” to the 1970s “Discover Japan” campaign. Marilyn Ivy 
explains that “Exotic Japan” had neither the lure of traveling as a way of discovery of the 
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genuine self nor offered a totalistic narrative about the authentic national identity (Ivy 
1995: 49). In order to make Japan look exotic, the campaign instead employed seductive 
and rare signs of difference such as the Silk Road, the iconic object of the non-Japanese 
Orient, and Mount Kōya, seat of the esoteric Buddhist sect. Juxtaposed imagery and 
textual signs faintly took contours of the national identity. The “Exotic Japan” is thus 
reduced to an object of signs and a matter of style (Ibid: 51; also see Kondo 1997).  
In the development of the commercially driven sign economy of the 1980s, 
Japanese society as a whole became an object whose meanings are discursively 
determined in relational and context-specific terms. In this socioeconomic milieu, 
maneuvering fragmented multiple selves becomes a social skill to smoothly cope with 
any given situation and social relationship (Asano 2005: 84). Like fashion styles, the self 
becomes a mere mode (mōdo) or character (kyara) to perform rather than an essential 
ontology (Saito 2005: 153). Matsuda Seiko, who skillfully played the sign economy and 
become a role model for young Japanese women, is a good example of this subjectivity 
formation in the 1980s. Seiko got married in 1985 and had a child, but continued her 
singing career and even launched an entrepreneurial boutique business. Her expansive 
lifestyle as a wife, mother, singer, and business owner was significant in contrast to 
women in earlier generations like Yamaguchi Momoe, a super idol in the 1970s, who 
retired at the peak of her popularity in order to become a housewife. The happiness of her 
generation was almost solely associated with marriage and family life. Seiko, however, 
became the embodiment of a new lifestyle for women, based on multiple modes of 
selves, prompting many women to idealize her ‘super woman’ model for self-fulfillment 
(Ogura 2003; Sakai 2003).  At the same time, women’s pursuit of self-fulfillment and 
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lifestyle diversification was greatly enabled (and pushed forward) by the huge expansion 
of the labor and consumer market for women during the bubble period.  
In effect, consumption can be considered an emancipatory activity that expands 
women’s life options and mobility within the spheres of marriage, family, and 
occupation. As Miura Atsushi, an influential marketing manager and critic of social 
trends in Japan explains, marketing technology employed in the 1980s increasingly 
stressed that individuals are the creator of their own self-narratives rather than passive 
recipients of meta-narratives created for them by the nation-state, the family, and the 
corporation (Miura 2005: 105). Miura explicates that 1980s marketing appropriated the 
same concepts as employed during the 1960s social movements in Japan that rebelled 
against social norms that constrain individual freedom and sensibility (Ibid). Yet, despite 
the similarities underlying 1960s social movements and1980s consumerism, I would 
argue that the latter finds postindustrial capitalism as a convenient sanctuary and secret 
weapon to fight against other forms of the status quo such as Japan’s marriage and family 
system, meta-narratives of the national identity, and the nation’s stratified class system. A 
result was that rebellious consumer activity becomes a handmaiden for the late-capitalist 
system. In essence, the 1980s sign economy deconstructed the genuineness of social 
identities and the fixity of social relations. Nonetheless, the socioeconomic condition 
results in further encompassing even social criticism and strengthening the postindustrial 
capitalist fortress. As such, the condition has become pervasive, but at the same time 
greatly depends on the active engagements of social institutions and individual actors 
alike that do not remain static.  
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In a sense, the consumer-oriented sign economy is both a reflection of consumer 
demands and the effect of marketing technology. Indeed, the postindustrial consumer 
culture to an extent helped Japanese women to free themselves from the status quo. By 
the same token, they are “liberated” into the further intensified postindustrial capitalist 
system that becomes so pervasive in creation of the self, lifestyle, and social 
relationships. Thus, consumerism based on the sign economy is not a mere the effect of 
manipulative capitalist ideology, but it is not an entirely emancipatory activity, either. In 
the sign economy, nothing is beyond semiotics. Anything potentially comes into being a 
commodity to be exchanged and circulated (Kondo 1997). The self, as well as affect, is 
no exception, as I will discuss further in the following chapters about the host club 
phenomenon in Japan. “Within this dynamic,” Yumiko Iida states, “the desire and 
subjectivity become a direct target of commercial marketing strategies whose effect is to 
ever further objectify and transform the subject, imbricating it into the intensive chains of 
differing signs, and ultimately to subjugate the empirical body to the brute structuring 
forces of the market” (Iida 2002: 182). Such a claim more or less takes place in 1990s 
Japan when the collapse of the nation’s bubble economy forced individual citizens to 
work on their body and self as projects to optimize their human capital. In short, the body 
becomes not merely a site where signs of difference are played out, but an enterprise, 
along with Japan’s neoliberal economy. 
 
“Natural” Selfness: Neoliberal Economy in the 1990s 
After the Plaza Agreement dramatically strengthened the value of Japan’s 
currency on the global market, the resulting flood of available capital inflated the price of 
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stocks, finance, and real estate. But by 1991 the party was over as equity values took a 
nosedive. The Heisei recession gradually settled in. The burst of Japan’s bubble had 
ripple effects throughout the economy and government. Perhaps most significantly, it 
exposed the cozy relationships that have sustained postwar Japanese business and politics 
and led to widespread distrust among citizens about their system of government. In 
Japan, the 1990s are commonly referred to as ushiinawareta juu-nen (“The Lost 10-
Years”).  
The economic stagnation, as well as the political distrust, undermined the respect 
and reputation that Japanese salarymen and (male) politicians had gained during Japan’s 
postwar economic prosperity. Japanese women, on the other hand, were quietly making 
gains. In 1986 the Equal Opportunity for Occupation legislation was passed, barring 
gender discrimination in hiring practices, and by 1989 for the first time more Japanese 
women than men pursued postsecondary education. The 1993 National Diet Election was 
called “Madonna Sensation” (Madonna senpū) due to the large numbers of Japanese 
women running for election. They succeeded in occupying the largest number of seats in 
the Diet since Japanese women gained suffrage in 1945. Although these changes still 
function more nominally rather than in actual gender equality in terms of the ratio in 
politico-economic managerial positions, they became proof of the social perception that 
women were “empowered,” whereas men were increasingly disempowered or in 
masculinity crisis (Ito 1996; Takeyama 2001). As greater numbers of Japanese women 
postponed marriage and pursued other life-enriching opportunities, men —particularly 
working-class men and men in rural areas— suffered from “marriage difficulties” 
(kekkonnan) (Ito 1993; Miller 2003).  
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With these socioeconomic and demographic changes reshaping women’s lived 
experiences, Japan’s so-called ren’ai būmu (romance boom) appeared in the early 1990s. 
This boom did not drop unannounced. At every turn, advertising, TV shows, hit songs, 
fashion magazines, comic books and mainstream books either promoted or implied that 
romance is the ideal state of womanhood and happiness. Romance, which is more or less 
intangible, is represented as a means to serve multiple purposes including stress relief for 
career-oriented women, fulfillment of a void for single women, and recovery and 
maintenance of youth, beauty, and attractiveness for middle aged or married women. In 
short, romance signifies multiple meanings and functions. Saimon Fumi, a popular 
cartoon artist known as the Goddess of Romance, writes that in her book Ren’ai-ron 
(Discussion on Romance) that romance offers salvation from loneliness and is also an 
exciting drama that generates extraordinary power and emotion and surprises the self 
(Saimon 1990: 24; 32). Kitagawa Eriko, who is known for her insights into romance as a 
screenwriter, also states, “It is only romantic love that saves us from the hardships and 
unhappiness in occupation, family, and life in general” in her book The Way of Romance 
(Ren’ai-dō) (Kitagawa 1996: 206). Discourses on romance, particularly in fashion 
magazines and self-help books, have highlighted romance not only for its redemptive 
qualities but also as a tool for self-growth. Romance in these discourses has become a 
means to polish women’s fashion, beauty, and communication skills, and nourish their 
sensitivity. An.an, which has substantially increased the number of romance-related 
headlines on its covers since the 1990s, increasingly puts stress on the project of the self. 
The “project” is discursively expressed in language such as self-producing (serufu 
purojūsu or jiko ensyutsu), self-reformation (jikokaikaku), polishing the self (jibun 
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migaki), and becoming the self one wants to be (naritai jibun ni naru). In the pages of 
women’s magazines such as an.an, work, marriage, childrearing, hobbies, art and culture 
centers the self and everything else, including romance, becomes a means to actualize the 
distinctive individual self.  
This self-centered attitude, predicated on self-growth, also mirrors socioeconomic 
trends dominant in the 1990s, when the Japanese government enacted various reforms 
aimed at liberalizing the economy and encouraged corporations, the bureaucracy, and 
individuals to transform themselves as part of the reconstruction process. Behind the 
reforms was a series of U.S.-Japan consultations for the restructuring that were held since 
1989. The U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, pressured Japan to take drastic 
measures to transform its conventional politico-economic structure into a more 
“transparent” and democratic system through further deregulation and market-centered 
economic reforms (Tomoyori 2006: 147). Following these consultations, the Japanese 
government pushed to break down the vaunted Japanese-style management system 
(typically represented by lifetime employment and seniority) in order to create optimum 
labor conditions. Japanese corporations in turn increasingly adopted a more result-
oriented salary system and replaced many lifetime employees with contract workers to 
cut back on labor costs. In her book Gendai Shihonshugi to Shin-Jiyūshugi no Bōsō 
(Contemporary Capitalism and Neoliberalism That is Out of Control), Ninomiya Atsumi 
asserts that excessive deregulation in the name of “natural selection” based on the market 
principle is a form of “deregulation fascism” solely designed to adjust labor and the 
employment system for more flexible capital accumulation (Ninomiya 1999: 78). Despite 
any underlying fascism on the part of business and government, the phrase 
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kawaranakucha (“I have to change”) has become ubiquitous in Japan’s mass media and 
everyday conversation. Self-help and self-improvement seminars in turn became a boom 
in the early 1990s. As such, the idea of reformation for betterment has gradually 
permeated Japanese culture and become a social ethos for individuals.  
What is commonly referred to as neoliberal reformation in English and 
“kozōkaikaku” in Japanese makes individuals and their bodies matter as projects to 
cultivate self-value rather than mere sites where the spectacular (elaborately-decorated) 
self is displayed through signs of difference. Individuals are encouraged to acquire useful 
skills into their bodies and substantiate their self-improvement, whereupon the results are 
assessed. This social attitude is well depicted in an.an articles that encourage female 
readers to cultivate and polish themselves so that they are acknowledged as a valuable or 
beautiful. A 1991 column entitled “In Order to Become A Chosen Woman,” written by 
Tanaka Yasuo, now the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, suggests that happiness is a 
competitive audition for which a woman needs to constantly apply herself: 
 
In various scenes such as career, romance, and marriage, the most 
suitable human being is carefully selected. In order to be selected 
and to experience the joy of the [victorious] moment, tireless effort 
is absolutely necessary. Everybody is equally eligible to participate 
in the screening process, i.e., the audition. Even if one is not selected 
today, one needs to make continuous effort to become a selected 
woman and achieve the unselfish victory (an.an 1991: 7).  
 
 
An interesting element of the audition metaphor is that the result depends upon 
judges —male bosses at work and men in romance and marriage— who decide who gets 
selected. On this point, women to be selected in the audition make a parallel to the 1970s 
ideal women, who were the objects to be loved by men. Women’s screening in the ’70s 
 
 74 
was limited to a marriage partner (and by extension courtship mate) and the judge was 
presupposed as men, whereas the range of audition in ’90s is expanded to include 
occupation and romance and the gender of judges is unspecified (but simply implied as 
men). Compared to the 1970s, when women were expected to submissively please men in 
order to be loved, the 1990s model has a neoliberal twist. Unlike the previous criteria that 
lay primarily in cuteness, the recent auditions expect women to strive to flexibly 
transform themselves into the fittest candidate depending upon the content of the 
competition. Women are in turn required to be agentive in acquiring the necessary skills 
and become competent. In the competition, everyone has a chance to be selected and is 
also responsible for one’s own result. Victory is unselfish, but failing is one’s fault, i.e., 
reflecting a lack of individual effort and talent. Thus, the ‘audition’ spotlights women’s 
agentive effort and competence in the 1990s. Nonetheless, women are still the objects to 
be selected despite the fact that they are said to be “empowered.”  
Indeed, Japanese men are not exempt from the audition-like competition in 
Japan’s neoliberal reformation. However, I would like to note that Japanese men’s 
competition is mostly fierce within the sphere of work, not romance. Feminist scholars 
have revealed that Japanese men’s well-being is primarily evaluated by their occupational 
success, whereas women’s is by their lovability (Ogura 2003; Sakai 2003). No matter 
how successful women are in their career, they are still expected to be ‘lovable’. 
Otherwise, they are pitied for being lonely and solitary or looked down upon as women 
who have nothing like childrearing or romance to devote themselves (Sakai 2003: 86; 
Ogura 2003: 175). The social calculation that equates single women —particularly, those 
who do not have romantic partners— as loners fuels, and also is reinforced by, the 
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romance boom. So, while women today are excused for postponing or avoiding marriage, 
they’re allowed no excuse for being out of romantic relationships (Ueno 1990: 60). The 
idealization of romance, which is intimately intertwined with the gendered evaluation 
system and social understanding of women’s happiness, impacts heavily on Japanese 
women’s subjectivity formation and gender relationships. Women in the 1990s are 
encouraged to be more than just cute or pleasant, but their competence, smartness, and 
competitiveness are not supposed to be overtly expressed because it threatens male 
subjects and consequently spoils their own lovability. Women are encouraged to be 
competitive enough to win multiple auditions in a way that the victory is (or looks), as 
Tanaka states above, unselfish.  
This seemingly contradictory message —the unselfish victory— manifests 
women’s paradoxical self-identity —the ‘natural’ selfness— in the 1990s. The natural 
selfness is an artful product that entails individual agentive efforts, calculated techniques, 
and presentation skill to enhance self-value and achieve victorious results in the way that 
the artful self looks unintentional and ‘natural.’ An.an’s 1996 article, “Everyone Has the 
Potential to Become Popular”, for example, asserts that popularity is an indicator to 
assess individual self-value but at the same time warns, “Obvious calculations and 
techniques to gain popularity disgust others. Only natural attractiveness draws positive 
attention” (an.an 1996: 7, emphasis added). The presentation of the selfness in fashion 
and make-up aligns with this emphasis on ‘naturalness.’ Sugao meiku, literally a “bare-
faced make-up”, meaning a make-up that is disguisedly natural looking, is, for instance, 
promoted in the mass media, advertising, and women’s fashion magazines. An.an’s 
“Advanced Techniques for the Sugao Meiku” issue (1996) also values this make-up 
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technique as a way to express the natural selfness (shizen na jibunrashisa). Idealized 
‘natural’ beauty here is, however, not the bare face itself. It is, as an.an describes, the 
face that “gives an impression of the bare face as if no artificial processes have been 
added to it even though the face is an end product of all sorts of calculations and 
techniques” (an.an 1996: 6). Thus, the creation of such a paradoxical face requires 
abundant knowledge about cosmetics, beauty, and trendy facial features, as well as 
advanced make-up techniques that make the fully painted face appear natural. Similarly, 
the ideal ‘natural’ self entails habituating socially valued characteristics into their bodies 
so as to cultivate the valuable self and body.  
What I intend to highlight here is not that the artificial face looks more ‘natural’ 
than the actual bare face (as Jean Baudrillard has already argued that the postmodern 
condition created hyper-reality), but that image- and information-based reality has 
become more real than the material reality (Baudrillard 1979: 24). Neither do I intend to 
argue that the ‘natural’ self is a fake. I would rather note that something significant in 
1990s Japan is that hyper-real beauty and self-value celebrated during the 1980s sign 
economy is brought to the level of materiality in the neoliberal project of the self. 
Individuals are no longer mere consuming subjects who play with signs and put them on 
their bodies to express self-greatness through conspicuous consumption. Instead, 
consumers and producers are alike encouraged to flexibly and creatively embody socially 
valued qualities in their bodies and enhance their human capital so as to self-actualize 
‘victorious’ results. The materialization is also considered to be a reaction to the 
superficiality of the sign economy (Iida 2002). In either case, the corporeality is 
centralized. Ann Anagnost, who has studied neoliberal reformation in the case of China, 
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argues that corporeal quality, which has been built into the body, has increasingly 
become a site of investment and a locus of technology of the self (Anagnost 2004: 192; 
also Gordon 1991: 44; Lemke 2001: 199). I also argue that Japan’s neoliberal economy, 
which is built upon postindustrial consumerism in the name of market-centered 
economics, permeates the empirical body and human life itself as a milieu where human 
capital is cultivated and accumulated. The body becomes the enterprise for the neoliberal 
subject, and the subject in turn becomes an entrepreneur who is evaluated in a variety of 
social and life events (Gordon 1991; Lemke 2001).  
Along with the romance boom in the 1990s, the socially valued quality of female 
lovability directs women’s subjectivity and desire toward cultivating so-called ren’ai 
taishitsu (body quality for romantic love). This body quality has been increasingly 
promoted and idealized at the turn of the 21st century. Ren’ai taishitsu usually refers to 
someone who has a tendency to fall in love easily, be in love always, and/or has had 
various romantic experiences (Sakai 2003: 22). Taishitsui, which originally means bodily 
nature by birth or acquisition, is usually used to describe one’s health condition, e.g., 
futoriyasui taishitsu (the bodily nature that tends to be fat), kyojaku taishitsu (a weak 
constitution), and taishitsu kaizen (continuous improvement of the body). Such health-
related vocabulary has been applied in popular discourses on romance since the 1990s. In 
one of An.an’s 1990 issues, “The Way to Make Ren’ai Taishitsu”, for example, 
responsiblizes an individual self, particularly her vanity, for an unsusceptible woman and 
suggests modifying herself to cultivate ren’ai taishitsu through what an.an calls a 
taishitsu kaizen (improvement) program. An.an proposes first to meditate and eagerly 
wish to have ren’ai taishitsu, then simulate a woman susceptible to romance as if one 
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were playing an interactive computer game, and finally do whatever provokes desire for 
romantic love like drinking champagne and reading romance novels (an.an 1990: 113). If 
one follows the program, the an.an article promises that the ren’ai taishitsu naturally 
inculcates the body like water flow within the body (Ibid).  
The body quality discussed here is considered as an environment or a set of 
conditions where certain behavioral and thinking patterns are habituated through 
meditation, simulation, and actual body moves. It is therefore modifiable and 
transformable by changing behavioral and thinking patterns. The body quality for 
romance that consists of image-based simulacra and materialized body condition 
manifests the intersection between the sign economy in the 1980s and the neoliberal 
reformation in the 1990s. As Baudrillard argues that material objects, to which images 
and meanings are attached, form the simulacra, the empirical body itself has become an 
object for the entrepreneurial subject to work on and hyper-realize self-worth in Japan’s 
neoliberal economy. Within the substantiated simulacra, a variety of interactive games 
and rituals such as romantic love and intimate relationships become socially scripted 
events, and any given social setting becomes a stage. On this stage, body quality is both 
the milieu and the media that one flexibly modifies to fit the stage setting and ‘naturally’ 
perform the socially valued self. The body is then neither a mere exterior that mirrors the 
interior, i.e., the self, nor a site where signs are displayed. The body in the 1990s Japan is 
rather a frontier where one cultivates and naturalizes the self of values—the values that 
are created, evaluated, and exchanged in the neoliberal social economy. This corporeal 
substantiation, I argue, is based upon the postindustrial sign economy of 1980s Japan. 
Individuals, who are aware of socially valued characteristics as mere signs or faking, 
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flexibly habituate them into their bodies to actualize self-fulfillment, self-worth, and 
well-being. This kind of creation and manipulation of the body and affect, as I will argue 
below, has closely intertwined signs with the body and affect and paved the road to 
commercialization of affect in the new millennium Japan.     
 
Affective Self in the New Millennium 
Despite the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s, Japan’s economy failed to 
recover from the Heisei recession. In 2002, the unemployment rate reached a record high 
of 5.5 percent with an estimated 3.8 million employees (male 5.9 percent and female 5.1 
percent) out of work. (Since many are left uncounted in government statistics, the actual 
unemployment rate was closer to 8 percent.) (Sōmuchō 2003) The prolonged economic 
stagnation, along with result-oriented neoliberal reforms, has led to an emerging class-
consciousness, popularly expressed in such terms as ‘winner’s group’ (kachigumi) and 
the ‘losers group’ (makegumi), largely overwriting Japan’s predominantly middle-class 
consciousness (Kelly 2002; Sato 2000; Yamada 2004). Many Japanese feel that there is a 
widening gap between rich and poor and that Japan has become a “society with a 
disparity in hopes”, in which only a few can realize their dreams, and the rest cannot 
afford any dreams whatsoever.  
Amid this general economic malaise, the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) 
stepped up its campaign to advance neoliberal reforms under the slogan “Restructuring 
Without Sanctuary”. These structural reforms introduced market mechanisms and 
principles of competition to every social stratum through deregulation and privatization. 
In order to increase the competitiveness of multinational corporations, for example, 
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Koizumi reduced barriers that limited mergers and acquisitions, and continued the “Big 
Bang” reforms started by his predecessor, Prime Minister Hashimoto, to create “free, fair, 
and global” financial markets. The government also supported such prospective 
industries as IT (Information & Technology) and the service economy with tax breaks 
and other subsidies. At the same time, in order to survive competition at home and 
abroad, companies have made cost reduction and greater outsourcing a top priority. This 
has helped create an underclass of drifting young workers—a highly politically and 
economically productive reserve army of labor known as furīta. Japan’s frīta have helped 
propel Japan’s service economy, performing as short-term contractors for major airline 
and automotive companies, government offices, restaurants, convenience stores, security 
firms, and host clubs. 
The expansion of Japan’s service industry has been promoted by neoliberal-
minded government reformers as the magical solution to simultaneously meet consumer 
demand for quality of life improvements and to absorb the unemployed. Foreseeing 
further increases in women’s entry into the labor market, continued diversification of 
values and lifestyles, and an aging society, the Koizumi administration stressed that the 
service industry is a potential area where creativity and innovation can expand the labor 
and consumer market (Shimada 2004: 3). Calling his plan to expand the service industry 
“bright restructuring” (akarui kōzōkaikaku), the Prime Minister launched his “Program to 
Create 5.3 Million Employment Opportunities” in 2003. The service activities outlined 
for individuals and families, as well as corporations and local communities, included 
house chores, childrearing, health care, elderly care, adult education, fitness, aesthetic 
salons, entertainment, financial management, legal services, and so on. In this rubric, 
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affect—feelings, emotions, desires, satisfaction, and intimate relationships—is 
increasingly fabricated into the service-based market economy.   
Such commodification of intimate life and human relationships is not peculiar to 
Japan. It is a global phenomenon. In their influential book, Empire, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri argue, “Today, productivity, wealth, creation of social surplus takes the 
form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic, communicational, and affective 
networks” in dominant capitalist countries (Hardt and Negri 2000: 294). They also argue 
that such a form entails “immaterial labor,” that is, labor that creates knowledge, 
information, communication, a relationship, or an emotional response (Hardt and Negri 
2004: 108; also see Lazzarato 1996). Immaterial labor, Hardt and Negri claim, consists of 
two principles: one is labor that produces “ideas, symbols, codes, texts, linguistic figures, 
images, and other such products,” and the other principle form is what they call an 
‘affective labor,’ that is, labor that produces or manipulates “affects such as a feeling of 
ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion” (Ibid). Particularly, affective labor 
is increasing in demand in postindustrial capitalist societies where affective laborers — 
nurses, nannies, maids, and sex workers— migrate (Ehrenreich and Hochschield eds. 
2003). And affective production and exchange in the service industry increasingly entails 
more direct human contact and blurs the line between the commercial and 
noncommercial as I will discuss in Chapter 3.  
The host club business has coincided with and flourished amid Japan’s intensified 
neoliberal restructuring and expansion of the service industry. Indeed, as most media 
reporting has emphasized, host club goers’ consumption has not withered during Japan’s 
bad economic times, but expanded into intangible commodities like “pseudo-romance” 
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(giji ren’ai) and male sexuality. Some might ask how private and intimate spheres of life 
such as romantic feelings and experiences has become commodifiable. I would argue that 
the sign economy in the 1980s uncovered not only identities but also affect that is 
performatively constituted through a chain of signs rather than essentially immanent. The 
idealization of scripted romance makes romance something that is externally stimulated 
rather than internally derived. It is not men’s ‘instinct-driven’ seduction but scripted 
codes that arouse women’s romantic fantasy. Kitagawa Eriko, the screenwriter and 
“Goddess of Romance,” for example, introduces some of the romantically coded 
locations, situations, and gestures that she uses to produce and manipulate affect in the 
viewing audience: twilight, beach at night, fireworks in the summer, a merry-go-round, a 
Ferris wheel, taking shelter from the rain, and such gestures as a man putting his overcoat 
over a woman’s shoulder on a cold winter day or holding her hand in a taxi (Kitagawa 
1996: 180). Thus, such affective labor, provided by a screenwriter, generates an 
emotional impulse and produces a certain affect via a TV screen in an image-based 
society. As such, romantic feeling itself becomes an immaterial product whether a 
screenwriter or a “real” boyfriend produces it, or it is manipulated in commercial or non-
commercial settings.  
In today’s information society, affective labor increasingly becomes accessible to 
the ‘ordinary’ people. Women’s fashion magazines such as an.an, for example, provide 
the reader with copious information, knowledge, and advice on romance. In an.an’s 
“Romance Supremacy” issue “ren’ai kagaku” (science for romance) reveals that physical 
proximity enhances mental intimacy and therefore, having side-by-side seats at a table 
creates a better romantic mood than face-to-face seating; the seating is also useful for a 
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woman to ‘naturally’ touch the arm of a love target or whisper into his ear (an.an 2005: 
36). Another tip advises that women stop contacting men for a week or so after 
exchanging short text messages everyday. (The method makes him think about her and 
their relationship.) (Ibid). Romantic feeling is thus decoded as something that affective 
labor in physical and psychological interactions is able to catalyze and manipulate. By the 
same token, anyone who acquires the knowledge and technical skills potentially produces 
and manipulates affect for business, sexual, and other purposes. In this respect, affective 
labor is ubiquitous and has economic value only when someone pays for it (see Lazzarato 
1996: 138).  
I argue that affective labor has social value\, if not an economic value, in Japan’s 
growing romance boom. Its value increases once the labor becomes scarce. Yamazaki 
Koichi, an influential columnist and trend watcher, argues that this is because Japanese 
men are caught in a triple-bind: they are objectified by women and the mass media, who 
expect them to act as leading masculine subjects but yet are not allowed to be 
domineering over women (Yamazaki 1995: 122). In other words, women’s fantasy and 
mass mediated messages paradoxically idealize the sensitive yet leading male “subject,” 
by whom women want to be selected and loved as a ‘naturally’ lovable “object.” 
Nonetheless, the objectified male subject is not supposed to actually dominate the 
relationship. Increasing numbers of men are, Yamazaki states, “timid with the binds and 
discouraged at devoting themselves to play such a role and please women” (Yamazaki 
1995: 122). Men are then allowed to withdraw from the scripted romance obligation 
because their self-worth can be fulfilled elsewhere such as in their occupation, hobby, 
and social network. I argue, however, that women too are under the threat of romance 
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supremacy and yet are not allowed to withdraw even though they are caught in a similar 
triple bind—the subjectivized female object, who is encouraged to be a competent agent 
but not supposed to threaten men’s self-esteem. The more scarce the resources, i.e., 
romantic partners, become, the more valuable and competitive romance becomes for 
women. In this gender null zone, men’s affective labor such as hosts’ “service” becomes 
commodifiable.  
Indeed, the host club commodity has become so successful that it is now self-
perpetuating. Televised representations, which are plentiful, typically feature a young, 
good-looking man in a designer suit who drives a brand new Mercedes and escorts his 
female clients to department stores, takes them to dinner, and finally his host club to 
relax. He embodies all the romantic codes: taking women to places known as romantic 
hot spots (e.g., amusement parks, fashionable bars, and places with lovely night views), 
treating them like “princesses,” and providing them with “ladies first” service such as 
opening doors, holding bulky shopping bags, and helping them put on their jackets. He 
also utilizes “scientific knowledge” on romance: having seats side-by-side at bars and 
restaurants, touching lightly on women’s arms and shoulders, and sending text messages 
to show his caring attitude toward them. Hosts I interviewed told me that they often read 
women’s fashion magazines like an.an in order to understand the kinds of romantic 
situations women fantasize about and how to practice pleasing them. In doing so, hosts 
equip themselves with the information, knowledge, and techniques that help interactively 
produce romantic affect in exchange for money. Several hosts told me that it was a 
pseudo-romance that hosts and their clients foster (even though they pretend as if they 
were serious) because money is involved and hosts’ feelings are not genuine. However, 
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they insisted that the pseudo-romance should be more ideal for their clients than the 
“real” romance. Hosts are paid to perform as idealized male subjects, by whom women 
are treated as if they were loved. In the host club, women ‘become’ the subjectivized 
objects, who are “lovable” despite their financial power. Thus, the “cooperative 
interactivity” between the service provider and the recipient — hosts and their clients — 
actualizes an ideal form of scripted romance in the market economy. 
This cooperative interactivity is increasingly stressed in Japan’s rapidly changing, 
yet still asymmetric gender relationships since the 1990s. As I have discussed, the notion 
of cuteness has been central to communicate with men, and please them, so as to be loved 
in return, whether the cuteness is genuine or fake. Cuteness used to flatter and please men 
so as to be thought of better is known as “kobiru”. The idea of kobiru, however, has given 
way to a more subtle show of conduct in the new millennium. Since the 1990s, an.an, for 
example, increasingly uses the word “kontorōru” (controlling), to describe the state of 
Japan’s contemporary gender power dynamics. An.an’s March 2005 issue, “How To 
Control His Mind”, for instance, proposes the use of “hypnotism for romance” (ren’ai 
saimin) in order to entice men to voluntarily act for a woman via tickling their self-
respect. An.an offers the following snippets of advice:  
Even if his sexual performance is dissatisfactory, you should say to 
him, “It was very good. Can you try this for me because I want to 
feel even more pleasure?” Such a way of asking motivates him to 
make greater effort to please you. … When you want him to call, 
don’t accuse him … because accusation makes him think that 
calling is something that is obligated and unpleasant. In order to 
make him voluntarily contact you, the key is to let him expect that 
there is something good waiting if he calls you. In this case, you 
should say, “Since I feel so lonely when I don’t hear your voice, I 
feel so delighted when you give me a call.” … Here, the rein called 
freedom (jiyū) is the key for the manipulation (an.an 2005: 23).  
 
 
 86 
 
This kind of psychological manipulation through calculated, yet suggestive speech acts, I 
suspect, also entails ‘natural’ performances expressed in such moments as when she says 
she is satisfied with his sexual performance or phone call, for example. The creation of 
the ‘natural’ selfness in Japan has extended its logic— an artful construct that is 
naturalized by advanced knowledge, calculated techniques, and stylized performance— 
to intersubjective communications and relationships where one manipulates the other as 
if it were unintentional. While the ‘natural’ self in the 1990s strove for social credibility 
on the self/body of values under Japan’s neoliberal reformation, in the new millennium 
the goal also seems to be to use the body in order to psychologically manipulate the other 
and extract advantageous deals. 
Competitive hosts stress that this kind of psychological manipulation is their most 
important business skill. In his popular book, Hosutoō no Sonokinisaseru Shinrisakusen-
jutsu (How the King of Hosts Wins Hearts), Reiji, a charismatic host often referred to as 
the King of Hosts in the media, for example, states, “The tactics used to seduce women 
are applicable to any sort of business situation with men or women” (Reiji 2001: 5). The 
key, he says, is to find the right spot to tickle his/her self-respect and psychologically 
manipulate him/her to have “better deals” (Ibid). In this way, hosts use their affective 
labor to create pseudo-romance not as an end product but as a means to entice their 
clients into spending more money on them. The affective labor thus becomes productive 
of social surplus and accumulative of capital in the market exchange. For male hosts, it 
becomes a means to cultivate neoliberal male subjects who self-actualize upward 
mobility via carefully calculated tactics, whereas for female clients, it is a way to perform 
as neoliberal female subjects who are financially competent and ‘unselfishly’ victorious 
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in romance. In the affective sphere of the host club, romance functions as a means and a 
process for both parties to self-actualize socially valued gendered selves and also 
manipulate the other, who has different interests and goals, for one’s own ends. 
Ultimately, fostering romance is about the production of the self, cooperative 
interactivity, and strategic negotiation. The multilayered meanings of romance are well 
depicted in the quotes at the beginning of this chapter: romance is “nutrition” for the self 
and “happiness” per se but also about planning, strategy, and victory.  
 The manipulative self—what I call an ‘affective self’—is made matter in this kind 
of subjectivity formation and intersubjective communication. The affective self is the 
term I use to refer to the self who has cultivated the bodily qualities of ‘natural’ selfness 
and is equipped with artful skills —seductive knowledge, communicative tactics, and 
persuasive performance—in order to entice the other into ‘voluntarily’ acting out for both 
his/her own and the one’s ends. The affective self is in this sense is the self who 
strategically provides the other with affective labor so as to take advantage of the other’s 
affect —self-respect, a feeling of ease, and passion— for the one’s personal gain, whether 
monetary reward or affective labor in return. An.an, as well as hosts themselves, use the 
term “self-producing” (serufupurojūsu or jikoenshutsu) to refer to this process. An.an’s 
“Fatal Encounter” issue carries an article entitled “26 Self-Producing Techniques to Draw 
More and Better Romance” with an illustration of a woman manipulating two puppets: 
herself and a man (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1: (From an.an 2006: 22) 
 
The article suggests there are two steps to bringing on romance: The first step is to 
“reform the self” through changing appearance, consciousness, behavior, and 
conversation in order to draw men’s attention (an.an 2006: 22). The second step is to “let 
a man believe” that you are his ‘fateful woman’ through such affective labor as creating a 
feeling of comfort and a sense that both share common interests (Ibid: 32). Here, ‘self-
producing’ means to manipulate the self (a woman) and the other (a man) puppet-like so 
as to conduct and persuade him to modify his beliefs, values, and conduct.  
The affective self is thus a performative self, one who creates, reforms, and 
manipulates to ‘self-produce’ certain effects on oneself and the other. Judith Butler 
(1990) has theorized that gender identity is not essentially inherited, but performatively 
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constituted in a way that repetitive speech and body acts of “men” and “women” refer to 
socially recognizable gender codes such as masculinity and femininity. Similarly, the 
affective self is a performative construct that consists of signification practices and the 
body quality of someone who is socially valued. It, however, entails not only signifying 
but also habituating the values to the self and the body so as to avoid uneasiness and 
distrust in interactivity. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) has conceptualized the 
notion of “habitus,” the acquired bodily characteristics, posture, and movements through 
which socialization into hegemonic social norms occur. While theorizing performativity 
and habitus is helpful to rethink the seemingly ontological reality of gender identity and 
body quality, neither Butler nor Bourdieu situate human agency in the process of 
subjectivity formation and use of the body—what an.an calls ‘self-producing’ and what I 
call an ‘affective self.’ The affective self, I argue, sheds new light on the process of 
agentive engagement. The affective self is neither a mere subject who (re)signifies a 
certain identity such as gender and sexuality nor a product whose socialization process 
largely fixates his/her conducts. The affective self is, rather, an entrepreneurial neoliberal 
subject whose self-identity and body quality is made matter as an enterprise for the 
subject to maneuver for personal gain.  
This model of the affective self is, I contend, a central feature of neoliberal 
governmentality because it allows individuals to act ‘freely’ to govern the self and the 
other, while simultaneously being governed by the other and by extension collective 
social norms and values. Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the ‘conduct of 
conduct.’ In his book Governmentality, based on Foucault’s lectures, Mitchell Dean 
describes the ‘conduct of conduct’ and writes:  
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[The ‘conduct of conduct’] is any more or less calculated and 
rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and 
agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, 
that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and 
with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects 
and outcomes (Dean 1999: 11, emphasis original).  
 
 
As Dean states, the affective self is the one who equips with diverse knowledge, 
techniques, and communication skills in order to shape the other’s conduct through 
affective labor (and satisfy one’s ends). The conduct of conduct is about suggestive 
speech and body acts that attempt to manipulate and govern the other’s conduct. Foucault 
calls this subtle direction of the conduct of the governed the art of government, 
suggesting that “governing is an activity which requires craft, imagination, shrewd 
fashioning, the use of tacit skills and practical know-how, the employment of intuition 
and so on” (Dean 1999: 18). In a postindustrial, service-intensive society such as Japan’s, 
I would argue that the art of government entails the affective self and its labor to conduct 
production of the agentive neoliberal subjectivity, social relations, and surplus value. I 
will demonstrate how the art of governance is undertaken by multiple agencies that are 
socially situated in class and gender terms in the later chapters.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
Since the 1970s, Japanese women’s subjectivity formation, ideal femininity, and 
gender relationships have transformed in tandem with Japan’s shift from an industrial to 
postindustrial economy. In the process, both men’s and women’s increasingly fragmented 
self-identity has been concomitant with Japan’s information-based sign economy where 
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informational, image-based, and communicative messages have created greater surplus 
value than before and helped fuel the nation’s flexible accumulation of capital. As I 
argued, the socioeconomic shift toward the sign economy resulted in the neoliberal 
subject, who is encouraged to flexibly substantiate socially valued signs in her body and 
artfully naturalize the ideal body/self. I also argued that the neoliberal subject is a 
prototype of what I called the affective self, that is, the self who utilizes the artfully 
naturalized self to manipulate the other’s affect and conduct in intersubjective 
communications. This manipulation of affect, i.e., the affective labor, has increasingly 
become a gear that drives the postindustrial service-based economy (Hardt and Negri 
2004).  
While affective labor has long existed, I demonstrate how it has become 
commodifiable via examining the case of the commodification of romance in 
contemporary Japan. I theorize that like self-identity, affect in the sign economy has 
become a performatively constituted experience through a chain of signs rather than 
essential immanence. Romance, for example, became overwhelmingly scripted in Japan 
during the romance boom of the 1990s, when knowledge of romance and techniques of 
seduction were decoded and re-scripted. Commodification of romance also reflects the 
changing, yet pervasive social valuation system based on sex differences that trap 
increasingly successful and prosperous Japanese women in a dilemma between being 
“empowered” individuals and “lovable” women. In this socio-historical context, men’s 
affective labor that fosters women’s feeling of being loved, respected, and satisfied 
becomes a commodity of value in the market. Thus, romance is transformed into a 
socially relevant commodity once it is exchanged in a market establishment such as the 
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host club. In my ethnographic study, the burgeoning host club business opens a window 
into understanding the mode of affect production, gender power dynamics, and the 
triumph of postindustrial capitalism.  
The historical reshaping of subjectivity formation, social relations, and policy 
making in the last 40 years was a story about the triumph of postindustrial capitalism. 
Japan’s neoliberal reformation has been a politico-economic solution to overcome crisis 
in national identity and economic stagnation. Today, the service-based market economy 
is proposed as a means to solve the nation’s unemployment and aging issues and enhance 
national competitiveness in the global economy. In the postindustrial sign economy, 
nearly everything is potentially commodifiable, including intimate life experience, 
romantic experience, sexual satisfaction, well-being, human relationships, and the self, 
itself. In the next chapter, I will examine how the commodification of affect is transacted 
in a Tokyo host club.  
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CHAPTER 3: COMMODIFIED ROMANCE IN A TOKYO HOST CLUB 
 
Recently, the landscape of prime-time Japanese television has become littered 
with shows about host clubs. Among the abundance of programs on air, the Super 
Television Series (Supā Terebi Shirīzu) by the Japan TV Broadcasting has featured an 
hour-long documentary program on host clubs every year since 2003. The station’s 
reporting focuses exclusively on clubs in the Kabuki-chō red light district, depicting the 
entertainment district as an extraordinary place within Tokyo, where women wantonly 
spend money on their hosts in exchange for fun and romance. A show named “Actual 
Recording! Hosts’ Prosperous Path” (Jitsuroku! Hosuto no Hanamichi) show, which 
aired in July 2003, was a typical example of Japan’s media representation of host clubs.  
The documentary opens at night with the sound of a loud siren and follows an 
ambulance rescue unit as it tries to prevent a young woman from jumping off a multistory 
building. The woman, who is dressed in a pair of jeans and T-shirt, screams, “Don’t 
come! Go away!” The program’s narrator begins, “The cause seems to be an emotional 
entanglement between a woman and a man.” A rescuer attempts to calm her down, 
saying, “There are so many men and women in the world. Death is a dead end.” After a 
few more tense moments, the rescuers succeed in stopping her from committing suicide. 
Spectators gathered below clap their hands and leave as if nothing has happened. The 
narrator comments, “In a big city like Shinjuku, life’s danger is no more than a 
spectacular sideshow.” Indeed, in these scenes of noise, darkness, messy relationships 
and sporadic happenings, anonymous individuals encounter the extraordinary but are safe 
within the familiar confines of Tokyo, Japan.  
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 Juxtaposed with the rescue scene, the TV program cuts to a host club scene in 
which female customers are flirting with their hosts at tables crammed with expensive 
bottles of liquor and multi-layered fruit plates. The show zooms in on Kazushi, a 26-year 
old top-ranking host who has just lost a few of his clients and is trying to reclaim his 
number-one status at the club. One day Kazushi is shown taking a trip to visit a wealthy 
client who lives in the city of Niigata, about 200 miles northwest of Tokyo. Wearing gray 
sunglasses, a black shirt, a pair of dark jeans, and brushing back feathered hair of medium 
length, he moves with the self-conscious demeanor of a celebrity. A woman dressed in 
black — long one-piece dress, stockings, and shoes — waits for him at the airport. Her 
face is fuzzed out for privacy, but a plump body is revealed below. “A company owner in 
her late 20s,” reads a caption. As Kazushi puts his right hand in his pants pocket and 
casually walks toward her, the client runs with short steps as she were about to melt in his 
arms. “If you say it is a sales activity on business, that’s exactly it,” explains the narrator. 
“Nonetheless, she must care for a man, who came all the way to see her,”  
On their way downtown, the woman asks, “You came all the way here to see 
me?” “Yes,” Kazushi says, “I came all the way [to see you or visit Niigata]. Niigata is so 
far away, isn’t it? I sort of understand how you feel [about the relationship or the 
distance].” The next scene shows her walking arm in arm with Kazushi to a men’s 
boutique. She looks for the same suit that Kimura Takuya, a popular singer and actor in 
Japan and other East Asian regions, wore in a TV drama series and buys Kazushi a 
similar one for 450,000 yen ($4,000). After shopping, they relax at a high-end bar before 
Kazushi has to fly back to Tokyo for the night’s host club business. She asks, “Can’t you 
stay?” “I have to go back,” Kazushi replies looking away. The client pleads, “The 
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airplane doesn’t fly tonight.” “I will let it fly,” he says, turning toward her. “You know, a 
liar cannot look into another’s eyes directly while speaking because of a guilty 
conscience. Today, I came here to see you because I am confident looking into your eyes 
and speaking. You know what I mean.” However, Kazushi’s speech and body language 
are disjointed onscreen. When making the remark he looks straight ahead, then at her, 
then straight ahead. He says no more and the scene abruptly ends.  
Despite the minimal communication, two weeks later the rich customer comes to 
Tokyo and orders Kazushi dozens of huge flower bouquets on his birthday, enough to fill 
the entire host club. Kazushi wears the new suit she has bought for him and makes her 
smile. Fifteen $1,000 bottles of Dom Perignon are placed on a table specially set to fill 
the so-called Champaign Tower — a pyramid piled four feet high with wine glasses. 
There is also a thousand-dollar fruit plate served. On that night, Kazushi’s client ends up 
spending over 2,000,000 yen in cash at the club, or roughly $20,000. The narrator says in 
disgust, “Her monetary sense goes beyond our common sense. Economic stagnation in 
the real world seems like a wind that is blowing somewhere else.” The money spent that 
night boosts Kazushi’s sales for the month and he recovers his number one status. The 
program ends with Kazushi smiling and having a drink with another client. The narrator 
concludes, “People might look down upon the hosting business, but hosts are doing their 
best. The host club is a men’s battleground, where hosts resolve their lies and insincerity 
with alcohol and play the game of romance on any given night.” 
Although the TV program displays the iconic extraordinariness signified by 
bundles of Japanese yen bills, as well as the game of romance and the speculative 
business of hosting, it does not attempt to examine the fluid and indeterminate 
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interactions between hosts and their clients. For example, how can sales and sincerity go 
hand in hand? What effect does Kazushi’s highly vague and ambivalent statements to his 
client have on her affect? In this chapter I demonstrate how the fluidity and 
indeterminacy of encounters and interactions between female clients and their hosts 
engender a romantic atmosphere and generate intimate feelings. Their cooperative 
interactions remain ambivalent, for instance, because they consist of a series of calculated 
speech and body acts embedded in seductive utterances, flattering words, and suggestive 
gestures that look “spontaneous” and of accidental touching and other occurrences that 
are manipulated to appear intentional. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter how 
‘natural’ selfness is paradoxically an artful craft that is designed to appear desirable and 
valuable by nature, I insist that an unexpected or ‘fateful’ encounter is an effect of these 
highly calculated, yet apparently unintentional speech and body acts that refer to scripted 
meanings of romance. In this respect, Kazushi’s strategic visit to his wealthy customer—
a business trip, really—is highly calculated to appear as an act of sincere love. In this 
way, Kazushi’s business activity is turned into a socially acceptable form of personalized 
“dating.” I argue that the intimacy engendered within this carefully constructed 
ambivalence blurs the dichotomy between the participants’ economic and emotional 
motives, commercial and “true” romance, and fantasy and reality. 
In order to demonstrate how the codes of romance are communicated and blurred 
in actual interactions, the goal of this chapter is twofold: to describe the topography of 
Kabuki-chō and what interactions with hosts are like and to analyze the ways that affect 
is provoked and manipulated through the communicative signs attached to the space and 
interactivity. I first demonstrate how Kabuki-chō as a space is formed through various 
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signs of differences in gender, sexual, ethnic, and class terms. Then, I illustrate my own 
experience of being a Japanese female researcher walking in Kabuki-chō, visiting a host 
club, and engaging in ‘after-hours activities’ with a host. In particular, I discuss how 
hosts’ affective labor in specific tempo-spatial contexts imbues a romantic atmosphere 
and produces intimate feelings, while simultaneously obscuring the line between the 
commercial and the personal. I use my own case as an example because I have found that 
other female clients who I have interviewed have had similar experiences. I also intend to 
highlight how hosts capitalize on their knowledge of romance and seduction tips gleaned 
from popular books and women’s fashion magazines. I argue that hosts are seductive not 
because they are womanizers in their own way but because their acts refer to and 
capitalize on romantic fantasy that women are familialized with. 
This chapter later introduces cases where female clients have “fallen for” their 
hosts. I analyze how female clients’ anticipation (including mine) of meeting a host in the 
host club slips into unexpected “happenings,” and point out that the uncertainty of the 
actual interactions make the romantic experience passionate and seductive. In his book 
Seduction, Jean Baudrillard writes, “Seduction … never belongs to the order of nature, 
but that of artifice—never to the order of energy, but that of signs and rituals. … Every 
discourse is threatened with this sudden reversibility, absorbed into its own signs without 
a trace of meaning” (Baudrillard 1979: 2). The romantic experience is then neither a final 
product nor a fixed order of nature. It is the communicative process itself that hosts and 
their clients mutually engage in and also put their assumptions and positionality under the 
threat of sudden reversibility. The fluid and indeterminate meaning-making and 
positionality of seducing and being seduced thus functions both as the threat and the 
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excitement of an encounter. This illegibility of the seducer and the seducee and of the 
victory and the defeat in a continuous cooperative interaction becomes the spark of both 
erotic fantasy and capitalist accumulation (Baudrillard 1979: 22). The nature of seduction 
hinges upon the affective and economic activities in the host club and therefore, it is 
important to investigate the art of seduction.  
 
Kabuki-chō in the Sign of Differences 
Shinjuku’s Kabuki-chō red light district, which houses the highest concentration 
of sex-related businesses in the world, is located in the heart of Tokyo. Initially 
established as an entertainment and amusement center after World War II, it helped spur 
the recovery of war-devastated Tokyo. In 1950, it was the site of Japan’s Exhibition of 
Industry and Culture, and the addition of the Seibu train line in 1952 rapidly accelerated 
the town’s development. Comprising an area roughly one-tenth the size of New York’s 
Central Park, Kabuki-chō today is packed with coffee shops, restaurants, public bars, 
theaters, karaoke boxes, game centers, pachinko-places, mah-jongg courts, hostess clubs, 
love hotels, and thousands of sex-related businesses such as pink salons (oral sex and 
assisted masturbation), peep shows, S&M clubs, and much more. The town is often 
called a “fuyajō” (sleepless castle) and a “yokubō no meikyū” (labyrinth of desires), 
where sexual activities are carried out all night long. Famous for offering all manner of 
erotic and sexual opportunities, images of alluring and scantily clad women are 
everpresent in Kabuki-cho, inviting the male heterosexual gaze.6 Information booths, 
                                                
6 By contrast, Shijuku 2-chōme, a well-known gay boy’s town, is located a few of blocks 
from Kabuki-chō. While there are a few transsexual/transgender bars in Kabuki-chō, 
these are mostly for the amusement of heterosexual customers and tourists.  
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which are scattered throughout the district, display free brochures advertising a 
smorgasbord of male-centered sexual fantasies —bathroom peeking, subway molestation, 
costume plays, erotic massages, assisted masturbation, and so forth. Except for a few co-
habit public bars, karaoke boxes, and game centers, Kabuki-chō manifests Japan’s 
longstanding male-centered heterosexual entertainments.  
Estimates on how much income Kabuki-cho’s sex-related businesses generate each 
year varies from hundreds of millions of dollars to more than a billion dollars. One reason 
why accurate figures do not exist is because of organized crime. In Kabuki-chō, several 
gangster (yakuza) groups territorialize the land and extort “rents.” Business owners largely 
see the yakuza as a necessary evil and pay them to receive protection from ‘troubles’ that 
other gangster groups create within the territory. Because of the gangster’s easy association 
with underground money, sex, and crime, their ubiquitous presence overshadows the 
image of the district. Not only the socially deviant yakuza but also ethnic minorities are 
associated with crime in Kabuki-chō. In particular, illegal immigrants have been 
problematized. A branch office of the Immigration Bureau was established in Kabuki-chō 
in 2003 to expose the high numbers of illegals, mostly from Korea,7 China, Thailand, and 
Russia, known to work in the district. While official numbers of illegal immigrants are 
unknown, a Japanese White Paper on Crimes (Hanzai Hakusho) blames foreigners for the 
increase of crimes in Japan in direct proportion to the increase in illegal immigrants. To 
many Japanese, ethnic mixing in Kabuki-chō is symptomatic of unlawfulness, deviance, 
and fear.   
                                                
7 The north edge of Kabuki-chō borders on Okubo, a town that is famous for the largest 
Korean town in Japan. There are some Korean restaurants, supermarkets, and 
entertainment establishments in Kabuki-chō too.  
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The presence of gangsters and ethnic “others” and the sporadic incidents of 
business trouble, fighting between drunks on the street, acute alcohol intoxication and the 
near constant presence of police car sirens, ambulances, and fire trucks intensifies the 
sense of uneasiness. These ubiquitous visual, auditory, and sensory signs signify Kabuki-
chō as an unsafe, yet fascinating phantasmal space within central Tokyo.  
 Such an exotic, erotic, and monetaristic consumer space lures both those who 
want to earn fast money and those who want to pursue pleasure and excitement. Kabuki-
chō is known as a site where jobseekers with little occupational skills and socioeconomic 
capital can try out their ‘bare’ self (hadakaikkan) or one’s arm (udeippon), both of which 
mean that such people have nothing else but the physical body itself to rely on. This type 
of unstable, non-salaried job was greatly marginalized by Japan’s corporate system up 
until the 1980s (Kondo 1991). Amid Japan’s neoliberal reformation, however, this 
perception has been changing. While working in Kabuki-chō is still looked down upon 
among mainstream Japanese due to the negative image of night work, the district today 
lures workers and jobseekers who do not fit Japan’s corporate system or who value 
‘entrepreneurial’ work over salaryman jobs. The opportunity myth that lucky women and 
men earn fast cash or gain sponsorship to open their own businesses is instilled among 
them. Indeed, Kabuki-chō has long attracted these people but as I will discuss further in 
Chapter 3, artisan-like or affective labor is increasingly valued as a way of expressing 
individual entrepreneurship. Hosts, for example, were once called “otoko mekake” (male 
mistress) and stigmatized, but hosting is today represented much more like a professional 
entertainment or service business in the media.  
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 While Kabuki-cho has long fed heterosexual men’s erotic fantasies in Japan’s 
postwar era, the consumer market also has expanded to feed heterosexual women’s 
romantic and sexual desires since the 1990s. No information is available about booths for 
women’s sexual fantasies, but hosts themselves work throughout the district to draw 
female attention and interest and to advertise hosting. Young hosts with stylish haircuts 
and fashionable suits are often seen hanging out with other hosts on the street. They 
typically smoke cigarettes and chat with one another while checking women passing by 
to tout for their host clubs.8 Each night hundreds or thousands of them prowl the streets 
of Kabuki-chō, making every effort to get women’s attention. With their slim bodies, 
tanned skin, and perfectly set medium-long hair, they show off their assets like peacocks 
preening for potential mates. On the crowded streets, once a host finds his target, usually 
a dressed up woman carrying an expensive designer bag, he intercepts her, imploring, 
“Good evening, are you going back home? Why don’t you stop by our club to relax and 
enjoy yourself?” Many women ignore their come-ons, but a few will eventually go on to 
spend tens of thousands — and in some cases millions — of dollars at host clubs.   
The majority of the host clubs in Japan are located in Kabuki-chō, which is not 
only signified in sexualized terms but is also class-marked. The host clubs of nearby 
Roppongi offer a study in contrast. The Roppongi area is nearby government offices and 
                                                
8 The increase in such hosts’ touting (which they call “kyacchi”, to catch), along with the 
rapid growth of the host club business, has become problematized as troublesome. As a 
result, a new regulation, “Rules to Prevent Troublesome Behaviors” (meiwaku bōshi 
jōrei), was put into force by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in April 2005. This 
new regulation now bans street vendors, as well as hosts, who insistently solicit potential 
customers. If they are caught, they may be imposed a less than six-month penal servitude 
or a less than 500,000-yen fine. Despite the regulation, hosts’ come-ons are not 
disappearing, but have become covert, with “catching” occurring secretly on the narrower 
streets and behind buildings.    
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TV broadcast stations and has recently redeveloped into Tokyo’s most upscale 
neighborhood. On top of high-end boutiques, jewelry shops, restaurants and bars, the 
newest symbol of the area, Roppoingi Hills,9 a gigantic 54-story building compound 
consisting of office, commercial, and residential areas opened in 2003. The Hills has 
come to symbolize Japan’s new-money wealth created from the IT business sector, which 
occupies most of the office spaces. Many corporate executives reside in the residential 
area.10 The wealthy image and sophistication of the Roppongi area is also projected on its 
host clubs, where fashionable “high-class” women like models, TV announcers, 
actresses, and Ginza hostesses pay visits. Roppongi hosts I have interviewed are proud of 
their club’s location and differentiate themselves from the Kabuki-chō hosts who, they 
describe, look sleazy and act greedy.11 They stress instead their “clean” and “fashionable” 
                                                
9 People, who work and live there, are called “Hills Tribe” (Hiruzu-zoku) and envied as 
members of the “winner’s group” (kachigumi) for their business success and privileged 
lifestyles. One of the better examples representing the image of the Hills Tribe is Horie 
Hirofumi. Although arrested for an illegal stock transaction, he was once directed his 
own start-up Internet company, Live Door, and was celebrated as the child of the age due 
to his business success, stock investments, and M&A management at the time I was 
conducting my research in 2003 though 2005. 
 
10 Rental for a Hills residence ranges from the equivalent of 5,000 up to 45,000 dollars a 
month, easily exceeding the average monthly income for a household in Japan. The 
average annual income per household in 2004 was 5,797,000 yen and has been declining 
in the past nine years in a row. (Fifty-six percent of the households reported their 
hardships.) The Ministry of Health and Welfare (Koseishō). 2005. “2004-Nen Kokumin 
Seikatsu Kisochōsa” (The 2004 Basic Research of National Livelihood). ” 
<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-tyosa04/2-1.html> accessed on July  
16, 2007. 
 
11 Hostess clubs in Kabuki-chō are similarly codified in class terms particularly in 
contrast to the hostess clubs in Ginza. Ginza is located nearby government and municipal 
offices and has a high-class image. In contrast, hostess clubs in the Kabuki-chō red light 
district are oftentimes associated with sleaze. Hostesses in Ginza have long been 
perceived as well educated, refined, and culturally sophisticated—able to serve 
government officers, CEOs, foreign VIPs, etc. On the other hand, Kabuki-chō hostesses 
 
 103 
(oshare) image. In my interviews, hosts at Kabuki-chō’s Fantasy admitted that host clubs 
in Roppoingi were more sophisticated and fashionable because of their location, but they 
also highlighted the fame, prestige, and history that Fantasy enjoys and the wealthy 
clients it consistently attracts.  
As such, the image of host clubs is closely associated with the topography of 
location and the signs that the location signifies. In this sign system, hosts, as well as the 
host clubs and Kabuki-chō, are always already classified by the sign of differences. At 
the same time, they take advantage of the signs of refined differences to manipulate 
meanings and affect in the same way Kabuki-chō hosts elevate their image status by 
mobilizing signs of fame, prestige, history, and clientele. Thus, space is not merely 
formed by the physical infrastructure but also shaped by production and manipulation of 
multi-layered signs: gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, values, ethics, and other forms of 
differences.  
 
Walking Alone in the Red Light District 
 One late summer night in 2004 I was walking alone in Kabuki-chō, observing the 
street scene for my research. I had just left a host club after interviewing some hosts. 
Since I had already conducted a month of preliminary research at a host club the previous 
summer, this was not the first night for me to be by myself in Kabuki-chō. But the street 
scene on this particular summer night seemed different because I was alone without any 
                                                                                                                                            
are thought to be recruited on the street and have little education. Indeed, the so-called 
“scout man” on Kabuki-chō’s streets, scouting for young women for “modeling,” hostess 
business, and sex work was once a well-known presence. They have disappeared from 
sight since the regulation was established.  
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specific purpose to be on the street except my observational research. After my research, 
I usually hustled through the crowded streets directly for the subway station to avoid 
hosts’ “catching” and catch the last train. (Whenever I was invited to after hour activities, 
I stayed with hosts and their clients.) At this point in my research, I was waiting for 
permission from some host club owners to conduct my doctoral dissertation research on 
site. My visual, auditory, and sensory perceptions reflected not only the tempo-spatial 
specificity of the night but also my positionality as a Japanese woman who had studied 
Japanese society and culture at U.S. institutions.   
On the streets were mostly young men and women socializing and hanging 
around, interspersed with salaried men in their business suits passing by. Fashionably 
dressed young women in small groups of two to five people were merrily chatting with 
one another, showing off their designer outfits, hairstyles, makeup, designer handbags, as 
well as accessories and other personal belongings. They looked like pages excerpted from 
young women’s fashion magazines. Their free and easy manner and occasional side 
glances created unguarded moments whereupon men on the street would approach and 
speak to them. They apparently enjoyed the male gaze and advances despite their bodily 
objectification. Juxtaposing these women in their 20s or so against my own image 
reflected on a window, I felt that I was an unattractive, isolated, and lonely woman who 
didn’t belong. This was a moment when my insider/outsider positionality as a Japanese 
woman/researcher prominently emerged. Because I had studied how the male gaze 
objectifies female bodies in Japan and other societies, I was critical about gender and 
sexual dynamics. At the same time, I was also raised in and exposed to the same cultural 
environment where the gaze itself paradoxically “empowers” women to be female 
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subjects of attractiveness and value. Kabuki-chō’s red light district at night is a 
microcosm of the latter cultural environment.  
With these mixed feelings, I walked alone in Kabuki- chō. A young man spoke to 
me obliquely from behind, “Hey, big sister, how do you like a host club?” (Onesan, 
hosuto kurabu wa ikagadesuka?) It was sudden and unexpected. I quickly stepped ahead 
as if to ignore and avoid him. My initial reaction was confusion: ‘What does he mean by 
‘big sister’? Do I look that old? I have to be cautious. Who knows what kind of sleazy 
host he is? Wait a minute! I am here to learn about the hosting business and this is a good 
opportunity, isn’t it? Oh no! I should have dressed up and worn cosmetics. I must look 
awful and am not ready for a host club! Should I just walk away? Should I talk to him 
about my research? I finally looked back and found that he was right next to me waiting. 
Unlike other hosts, who dyed their hair, wore gorgeous accessories, and pretended to be 
playboys, he had short black hair, wore a simple suit, and looked polite. Moreover, he 
was a handsome young man. I was at a loss for words. “Well, I …, I am researching host 
clubs. But, I …” “Why don’t you come over to see my host club?” he said. “It’s only 
5,000 yen for the first time visit.” “Where is your club?” I asked. “I work for club 
Fantasy.” “Fantasy is a famous club, isn’t it?” “Yes, it is one of the oldest clubs.” By 
then, I had made up my mind and followed him. 
 To be frank, his handsome features and polite demeanor helped finalize my 
decision, but clearly I also had my (research) interest in the host club scene. Going to and 
hanging out in the district was my own agentive act. Nonetheless, I also want to highlight 
that I expected neither to meet a host nor visit a host club on that particular night. Thus, 
while my agentive act set myself up for entry into the host club world, the concrete 
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encounter that had been made by someone else, i.e., the host, made the encounter 
accidental. As I will discuss later, this combination of general interests and unexpected 
actual encounters is a commonality that myself and other female clients share as host club 
goers. 
On the way to Fantasy, which was a less than a ten-minute walk, I mentioned 
briefly that I was a graduate student in the U.S. and was studying Japan’s host club 
phenomena. I learned that he was a 23-year-old host who had just started working at 
Fantasy five months earlier. His host name was Shin, which he said was his brother’s 
name, and he was the eldest son among four children. Upon finishing his middle school 
education, he began working for his father’s construction company but soon quit because 
of the hard physical labor. He then took a job at a men’s clothing store for a while but 
soon got bored, he said. While he was looking for something new in a job magazine, he 
happened to see a host club ad and decided to become a host. He said his plan was to 
make enough money to open up his own clothing store in the future. He now devotes 
himself to the hosting business and does not have a girlfriend. He talked openly about his 
family and educational background and occupational and romantic experiences. His 
sincere attitude embodied in his talk and manner convinced me that he was an honest, 
trustworthy person. Walking with him abruptly transformed my sense of unfamiliarity, 
fear, and loneliness to that of familiarity, comfort, and joy. Thus, as I come to know Shin 
and walk with him, both my feeling in and perception of the space is transformed.  
I would argue that this transformation was an effect of Shin’s affective labor that 
created and manipulated my feelings (see Hardt and Negri 2004: 108). It was also a 
cooperative interactivity between him and myself to meet two ends: fulfilling his goal to 
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“catch” a customer on the street and my interest in conducting participant observation. I 
also want to note that the contrast between the sense of alienation I felt in wandering 
alone and the feeling of ease in walking with someone made the latter more meaningful 
and pleasurable. Thus, Kabuki-chō, which is an encoded space with the excitement of 
various opportunities, relief from daily stress and constraints, pleasure of anonymity, 
anxiety of risk-taking, and sense of transience, yields not only a dreamlike, phantasmic 
atmosphere but also an affective environment—the environment where hosts capitalize 
on women’s affect and provide them with affective labor.  
 
Affective Labor and Intimacy in Club Fantasy 
Fantasy, one of the oldest and largest host clubs in Kabuki-chō, employing over 
90 hosts, is located in a basement and officially opens its doors at 7 p.m., but business 
really only gets going after 9 p.m. and typically lasts until dawn.12 Outside the building’s 
street-level entrance, a large, spot-lit glass showcase features glossy photos of the club’s 
top-ranking hosts who entice women passing by with their seductive and reflective poses, 
oblique glances, gentle gazes, and sometimes ecstatic facial expressions.  
Upon entering the club, customers descend like Alice in Wonderland into an 
opulently decorated open set, with gold-colored chandeliers, red carpet, mirrored walls, 
and neatly arranged marble-like tables in rows separated by various objects such as gold-
painted sphinxes and lions. A dance floor is set in front of a band playing live music. The 
                                                
12 The current Entertainment and Amusement Trade Law in Japan forbids host clubs to 
operate between midnight and sunrise in order to eliminate “unhealthy” sexual 
encounters. Nonetheless, the host business prospers during those illegal hours and silent 
approval is given by the authorities. 
 
 
 108 
splendid setting connotes glittering Las Vegas casino rooms or shakokai, a ‘sophisticated’ 
society where dressed-up men and women socialize. The smooth, glossy, superficial 
atmosphere derived from the club’s décor, the hosts’ polished etiquette, and dressed-up 
female clients renders the host club space otherworldly in contrast to the world outside. 
Shin explained that the club’s expensive image differentiates Fantasy from other 
“sleazy” small clubs.13 On this particular Saturday night, nearly every table was filled 
with female clients and their hosts. Looking at the rich- and beautiful-looking clientele, I 
felt completely inadequate. This sense of inadequacy was, I learned, a common feeling 
that many women in the club shared. Even Sachiko, a female client in her 40s and mother 
of two daughters, who had spent more than seventy million yen of her husband’s 
insurance money (roughly 700,000 US dollars) over three years, told me that she felt 
inadequate because she neither thought she belonged to the upper class nor wore 
expensive designer clothes. In this respect, affect is not a thing or a product that 
something like a host club space externally stimulates or someone like a host creates for a 
customer. It is rather an effect of how she positions herself in relation to and interaction 
with them as signs. As Sachiko’s case (and mine) exemplifies, the positionality is then 
neither determined nor fixed by the actual degree of social, economic, and cultural capital 
                                                
13 Host clubs are largely divided into two types based on the size of business flour and the 
number of employees: the so-called “big box” (ōbako) and “small box” (kobako). The 
former has a dance space with live music and employs over 50 hosts like Fantasy, 
whereas the latter usually has only a karaoke set with no live music and employs at most 
20 to 30 hosts. Majority of the host clubs in Kabuki-chō are the small ones. There are 
only a handful of “big” ones due to the necessary expenses. The table charge and prices 
of food and drinks are set higher at the big clubs. The minimum charge at a small club 
would be roughly 15,000-20,000 yen for a night, whereas it would be about 25,000-
30,000 yen at Fantasy. Because of the price, female clients who visit Fantasy expect 
better service in return.  
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one owns; rather, affect is reflectively shifting as the positionality changes depending 
upon signification practices of (inter)relational contexts.  
Once I was seated, Shin smoothly sat down next to me and immediately started up 
a conversation. “How are you doing? What do you think of the club?” Meanwhile, two 
helper hosts greeted me and sat down on small chairs on the other side of the table to 
make alcoholic beverages and keep the conversation going. They quickly lightened the 
mood and established a friendly atmosphere. Another helper host appeared to carefully 
lay a lace napkin on my lap and provide a steaming towel. All hosts in the club offered a 
seductive masculine image — fit, tanned, and exceptionally well-groomed. Shin, for 
instance, was average in height, but had a lean body, smooth facial skin, and a narrow 
nose, thin red lips, and neatly set short hair. He wore a dark navy suit with a three-button 
jacket over a white and light blue striped shirt with a salmon pink tie. His suit fit 
perfectly, without any noticeable dust or wrinkles, and his smooth hands and manicured 
fingernails disassociated him from dirt, sweat, and hardship. He did not smoke. 
In contrast, one of the helper hosts at the table looked much wilder and athletic. 
He was in his mid 20s and wore a casual dark brown suit coordinated with a brown shirt 
and dark orange tie.  He introduced himself as a surfer. His tall and athletic figure, tanned 
skin, lightly set medium-long brown hair, and gold chain bracelet associated him with the 
iconic image of surfers. However, his appearance, as well as Shin’s, seemed to be 
carefully sanitized so that he wouldn’t look sweaty, rough, or illiterate. Like the club’s 
décor, hosts’ appearances are carefully constructed so as to present themselves as 
phantasmic objects through which their clients evoke certain images and associate the 
images with their fantasized romance. In the host club, the exchange of signs creates 
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meanings and manipulates affect through the cooperative interactivities between clients 
and their hosts.  
Once alcohol was served to everyone at the table, I was given a toast. Since the 
customer is responsible for paying for the entire table, they also individually said to me, 
“itadakimasu” (thank you). Despite the casual atmosphere, I was nervous in the 
beginning because I didn’t understand the rituals in the club. Mild intoxication from 
alcohol consumption and hosts’ witty talk, however, soon broke the ice. “What is your 
name?” asked a host. “Akiko,” I replied. “No wonder you are pretty! Women named 
Akiko tend to be beautiful. Haven’t you ever been told that you look like a TV 
announcer?” “Um … , no, not really,” I said. “You know, the announcer in a local TV 
station, who has the unsophisticated beauty of the rural area!” Everyone burst into 
laughter. Harmless and meaningless conversation further kept up the lively atmosphere.  
 Later I learned from other hosts that such blandishments and flattery was a 
business technique hosts often used. They told me that the key is to elevate a person to 
the summit of praise and then let her drop in order to harmlessly please and amuse her. 
Unlike excessive flattery that sometimes annoys or disgusts a customer, the technique 
allows the host to leave her an aftertaste tinged with subtle pleasure. Although I didn’t 
pay much attention to the fluttery directed toward me, I remember that I didn’t think the 
remarks were mean or rude but rather felt pleased. Thus, hosts’ flattery is a form of 
affective labor that has elevated my positionality and created my pleasant feeling by 
covertly guiding me to associate with the socially popularized image of the female 
announcer. To put differently, the host’ affective labor that manipulates signs created an 
arbitrary meaning —I am an ideal woman— and flattered me.  
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Hosts’ affective labor consists of not only speech acts but also attentive service. 
While listening to the entertaining talk, I looked around the club. At any given table, four 
to five hosts surrounded one or two females. The hosts made sure that drinks were always 
fresh and food was served on small plates. This attentiveness was also highly stylized. If 
a woman stretched her hand to reach for a cigarette, for example, a host would reach for 
his lighter and flip it open elegantly with quick and smooth finger movements and lay it 
on his palm while he waited for her, all in one motion. Helper hosts immediately replaced 
the ashtray with a clean one once she had finished smoking her cigarette. They constantly 
removed empty bottles and dirty dishes to keep the table clean. They made every effort to 
treat women as extraordinary VIPs. The extraordinariness is illuminated in contrast to 
women’s day-to-day life experiences. Whether it is at home or at work, it is usually 
‘women’s work’ to serve food and drinks, make sure that family members, colleagues, or 
customers at the table are taken care of, and to clean the table (see Kondo 1990). The 
artful servitude of hosts inverts expected gender expectations for Japanese women and 
heightens their sense of self-importance, as several female clients commented in my 
interviews. In the sign-laden atmosphere of the host club, even the most prosaic gesture 
cannot be overlooked, as it is usually packed with significance and meaning. In the act of 
providing the cigarette light, for instance, a symbolic power hierarchy was observed: A 
person of inferior status exhibiting exaggerated servility to a person of superior status, ala 
a scene in a gangster movie. Sachiko, the widowed mother, told me that hosts’ fastidious 
servitude provided her with a feeling of freedom and satisfaction since she felt that she 
had been always a caretaker in her life. Akemi, a sex worker in her forties, praised hosts 
for their attentiveness in comparison to the majority of Japanese men, and stressed that 
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the host’s attitude made her feel like a princess. Again, host’s affective labor signifies 
inverted gender roles and hierarchy that evokes and drives their clients’ sense of self-
importance and freedom, as well as feelings of pleasure and satisfaction. Thus, the host’s 
affective labor is a form of production of signs and meanings through strategic speech 
and body acts to provoke certain affect, and consume it. In short, the affective labor is 
both productive and consumptive simultaneously.  
Host’s affective labor also serves to blur the line between the commercial and the 
noncommercial and complicates the host-client relationships. One of better examples is 
hosts’ intentionally personalized conversation as part of their affective labor that confuses 
a client as to her hosts’ intention. Behind their utterances and questions, is it commercial 
or personal? Hosts’ seemingly unconcerned questions and casual statements seem to be 
all for their business purposes in the commercial space of the host club. Nonetheless, 
their apparently “genuine” interest in their clients as women or persons in the 
conversational interactions undermines this suspicion. The indeterminacy of whether 
their intentions are commercial or noncommercial is something that is never completely 
resolved. 
Noticing that I was looking around and not paying attention to the conversation at 
the table, hosts began to alternately ask me personal questions. Here I will juxtapose the 
dialogue I had with the hosts with the actual subtext of the conversation as I 
simultaneously deconstructed it. I wish to note the indeterminate distinctions that casual 
utterances in personalized conversations can create between commercial and 
noncommercial natures.  
 
 
 113 
Shin: Do you like drinking? How often do you drink? 
Myself: Well, not much. I don’t dislike drinking, but I don’t drink much, either. 
 
I suspect that Shin was trying to find out if I would be a customer who would repeatedly 
visit the club. If a customer dislikes drinking, there is no point for her to visit the club and 
spend money unless she were “in love” with her host. Although my answer was honest 
about my alcohol consumption, I admit that the answer was more or less strategically 
ambivalent because I didn’t want them to have excessive expectation of me, but at the 
same time I didn’t want to lose their cooperation for my research, either.  
 
Shin: That’s best for girls. It is ugly for them to drink too much and get awfully drunk, 
isn’t it? 
 
I thought his response was similarly strategic to mask his intention of asking these 
potentially loaded questions. He simply responded in general terms to my vague answer 
so as to maintain his courteous engagement in the conversation. The surfer host, Natsuki, 
asked next: 
 
Natsuki: Where do you live? 
 
This innocuous question could be an inquiry about my social and economic capital. Had 
I said that I lived in Roppongi, the newly developed upscale neighborhood, I am sure that 
I would have impressed them. Since the host club is a space where customers enjoy 
 
 114 
playing the game of signs, some fabricate another self and hosts pretend as if they believe 
in them. For my part I honestly answered: 
 
Myself: I live in Shinjuku.  
Natsuki: Wow, do you? 
 
He sounded impressed. The image of Shinjuku is not as wealthy and sophisticated as 
other well-known locations in Tokyo like Denenchōfu, Aoyama, and Daikanyama, but due 
to its centrality Shinjuku is still expensive to live in compared to other parts of Tokyo. He 
continued: 
 
Natsuki: What kind of structure does the housing have? 
Myself: What do you mean? 
Natsuki: Is it an apartment or a house?  
Myself: Oh, it’s an apartment.  
Natsuki: How many rooms does it have? 
Myself:  It’s just 1K (one room and kitchen). 
 
I again wondered if these questions were intended to assess my assets, lifestyle, and 
family situation. It was, however, hard to tell why he asked about my housing in such 
detail. But, if I asked him why, I thought that I might ruin the conversational flow or that 
he would just say he was interested in moving to Shinjuku. Another helper host, Yuji, then 
interjected:  
 
 115 
 
Yuji: What do you usually do? 
Myself: Well, I am still a student and researching about host clubs. 
Yuji: So, do you write reports and essays?  
Myself: Yeah, something like that… 
Yuji: That is a luxurious lifestyle, isn’t it? You must enjoy afternoon tea every day. What 
kind of sweets did you eat today?  
 
They could guess my consumption patterns and lifestyle based on the kind of 
confectionery I ate and whether I bought it at a high-end department store, a widely 
known confectionery store, or a local supermarket because these commodity signs 
classify myself in Japan’s postindustrial consumer society. I didn’t want to reveal my 
financial condition and said: 
 
Myself: Oh, I just had a chocolate bar.  
The hosts at the table broke into laughter.  
 
I said so even though I didn’t have the “afternoon tea” because I felt obligated to say 
something to keep the conversation going.   
 
Here, I must note my positionality as a researcher (rather than as a client) that 
shaped my conceptualization of the conversational exchange. With a little knowledge 
from my preliminary research about the host club business, I assumed that there was 
 
 116 
some intentionality behind hosts’ speech and body acts and constantly tried to analyze the 
underlying messages. I presumed that everything they said and did was a business 
decision. On the other hand, I also need to note another aspect of my experience as a 
client. Hosts’ highly personalized questions and apparent interest in my answers made me 
feel as if they were interested in me as a person rather than as a potential client. Asking 
personal questions signifies his/her intention to get to know the interlocutor better 
professionally, personally, and commercially, particularly in the service economy. The 
ambivalence of tempo-spatiality in the host club —the personalized interactions taking 
place in the commercial setting— confused me as to whether their displays of interest 
were commercial or personal. The experience was particularly confusing because unlike a 
legal office or a hospital, the host club is a consumer space where no discrete professional 
treatment but rather romantic fantasy, intimate relationships, and personal services 
themselves are the commodities. As a result, some women interpret these indeterminate 
encounters as fateful and fall in love with their hosts as I will further detail below. I do 
not intend to bifurcate women’s interpretation patterns into either business assumptions 
or romantic beliefs, but I do wish to highlight the nebulous nature of the interactivity that 
creates room for multiple interpretations.  
While engaged in the Q & A session and trying to decode their intentions, I 
realized that Shin’s left knee was slightly touching my right knee. I first thought that it 
was unintentional, and moved my leg slightly away. But the fabric of his pants kept 
touching mine again. I realized that Shin had inched slightly closer to me, and I could 
smell the cologne he was wearing. As the scent further intensified, the rubbing of fabric 
became a clear sense of touching when Shin turned around to me and directly spoke into 
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my ear amid the loud laughter and noise. He simply asked me, “Are you having a good 
time?” I just nodded with a smile. This trivial interaction, however, left a ticklish feeling 
in my ear and created a sense of secrecy and intimacy. Indeed, Shin’s affective labor, i.e., 
the act of whispering, catalyzed a sense of sharing something that “we” were withholding 
from the others at the table. Along with his cologne, knee touching, and whispering in my 
ear, however, other factors such as my sense of mild intoxication, the dim and noisy 
atmosphere in the club, and the presence of other helper hosts synthetically created an 
intimate feeling. Thus, host’s affective labor depends for its effect upon other interactive 
factors and sign codes.  
It was approximately1 a.m. when the music died down and many of the hosts 
started to walk toward the cashier. It was closing time for the club’s early business hours. 
Shin brought me a bill on a tray held with both hands as if it were a very important thing. 
The bill showed the total amount of only 5,000 yen. I felt that I had gotten a great deal 
even though I had paid five times as much as the retail price of what I had ordered on the 
table: a roughly seven-dollar bottle of shōchū (wheat liquor) and a couple bottles of 
mineral water. My contentment did not mean that I was satisfied with the service per se. 
It rather derived from a comparative sense. I felt good about the special rate knowing that 
the regular price for the same package would normally cost more than 20,000 yen. 
Handing me a receipt, Shin spontaneously asked, “Are you hungry at all?” I was at a loss 
for words. I wasn’t that hungry but I felt as if I could eat something. Shin asked me again, 
“Do you wanna have something light?” I just nodded since I couldn’t come up with a 
reason to say no. Shin grabbed my bag from the sofa and escorted me outside. All the 
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helper hosts followed us, and saw us off by deeply bowing and saying, “Thank you very 
much!” (arigatōgozaimashita).  
 
Intensified Intimacy in the After Hour Activity 
As much as hosts’ affective labor can create a feeling of ease and intimacy, 
feelings of intimacy are further intensified outside context of the host club, i.e., during so-
called “afutā” (after hour activities). After leaving Fantasy, Shin took me to a casual style 
public bar (izakaya) in Kabuki-chō, where the prices were reasonable. Asked at the 
entrance if we preferred a counter or a regular table, Shin immediately chose the counter 
and told me that side-by-side seating enhanced proximity and promoted a relaxed mood 
compared to face-to-face seating. (Seating, I learned, was an important part of a host’s 
business technique.) Under the bright lights of the bar, Shin looked drunk. His eyes were 
reddish and watery, and his speech and movements were slow. “Are you drunk?” I asked. 
“Yes, I usually don’t drink this much. I feel special tonight. I feel good.” His response 
made me feel good. Making this kind of statement —“being with you is special and 
pleasant”— was another seduction technique that, like the seating arrangements, an.an 
had suggested to female readers to take advantage of and signify their special feeling to 
their romantic target. Shin’s table choice and statements mirrored what women were 
advised to do in order to seduce men. Nonetheless, Shin’s behavior appeared so 
spontaneous due to his smooth performance (if it was) and physical indication of “real” 
intoxication. He seemed much more relaxed, as if the weight of his work had been 
unloaded. That might have been the effect of my own affective labor and also his labor to 
make me feel at ease about the situation. Both of us had soft drinks to cool down and had 
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some fried shrimp, grilled fish, and salad. Once the food was served, however, Shin 
immediately divided it onto small plates and gave to me first. Since he was drunk and his 
hand was shaky serving the food with his chopsticks, I tried to help him. But he insisted, 
“Please go ahead and eat. Ladies first!” 
Mindful of my role as a researcher, I asked if it was common for him to engage in 
after-hours activities with his clients. “Only when a client asks me or when I feel like 
doing it,” he said. While he answered in general terms, he might not have meant 
anything. Because of my ambivalent positionality as a researcher and a client on that 
night, however, I couldn’t help wondering what he wanted to do that tonight with me 
since I hadn’t asked. Shaking off my distracting thoughts, I continued to ask, “So, when 
do you feel it’s appropriate to have after hour activities?” “When I am interested in the 
woman and want to know her better,” Shin said. “What kind of persons do you tend to be 
interested in?” “Well, I like a person who has something missing in myself such as … 
intelligence,” he said. Shin looked toward me and casually, yet semiseriously added, “I 
like an intelligent woman,” as if to observe my reaction. I was at a loss for words. It was 
one of the few moments when the division between researcher/client, 
occupational/emotive motive, and the truthful/pseudo reaction had collapsed. For a 
second, I wondered if he meant he liked me but then I thought he was a host after all, 
someone whom I should not be taking seriously. I jokingly said to him, “You were 
hungry, anyway.” Shin kept looking at me and teasingly said, “You don’t understand 
men’s minds, do you?” Although I wasn’t (and am not still) sure what he really meant, 
with my later research on hosts I learned such suggestive statements and gestures are part 
of the game of romance that hosts play. Instead of saying, “I like you,” as Shin did, they 
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would typically make generalized statements like, “I like a woman like you” and “You 
are my type” to subtly direct women to voluntarily (mis)understand and assume that he 
likes her. Shin’s phrase, “a man’s mind,” would be another example of carefully created 
ambivalence in both general and personal terms: it could be interpreted as both “women 
in general do not understand men” and “You don’t understand my mind.” Hosts use this 
uncertainty and ambivalence to guide women to enhance their imaginative romance   
because, as Baudrillard, among others, argues, the imaginative romance is more romantic 
than the real one (Baudrillard 1979: 12).  
Trying to change the topic, I asked Shin about his hosting experience. He 
confessed that he had lost a few clients recently, and I asked why. He said that probably 
he had become too busy to pay personal attention to his clients after being promoted to 
kanbu (a chief). He sighed and quietly said to me, “It is such a crucial time for me to keep 
the position, you know?” I was glad that he shared his vulnerability with me because his 
“honest” voice was valuable as a friend as well as a researcher. At the same time, I also 
wondered whether he intended to evoke my sympathy and lead me to support him as a 
client. My research and his business interests evolved around friendship and intimacy that 
again blurred the distinction between a “true” and “calculated” relationship. I could 
clarify myself as either a researcher or a potential client. I was, however, afraid of losing 
his interest in the “relationship” I needed for my research. Much like the hosts I was bent 
on researching, my own equivocation was equally calculated.    
Once he finished his stories about his hosting, romantic, and life experiences, he 
suddenly grabbed my left wrist and brought it toward his chest. It was so sudden that I 
didn’t know how to react. I just felt the warm, smooth, and soft skin of his hand against 
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my wrist. He looked at my wristwatch asked what time it was. Then he looked at me, 
saying, “Oh, it’s past 3 o’clock. Shall we go?” I nodded. Shin added, “By the way, this 
watch is nice. Who is the designer?” I said, “Oh, it’s just a fashion-label watch,” while he 
kept holding my wrist. I noticed that my sensory attention was concentrated on my wrist 
and the pleasant tension created a feeling of intimacy. Again, “touching” is a common 
seduction technique in Japan and other cultures. Attendant with the side-by-side seating 
arrangement that allows ‘natural’ touching on the arm and knee, for example, an.an 
stresses that the effect of touching lies in drawing attention to the adjoined body part that 
evokes physical and mental proximity and by extension erotic passion (an.an 2005: 24). 
Based on hosts’ interpretations of Shin’s moves in my interview research afterward, I 
now think that his actions had at least four related but discrete functions: He literally 
wanted to know the time; he concomitantly checked my wristwatch to assess my 
financial capability; he also attempted to evoke my intimate feelings by touching, and/or 
he indirectly tried to guage my reaction to see if I wanted to stay with him for the rest of 
night. His single act had multiple functions and meanings that could have proliferated 
with a variety of possible combinations.  
Meanwhile, the waiter brought us the bill. It was about 4,000 yen. I tried to pull 
out my wallet, but he stopped me. “It’s on me. This is something I wanted to do. So, …” 
He wouldn’t let me pay. This was, as I learned later, another hosting technique that 
confused business activity for personal ‘dating.’ For hosts, paying a small amount of 
money outside the club is a gesture to reciprocate their clients’ favor and also a business 
investment for later high returns in the host club, where clients are fully in charge of 
paying. This act whereby a host pays even a small amount of money for his clients 
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confuses clients’ perception as to whether their relationship is commercial or 
noncommercial. This is because in the act of paying inside and outside the host club for 
the time and “service” the relationship is demarcated as commercial. In particular, the 
commercial aspect is highlighted in contrast to the pervasive social expectation that men 
pay in dating or at least split the cost.14 If women pay, it is an indication that they are well 
off and can “buy” men. Therefore, once hosts pay for their clients, the act of hosts’ 
paying causes conceptual slippage that turns acts of commercial purpose into fulfillment 
of a socially expected men’s role. Thereby, their clients become confused about whether 
their relationships are commercial or not.  
Some women addressed this confusion. A woman in her 50s said to me that she 
believed that her host thought of her as special because he invited her out for a dinner and 
paid for the meal. In her mind, when out with hosts women are supposed to pay because 
they are the clients. Because of this assumption, when her host pays even small bills, the 
relationship becomes ambiguous to her. For a female client who wants to be thought of as 
special and wishes the relationship were for real, men paying is selectively highlighted to 
mask the fact that she pays the big bills at the host club.  
Once out of the pub, it was drizzling. Shin said that he would help me find a taxi. 
We started to walk without umbrellas. My sandals got wet and I couldn’t keep up with 
                                                
14 The gendered expectation has been changing in concomitance with the increase in 
Japanese women’s disposable income, and more couple split their dating costs. 
Nonetheless, the gendered social expectation still remains in a more nuanced form. For 
example, it has become pretty common to go Dutch with pretty much everything except 
the cost of the so-called “love hotel,” where intimate and erotic interaction occurs. This is 
because men are still largely perceived as the ones who are in charge of sexual matters 
and play active roles in both sexual encounters and paying. If a woman pays for the hotel 
cost, that fact signifies that she is active in sexual matters and risks being labeled as a 
promiscuous woman. 
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Shin. I was walking one or two steps behind. We had no conversation. I then realized that 
we were walking on the so-called “hotel street” (hoterugai), where “love hotels” line both 
sides of the street for three blocks. The street reminded me of a host’s account I had read: 
hosts who did makura eigyō (literally pillow business, meaning to have sex with clients 
for money) intentionally walked the street to lure their clients into the hotels. I suddenly 
felt uncomfortable about the silence, and innocently resumed the conversation. “I’ve read 
a host’s account about the pillow business …” “Oh, did you know about that? What did it 
say?” “Well, those who do pillow business intentionally walk on this street and those 
who don’t avoid here.” Having said that, I realized that the statement assumed Shin was a 
potential pillow host, looked down upon as a sex worker even among hosts themselves. 
Reservedly, Shin simply said, “These are just buildings and mean nothing to me.” I was 
impressed with his answer. Indeed, they were just buildings if all the conceptually and 
morally attached erotic signs and sexual meanings were removed from them. I still 
wondered why he took the route, however, despite the fact there were many other ways to 
get to the main street. Did he try to mask his real intentions? Or, did I interpret his 
accidental street choice intentionally by assuming that Shin was a potential pillow host? I 
asked Shin, “Why are we walking here?” “No special reason,” said he.  
On the main street, Shin hailed a taxi for me. He pulled out my business card from 
his jacket and said, “I will call you. Please call me anytime if you have a question or 
anything.” I thanked him. His phrase, “I will call you,” echoed in my mind because he 
said earlier that he rarely called his clients. The everyday exchange in turn became 
significant in relation to his earlier remarks. I got in the taxi. Leaning his upper body 
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toward me, Shin said loudly, “Please come to research me again.” I smiled and said, 
“Bye.”  
The next day, he sent a text message to my cell phone, asking me how my 
research was going. We had text message exchanges for a few days. I gradually came to 
notice that his personalized messages to me were replaced with the mass mail he sent to 
his clients indifferently. While his earlier personalized messages had referred to me by 
name and involved some back-and-forth dialogues, the mass-produced ones did not refer 
to me and tended to be shorter, general, and one-way. With the fewer and less personal 
messages that I received, the attachment and friendship I had felt earlier quickly faded. 
Shin stopped contacting me once he learned that I had officially received permission 
from Fantasy’s management to do research at the club. The permission allowed me to be 
less dependent on Shin and at the same time, it probably meant for him that I would no 
longer be a potential client who would spend money on him. While some scholars have 
argued that modern technology such as Internet and cell phone can facilitate feelings of 
intimacy despite actual physical distance, I would stress it is not about the technology 
itself that overcomes the distance. It is rather about the affective labor embodied in the 
frequency of personalized contact via the technology that creates intimate feelings, 
whether it is a commercial or non-commercial setting.  
 
Various “Falling For” Hosts 
Like any other human relationships, romance entails a processual set of mutual 
encounters, interests, and investments in the relationship. The process, however, tends to 
be taken for granted, whereas the spontaneous and accidental aspects tend to be 
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highlighted in dramatizations of romance among women I have interviewed. Their 
narratives on the relational development with their hosts tend to stress unpredictability 
and fatalism. This is because despite the well-known nature of the host club, female 
customers do not necessarily expect to actually fall for their hosts. As such, their actual 
encounters with hosts become “unexpected” against the backdrop of their general interest 
in the host clubs. As my own encounter with a host on the Kabuki-chō street showed, I 
was no exception. My research interest brought me to the district but I didn’t expect to 
meet a host on that night. Unintentional encounters with hosts were also a common theme 
among three other women I interviewed who regularly patronized Fantasy.  
Sachiko, the 42-year-old widow and working mother of two daughters, for 
example, visited Fantasy with her friend after a year-end party on a December night in 
2002. She told me that at the time she was just curious to see what kind of place a host 
club was since she saw some host club scenes on TV. She never imagined that she would 
become involved with a host as a widow and mother. In fact, she said to me, “I thought 
that flirting with hosts was really stupid (bakabakashii).” As a first time visitor, Sachiko 
had many hosts who came to introduce themselves and gave her their business cards. 
Hikaru, a 29 year-old new host, was one of them. It was Hikaru who changed her original 
intention completely. Sachiko told me that she fell for him at first sight and added that he 
also seemed to feel the same way. She described that Hikaru sensed her feeling toward 
him immediately since she couldn’t stop keeping her eyes off him. She liked him because 
he didn’t look like a host at all and gave her a “clean” image. According to her, he wore a 
simple suit with his short black hair and looked very athletic. Although she wanted to get 
to know him better, his senior host eagerly approached her and intervened. The senior 
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host invited Sachiko for an after-hour activity and also brought along some other younger 
hosts including Hikaru. While he was seducing her, Sachiko said that she kept brief eye 
contact with Hikaru. In order to get rid of him, she suggested to him that she would pay 
to take him home by taxi since he was drunk. As soon as she took him home, she swung 
back to Kabuki-chō to see Hikaru. The obstacle the senior host created, Sachiko said, 
made her passionate about Hikaru, and the re-encounter with him intensified her feelings 
toward him. She went on to visit Fantasy to see Hikaru twice a week and helped him 
become a top-ranking host within a few months. Sachiko said, “If Hikaru wasn't at the 
club, I wouldn’t go there. I like him as a person, a person who happened to be a host at 
that moment.”  
Not all clients, however, have had a dramatic encounter with a host like Sachiko. 
Lisa, a 33-year-old divorced mother of two sons, for instance, also faced an “obstacle” 
but took a different approach. She and her neighborhood friends decided to visit a nearby 
host club one night in a Tokyo suburb to enjoy themselves. She simply designated a 
young host since she thought all hosts were more or less the same. But she soon became 
attracted to Koji, a tall and senior host, who she thought sincerely listened to her. She 
wanted to, but couldn’t, replace her designated host with Koji because of the 
monogamous designation system in the club. She followed the rules and tried to enjoy 
her short conversations with Koji when she visited the club once a week or so. Three 
months later, she was able to designate Koji because her host quit. Since then, she has 
been a client of Koji’s for three years. Lisa told me that her relationship with Koji is more 
like friendship since Koji has been very supportive when she has had troubles in her 
marriage with her ex-husband, who was addicted to gambling. Her female friends were 
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too busy for their own childrearing to consult with her concerns, she said, whereas Koji 
was always there. She is now a single mother and cannot afford to visit the host club 
frequently. Koji, however, still maintains the friendship, which Lisa appreciates, but is 
wary of validating his feelings for fear of furthing developing the relationship while she 
is in financial distress. For her, things have just happened for a reason. She does not feel 
that she has done much and comments, “Maybe it is fate, the fate that things happen as 
they are meant to happen.”  
Like Lisa, Fumi, a single and self-employed sales woman in her mid-40s, ended 
up designating a host who was not her first choice. A good friend of hers took Fumi to 
Fantasy after her birthday party for the first time, and she was immediately attracted to 
her friend’s host, Tsutomu. She told me that Tsutomu took her breath away because he 
was her ideal type — a masculine, humorous, and warmhearted handsome man in his 
30s. She had to give up him up, however, because her friend was in love with him and 
she didn’t want to disturb their friendship. Observing the radical transformation of her 
friend from a careless middle-aged woman to a young-looking and attractive woman 
because of her romance with Tsutomu, Fumi said that she also wanted to experience it for 
herself. Tsutomu introduced his friend and host, Daisuke, who was not her type. Even so, 
it was a way for her to maintain her close friendship with Tsutomu and enjoy group 
activities between the two couples. As time went on, however, Fumi told me that 
Daisuke’s eagerness and sincerity to have a serious romantic relationship gradually 
changed her feelings toward him. He showed how much he cared about her via telephone 
conversation, text messages, and through his friend, Tsutomu. Although she didn’t take 
him seriously in the beginning, she told me that she was eventually convinced that he was 
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serious. Since then, she became his “girlfriend” and helped him become a top-ranking 
host.  
While all of these three women I interviewed somehow got interested in the host 
club scene, none of them originally expected themselves to actually become romantically 
entangled with hosts. Sachiko and Lisa, for example, perceived that flirtation in the host 
club was a waste of time and individual hosts were indifferent. Even Fumi, who envied 
her friend’s drastic makeover, indicated that she was interested in her own transformation 
rather than romance with a host itself. Interestingly, Sachiko and Fumi’s narratives 
suggest that paying for romance is either “wasteful” or instrumental in getting something 
else but romance per se. I will discuss women’s motives further in Chapter 5. The 
intentional distancing of the self from the game of romance paradoxically creates 
exceptionalism. For Sachiko, Hikaru was not like a host and for Lisa, Koji was a 
distinctively caring person among indifferent hosts. In addition to the exceptionalism, 
some sort of “obstacle” enhanced their feelings toward their hosts and dismantled their 
resistance to the idea of romance in exchange for money. In the consumer space of the 
host club, where customers supposedly enjoy fantasies, these customers were constrained 
still by social obligations and ethics such as friendship, hierarchy at work, and the club’s 
rules. These socially created obstacles, I would argue, stimulated the female clients’ 
affect and made them passionate about their relationships and appreciative of even trivial 
and limited interactions. Furthermore, the social aspect in the commercial environment 
blurs the line between everyday reality and fantasy, and socioeconomic and emotional 
motives. In short, “true” and commercialized romance becomes inseparable. Thus, the 
indeterminate tension between the conceptually produced exceptionality and the 
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externally imposed constraints intensifies the sense of intimacy and leads the client to 
make the relationship with the host meaningful and real to them despite their original 
intention.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the affective self, who provides affective 
labor and manipulates the other’s affect to entice him/her into ‘freely’ acting for both 
ends, is a central feature for neoliberal governmentality in a postindustrial service-
intensive society. Along with Japanese governmental programs to expand the 
postindustrial service-based industry in the new millennium, the affective labor in 
extensive interpersonal contacts would be in greater demand in the labor and consumer 
markets. In this respect, the personalized interaction in such a commercial area as the host 
club provides a unique window into the fluid and indeterminate interactivity that 
undermines dichotomies between instrumental and emotive acts, commercial and “true” 
caring, and phantasmal and real relationships. Because of its ambivalent nature, affective 
labor could be exploited by the other (clients, employers, and by extension national 
policy makers). Likewise, however, it also has the seductive potential to manipulate the 
other, mobilize the other’s assets, and make greater surplus for personal gain. In other 
words, affective labor potentially triggers speculation in the production of phantasmic or 
hyper-real affect.  
Indeed, such affective labor can be used for dishonest trading, too. The so-called 
“furikome sagi” (money transfer fraud) has become a nationwide social issue in Japan 
since 2003. The scam, which is well plotted out, takes advantage of familial concerns and 
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affections to swindle money. A typical plot goes something like this:  a victim, who tends 
to be a women or an elderly person at home alone, receives a call from the “police,” a 
“lawyer,” or a “gangster,” who claims that her/his beloved husband, child, or grandchild 
is in a big trouble because they have caused by an awful traffic accident, 
misappropriation, or other misbehavior. An authoritative voice over the phone 
persuasively convinces the victim to transfer money to a bank account immediately so 
that he/she can “rescue” the family from the criminal and legal charges. The victim even 
has the “family member” on the phone, who apologizes and begs for help in an 
uncontrollably groaning and lamenting voice. The unexpected conversation usually 
compels the victim to go to the bank immediately without consulting anyone. The fraud, 
which has increased rapidly since 2003, counted 21,612 reported cases and damage 
amounted to 25.1 billion yen (equivalent to 250 million U.S. dollars) in 2005 (The 2006 
White Paper on Crime).15 Despite improved social awareness and preventive efforts by 
the National Police Agency, the problem continues to get worse because the scam has 
increased in sophistication. In addition, similar to many host club clients, the victims in 
TV interviews insisted that they knew about the fraud but never expected that they would 
actually become victimized. But the telephone conversation they had sounded so real and 
so disturbing that they ended up believing in and involving themselves in the fabrication.  
I do not mean to imply that the host club business is a swindle or Japan’s service 
industry is dishonest and manipulative. Nonetheless, I do highlight the scheme that 
                                                
15 According to the National Police Agency in Japan, the reported furikome sagi were 
3,807 and damage amounted to over 4.3 billion yen in 2003. The 2006 White Paper on 
Crime. 2006. The Ministry of Justice. <http://www.moj.go.jp/HOUSO/2006/hk1_1.html> 
accessed on July 21, 2007. 
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affective labor gears individual affect toward economic transactions, whether for a 
personal, commercial, and criminal purpose. In this sense, I am not concerned about the 
nature of ambivalent affective labor and its impact on social relations, production and 
consumption, and value making in Japan’s service-based postindustrial society. While 
affective spells in transient interactions like fraud are soon broken, interactive 
relationships for extended periods between service provider and recipient might even 
muddy the discrete line of legality and illegality since the participant, who is part of the 
cooperative interactivity, is in the position of judging and reporting a transaction if it is 
criminal. With this in mind, hosts’ affective labor that sustains ambivalence works to 
avoid illegal claims by leaving room for the client to make her own decisions and 
voluntarily act them out. In such a way, the conduct of conduct is based on not forceful 
coercion but suggestive guidance in the name of ‘freedom,’ and remains in the realm of 
legality.     
The ambiguity of affective labor, which has multiple functions as part of the 
creation of affect, manipulation of the other’s acts, and maintenance of legality, is largely 
overlooked in mass mediated representations of hosts and taken for granted among 
female clients. As the women above exemplify, their narratives about their relationships 
with hosts tend to stress the accidental nature of their encounters and they perceive hosts’ 
affective labor not as work or business but as an expression of their passionate feeling, 
caring personality, and love. I argue that this perception is exactly the effect of the host’s 
affective labor that is work, yet is not allowed to look as such. In short, the labor consists 
of highly calculated acts and learned skills that are manipulated to look spontaneous and 
unintentional. In the next chapter, I will discuss what motivates hosts to acquire such 
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acting skills and demonstrate how the skills are counted as human capital — the capital 
that allows them the opportunity to dream of upward class mobility via mobilizing their 
female clients’ affect and economic assets.  
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CHAPTER 4: NEOLIBERAL CLASS STRUGGLE: SELF-NARRATED 
ENTREPRENEUR HOSTS VIA COMMODIFYING THE SELF 
 
 
Hosts are the commodities. Here [in the host club] hosts have 
nothing particular to sell except outrageously inflated drinks and 
food. So, if we provide or sell something, that’s ourselves. (Hide, a 
33-year-old host and former computer salesman). 
 
[Unlike salarymen] hosts are more like self-employed 
entrepreneurs who simply rent the host club space to do their own 
business (Daisuke, a 34 year-old host and ex bar owner). 
 
If asked, hosts usually say, “Hosting is an occupation to sell 
dreams” (yume wo uru shigoto). For those who want us to allow 
them to dream, we become a cool guy, a funny person, a romantic 
lover, and an interlocutor. You name it (Yoshi, a 24 year-old host 
and former part-time worker).  
 
 
 What is a host? This is a somewhat misleading question. In the context of the 
hosting business, which by its proximity to Japan’s normative sex industry is often 
associated with the sordid underground of gangsters and female exploitation, the typical 
answer offered by the media and other commentators is that hosts are akin to male 
geishas or prostitutes, professional entertainers, or barely distinguishable from gigolos 
(Associated Press 1996; Marketplace Radio 2003). Such reactionary, stereotypical 
categorization reflects not only the novelty and fascination the public has about men 
“entertaining” women, but also a general unease about the seemingly inverted traditional 
sex roles, women’s speculative spending during the nation’s prolonged economic 
downturn, and the subversive threat it represents to Japan’s conventionally hegemonic 
salaryman-centered corporate system. As I argued earlier, the host club phenomenon 
extends beyond what is new or faddish.  
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When I asked hosts to define themselves, the most common responses I got were: 
“The host himself is a commodity” (jibun ga shōhin) and “A host is like a self-employed 
entrepreneur (kojin jigyōnushi).” Indeed, the more I talked with hosts and learned about 
what they do and how they define their work, I gradually came to understand that hosts 
occupy a dual self—the self as a commodity and entrepreneurial salesman. The former is 
the self/body that hosts beautify and incorporate stylistic movements to appeal to 
potential female clients. The latter is the embodied person who maneuvers the 
commodity self/body as a vehicle to manipulate the customer’s affect and stimulate their 
desire to ‘buy’ a time and service that it provides. These two selves are inseparable and 
oftentimes unclear. But together they clearly define not only the stage performance that 
they carefully rehearse and act out in the host club but also the ambivalent nature of the 
neoliberal self in Japan’s affect economy.  
Hosts’ dual sense of self as both an enterprise and an entrepreneur echoes 
Foucault’s theorization of human capital under neoliberal governmentality. Foucault 
describes that human capital consists of two components: “an inborn physical-genetic 
predisposition and the entirety of skills that has been acquired as the result of 
‘investments’ in the corresponding stimuli: nutrition, education, training and also love, 
affection, etc.” (Lemke 2001: 199; also Gordon 1991: 44). Hosts exemplify this model 
and indicate that their work is not merely a mechanical labor based on a given instruction 
and discipline; their work builds on prior investments and the use of acquired skills, 
sensibilities, and aesthetics that produce affective values and yields revenues on human 
capital. As Colin Gordon states, the individual is “in a novel sense not just an enterprise, 
but the entrepreneur of himself” (Gordon 1991: 44). As a result, an individuals’ human 
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capital enables him/herself to become “autonomous entrepreneurs with full responsibility 
for their own investment decisions and endeavoring to produce surplus value” (Lemke 
2001: 199).  
While Foucault’s notion of human capital is helpful to understand host’s dual 
sense of the body/self, what counts as human capital is situated in the socio-historically 
specific context and hosts’ subjectivity formation is much more complex than the binary 
model. Since hosting is a corporate business aimed at providing affective labor for 
consumers, hosts have triangular relationships and attempt to seduce female clients into 
spending (and investing) money on them, while the club management seduces hosts into 
being voluntarily exploitable. In addition, to sell dreams or seduce women, hosts are 
expected to willingly objectify themselves and play whatever role their clients want them 
to (as Yoshi’s above quote demonstrates). In Chapter 2, I discussed how Japanese 
women’s expectations for their counterparts caught men in a triple bind as the objectified 
subject, who is expected to be a sensitive yet a leader, but not domineering. I also traced 
how affect such as romance has reached commodity status and men’s affective labor has 
become socio-economically valuable at the nexus of Japan’s socioeconomic 
transformation, postindustrial consumer culture, and state of gender relationships. 
Chapter 3 illustrated how host’s affective labor, which is highly calculated to look 
spontaneous, blurs the line between economic and emotional motives and commercial 
and “true” relationships. In this chapter, I focus on male hosts and explore how they cope 
with the complex whirl of the paradoxical signs and relations.   
More specifically, this chapter examines the ways that hosts engage in class 
struggle through the affect economy. Some neoliberal critics have pointed out that 
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diversified self-expression in the neoliberal market economy undermines class-
consciousness despite expanding income inequality (Brown 2003; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2000: 298; 301; Harvey 2005). For example, Jean and John Comaroff state, 
“[A]s neoliberalism conditions render ever more obscure the rooting of inequality in 
structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical solidarities of ‘identity’ in 
constructing selfhood and social being, class comes to be understood, in both popular and 
scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2000: 306). They perceive that the concept of class becomes ever more 
intractable and fundamental, and “captures neither the complex construction of 
contemporary experience nor the crises of social reproduction” (Ibid). I argue against 
such a view and demonstrate how hosts have a keen sense of class-distinction. 
Nonetheless, they do not intend to erase class markers or dismantle social inequality; 
rather they glorify the handful of successes and the winners of socioeconomic 
competition and intend themselves to scale the ladder within the existing capitalist market 
system.  
I argue that such a paradox—being aware of social inequality and yet eagerly 
sustaining it—is made imaginable and practicable in the neoliberal social ethos of 
entrepreneurship and future-oriented profitability in Japan. I also argue that the affective 
speculation in the host club is an effect of the global economic shift toward less tangible 
ways of accumulating capital. Along with the transformation to greater flexibility in 
modes of production, accumulation of capital has been intensified in such industries as 
finance, information, and service where speculation creates greater market values 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; Tsing 2000). In the speculative economy, such skills or 
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human capital as aesthetization, dramatization, and sensual appeal, i.e., the affective labor 
that creates and manipulates excitement, passion, and satisfaction, become instruments of 
value making and capital accumulation. In this respect the host club, I contend, is a 
microcosm of this global economic trend.  
More succinctly, it has become an opportunity site for typically working-class 
Japanese young men to deploy their bodies and self-actualize a ‘luxurious’ lifestyle. In 
this regard, the affect economy of the hosting business provides them with the 
opportunity to acquire and propagate new techniques and skills for the purpose of 
dramatizing their marketplace (i.e., the host club) and seducing the other (i.e., their 
client). While seduction lies at the heart of any commercial enterprise, an attempt to 
mobilize consumptive labor, that is, the speculative spending consumers provide in an 
affect economy, creates greater surplus value because speculative value-making exceeds 
human labor capacity within the twenty-four-hour day (Joseph 2002: 41). Such 
mobilization entails what I refer to as the art of seduction, that is, a host’s creative use of 
aestheticized body, calculated moves, and strategic interactions to guide or affect the 
conduct of his clients to spend more money on him while at the same time satisfying their 
own fantasies and desires, as well as his ambition. I ultimately argue that the art of 
seduction is the pivot of such a speculative market activity as an affect economy in the 
host club.  
 
The Opportunity Myth 
Unlike other ‘ordinary’ ones, the host club job ads typically read, “Want self-
motivated individuals. Education or career experience not required.” Club Fantasy also 
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extends its employment opportunity to pretty much anyone as long as one is a male 
Japanese who has a ‘decent’ and youthful look.16 In the club, a brutal monthly sales 
competition provokes a survival-of-the-fittest battle over a scarce resource—wealthy 
women—and the resulting sales solely determines hosts’ wages and rank. Due to the 
harsh competition nearly one-third of new hosts quit their jobs within six months of 
starting work. Nonetheless, the host club does not run short of hosts. Fantasy employs 
over 90 hosts ranging in age from their early 20s to 60s. For many of them, the host club 
represents an opportunity to achieve upward mobility despite coming from a lower social 
background.  
Koji, a 25-year-old veteran host and ex-construction worker, is a case in point. 
Originally from Hokkaido, in the northernmost part of Japan, he moved to Tokyo when 
he was sixteen after dropping out of high school. He told me that he was a promising 
basketball player but he injured his knee, shutting down his future as a player. He needed 
a new environment to start over his life. He said he imagined Tokyo as the ideal place to 
have an urban city life filled with limitless opportunities and freedom; but he soon found 
that he had limited employment opportunities with his educational background and no 
work experience. While employed at a construction site, he learned about the hosting 
business from his female friend who told him that he would become a popular host due to 
his height, ‘pretty’ face, sense of humor, and likable personality. She took him to a 
suburban Tokyo host club, which was, as he said, a completely different world from his 
dirty, sweaty, and physical working environment. “Looking at the number one host there 
and learning that his monthly wages were over two million yen, I thought there was a 
                                                
16 Fantasy limits its employment to Japanese citizens. The owner explained the reason 
was to avoid unnecessary problems such as illegal immigration and language barrier.  
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chance I could try myself here (jibun wo tamesu chansu).” Koji said, He started working 
at the host club at age 17. (He lied about his age, saying he was 19.) For him, hosting 
provided not only an employment opportunity but also a chance to “become a successful 
man who can afford to live in nice place, wear nice clothes, and drive a nice car.”  
In contrast to Koji’s future-oriented motives, an older host I interviewed glorified 
his past success in the hosting business. Fifty-five year-old Mr. Minami, a number one 
host roughly thirty years ago, quit hosting and started his own bar with the money he 
earned in the club. His business, however, went bankrupt and he was forced to find 
another occupation. He soon found that he could do very little with his compulsory 
education and night work experience. Although he could have become a taxi driver or a 
factory worker, he said that he couldn’t imagine himself working for such low pay and 
rigid working hours. “Since I had tasted nectar from a flower (amaimitsunoaji) in the 
club, I couldn’t forget about it,” he said. “I just wanted that one more time before I 
retired.” His flower metaphor connotes easy money with a flexible work style, and 
idealizes the hosting job in comparison to blue-collar work. Mr. Minami, who earns the 
equivalent of about 2,200 dollars a month, confesses that he sometimes cannot sleep 
when he thinks about his advancing age. He has no family and little savings. He is not 
eligible for the national pension because he hasn’t paid into the system as the salaryman 
has. For Mr. Minami, the host club is a site where he embraces his past as a comeback 
opportunity.  
Idealization of the hosting job is not limited to those who have working-class 
backgrounds. It has also extended to former white-collar salarymen with a college degree 
in the midst of Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation. Hide, a 33-year-old host with 
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college degrees from a third-tier university, used to work as a salesman for a computer 
company. He told me, however, that he was constantly living under the anxiety of being 
laid off and the pressure of working long hours. With the salaryman job, Hide said, “The 
future vision is bleak. Even if you are lucky to avoid getting laid off and work until 
retirement, you can still barely afford a house.” He decided to become a host when he 
saw a TV show about hosts who became overnight millionaires. “With hosting you are 
like the self-employed,” he explained. “The more you sell, the more you earn. It all 
depends upon self-motivation and effort. It’s not impossible to make over ten thousand 
dollars a month. I want to bet on the dream.” Ever since Japan’s economic situation 
started worsening in the 1990s, Fantasy’s Club Manager told me that increasing numbers 
of ex-salarymen had started working at the club. Former salarymen now comprise 
roughly one fourth of the hosts in Fantasy. Hide is not an exception but an example of 
those who eschew the supposedly stable salaryman-type employment to place all bets on 
the casino-like “opportunity” available at the host club.  
Despite their different ages, these three hosts share some common characteristics 
with other hosts in terms of social background, attitudes, goals, and endeavors. The 
majority of hosts I met at Fantasy have a limited educational upbringing —many are high 
school dropouts— and have little hope of achieving socially-screened success in Japan’s 
highly stratified corporate-based economic system. Most arrived after working part-time 
jobs (as so-called frītā) in convenience stores and fast food restaurants, or as factory 
workers, construction workers, and salarymen at small-size (chūshōkigyō) corporations. 
A few hosts, who have prestigious university or college degrees, have created a special 
niche within the club to sell themselves as “intellectuals” (interi in Japanese). Hosts 
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generally view the host club as offering the chance to make easy money and achieve 
socioeconomic advancement. Dreaming of their chance at success, they fixate on their 
appearance, sales technique, skills of seduction and persuasion, and flair for the dramatic 
in order to enhance their marketability and desirability. All effort is focused on pleasing 
women and increasing monthly sales, culminating in the coveted ‘number one’ status—
the sure path to a ‘luxurious’ future.  
Several hosts I interviewed named Horie Takafumi, a former president and CEO 
of an Internet portal company called Livedoor, as their role model. Mr. Horie, who is in 
his mid-30s, launched his company when he was a college student and is Japan’s most 
celebrated, if not visionary, entrepreneur of the new Millennium. Although he was 
arrested for violating Japan’s stock exchange law in 2006 after a hostile takeover bid, his 
outspoken criticism and assertive manner in confronting Japan’s ‘old guard’ business 
establishment has captivated the public’s imagination and made him a symbol of what 
Japan’s new economy is capable of if only free market forces can be set loose. His 
chubby face, spiky hair and informal attire have set him apart from the septuagenarians 
who, until recently, have dominated Japanese business. (In a country where neckties are 
the norm for businessmen, he is frequently seen wearing T-shirts or unbuttoned collared 
shirts.) Former prime minister Koizumi, the architect of Japan’s so-called “restructuring 
without mercy” (seiikinaki kaikaku), enlisted Horie’s help in an attempt to privatize 
Japan’s postal system and spoke highly of Horie’s entrepreneurship that prioritized 
innovativeness, competitiveness, and monetary success, and challenged traditional 
Japanese business conventions such as respect for harmony, seniority, and consensus 
building. Several hosts told me that they wanted to become like Mr. Horie, and for them, 
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hosting is a suitable means of achieving what Horie has achieved—success, fame, and 
financial capital accumulated through hard work, luck, and speculative tactics.  
In the host club, Japan’s stock market for romance, hosts’ body itself becomes an 
investment tool for mining what is possible. Hosts deploy their body to entice female 
clients into spending more money on them in direct relation to their desirability, 
capability, and market value. The result is quantified and evaluated by the monthly sales 
competition. Hosts dream of achieving “top-ranking” status and celebrity-like recognition 
in the club, and many fantasize about becoming business owners and eventually 
managing their own clubs. As such, the body itself is an integral part of an affect 
economy that allows hosts to fashion themselves as both commodities and entrepreneurs.  
The very potentiality of the body as a vehicle, however, paradoxically enables the 
expansion of capitalist accumulation in the market economy (Anagnost 2004: 201). In the 
case of hosts, they are aware of their self-commodification and the myth of achieving 
wealth in the host club, and in this respect they are not trapped by any false 
consciousness. They rather ‘voluntarily’ subordinate themselves to the exploitative nature 
of their working conditions because they so strongly believe that if they can get lucky and 
meet the right woman —i.e., a wealthy woman—they too can get rich and live the life of 
their dreams. Such wealthy clients, called futoi kyaku (“fat customers”), are relatively 
rare. But to hosts who work excessively long hours in an attempt to make their own luck 
despite the fact that only a handful of hosts actually make a successful living in the 
hosting business the odds of hitting the jackpot are always one rich customer away. When 
asked what appealed to them most about hosting, many of the hosts I interviewed 
mentioned the casino-like nature of the job as a main reason. Indeed, many admitted to 
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gambling outside the club at baccarat, racetracks, Pachinko parlors, and other betting 
venues during their off-hours. Hosts, who are either speculative by choice or necessity, 
are fitting players of the affect economy, where the mode of accumulation of capital has 
become more intractable and imaginative in Japan’s neoliberal socioeconomics.  
One host I met at Fantasy, who asked to remain anonymous because he said his 
family did not approve of his occupation, admitted that he was a heavy gambler, and said 
that luck plays a big part in the hosting business. “There's a lot of cases where in one 
night you can get really rich or really broke,” he said. The host recalled the time a 
customer walked into the club and turned a bottom-ranking host who was struggling into 
the number one host, spending over 100,000,000 yen on him. Three months later, the host 
quit because the woman had bought him everything he wanted. The host club showcases 
such successful stories and promotes itself as a land of opportunity for self-motivated 
individuals. Top hosts at Fantasy earn the equivalent of more than $10,000 to $20,000 
dollars a month. In their birth months they typically rake in $30,000 to $50,000 by 
throwing a special birthday party in the club. Like celebrities, they draw attention in the 
club as they show off their consumption — expensive wristwatches, fashionable brand-
named suits, and imported high-end European cars — that they have received from their 
clients as ‘gifts.’ Such opportunity is open to any ambitious and good-looking young 
male, as the host club job ads promise.” 
Thus for the typical working-class host, the host club represents a chance to 
exploit their human capital both as a commodity and a means to self-actualize their 
economic success. Indeed, for those who do not own means of production, 
commodification of physical, emotional, and sexual labor is not new in the history of 
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capitalism. Nonetheless, commodifying the self and at the same time pursuing a 
speculative style of earning in the name of entrepreneurship is, I argue, peculiar to 
postindustrial neoliberal capitalism. It is symptomatic of neoliberal ethics and values in 
Japan, where the nation’s long-term social security, corporate welfare, and family-
oriented way of life are gradually giving way to future-oriented profitability and 
individual-based entrepreneurial opportunity.  
Such ethics and values entail individual self-motivation toward the futurity, which 
is not necessarily inherited in hosts or spontaneously provoked. It is, I argue, produced 
and manipulated in hierarchical tempo-spatial formation, numerical and visual reminders, 
and ritualistic events in the host club. In the following section, I will demonstrate how the 
host club space, which is presented as a fantasy world for female customers, 
simultaneously functions as both an opportunity site and battleground for hosts that stirs 
their pride, self-respect, and motivation for success and fame.  
 
Topography of Self-Motivation 
Ohayogozaimasu! The familiar Japanese morning greeting reverberates inside 
Fantasy around 6:30 p.m., when the new hosts with no sales start work for the day. 
Although it is evening, it is the beginning of a new day for those who sleep during the 
daytime. The club feels radically different at this hour. With bright incandescent lighting, 
evening news on the radio, and the emotionless faces of hosts, the usually splendid image 
of the club is missing. Like the exposed aftermath of a Las Vegas lounge act, the stage is 
laid bare with rickety lamps, worn-out sofas, and stained walls. A few of the newer hosts 
can be seen sweeping the floor, wiping tables, cleaning restrooms, replacing burnt-out 
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light bulbs, gluing broken pieces of decoration, and setting up tables before the club 
officially opens its doors at 7:30 p.m. A couple dozen more hosts gradually show up. 
When upbeat background music is turned up and the lights turned down ten minutes 
before opening time, the scene abruptly changes, replaced by a pleasant tension that runs 
throughout the club. Hosts quickly fasten their ties and fix their appearances. Some hosts 
reset their hair with perm dryers in front of the mirrors built into the walls. Others check 
their facial expressions, like stage actors prepping for a show. They wrinkle their 
eyebrows and loosen their lips as they rehearse their masculine poses and facial 
expressions and seductive smiles. All hosts make sure their ties are straight, their collars 
are even, and hair is perfectly set one more time before they sit down to wait for their 
clients. It’s nearly showtime. 
Showtime, however, differs based on the actor’s monthly sales. At Fantasy, 
individual hosts’ sales result determines not only their hierarchy and earnings but also 
starting time. When the club opens at 7:30, only a third of the hosts that work at the club 
are present. Since business really only gets going after 9 p.m., the top-ranking hosts enjoy 
a later start time. New hosts like Hide, for example, have to show up for work by 6:30 
p.m. and do cleaning, set-up, and telephone operation. Those who are no longer new but 
have less than $2,000 in monthly sales (like Mr. Minami) must start work by 7:00. They 
are exempted from major cleaning, but are supposed to assist the new hosts. Those in the 
$3,000 monthly bracket, including Koji, begin at 7:30. They are free from having to 
clean. They come to the club to get ready for the evening’s business. Those whose sales 
are in the range of $3,000 to $4,000 start work at 8:00, and those lucky individuals with 
more than $4,000 in sales begin at 8:30. Hosts who have accumulated more than one 
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million yen ($10,000) for two consecutive months (of which 2.5 million has been gone to 
the club) earn managerial status and enjoy the best hours, the 9 p.m. to 1 a.m. time slot. 
Usually, these veteran top-ranking hosts come to the club with their clients already in 
tow. This highly stratified pecking order based on sales, along with photo displays of top 
ranking hosts hung here and there on the walls inside and outside the club, embody and 
visualize the club’s rigid hierarchy, a similarity shared with Japan’s traditionally 
hierarchically organized culture, especially in the workplace.  
But the similarity ends there. At Fantasy, age, social background, and job tenure 
don’t matter. For hosts, only sales matter. As many hosts like to say, “This is a world 
where only results speaks for themselves” (kekka ga monowoiu sekai). The results-
oriented mantra extends to the placement of timecards and constantly updated sales charts 
as well. The time cards are located nearby the front desk and are held in a rack in 
descending order — the top-selling host at the top and the lowest at the bottom. It is 
designed as if it were a physical reminder, particularly for the lower-ranked hosts who 
literally need to make more physical effort in picking up their cards, not to mention 
improving their sales. The rack is set up conveniently for the top-ranking hosts to easily 
pick up their time cards placed at their eye-level, whereas the lower-ranking hosts like 
Mr. Minami and Hide must bend over or squat down to reach their cards. Like the photo 
displays, the placement is also a visual reminder to each host of his ranking each time he 
punches in for work. As hosts turn around to walk toward the locker room, a sales chart 
attached on the sidewall comes into view. Again, hosts’ names appear in descending 
order on the chart, with the names of top-ranking hosts at the eye-level, and the names of 
lower-ranked located way down. Each month the chart is updated weekly for the first 
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three weeks and daily for the final week, showing rank, sales amount, and designated 
numbers.  
For hosts, the backstage sales ranking system is a constant reminder that their 
workplace is primarily a sales contest. There is no escape from the competitive 
atmosphere within the club. The men’s room is no exception. The narrow toilet booth, 
which is located at the furthest corner from the entrance, is filled with the club owner’s 
own handwritten business lessons. Highlighted lessons in red ink are placed at the eye 
level of hosts who use the urinal built in the wall. Lessons, for instance, say: “Quit the job 
immediately if you are not self-motivated!” “Don’t become a loser!” and “Take 
advantage of even your own girlfriend until you have your own clients and sales.” The 
owner’s lessons extend to his business philosophy that emphasizes money, success, and 
fame. The philosophy at chest level says: “All money is equally honorable and has no 
distinction in its origin.” “People and money follow success.” “Believe in yourself and 
work hard until you achieve your success.” These business lessons and philosophy leaves 
no room for mercy, redemption, and excuses. As hosts maintain, only results after all 
speaks for itself in the host club.  
Even if a host turns his eyes away from these lessons, an itemized penalty system 
is prominently displayed on the side walls in the men’s toilet. If a host is late to work, for 
example, he is penalized 500 yen ($5) for every ten minutes he is tardy. If he has no 
client on Sundays and other selected dates, a 5,000 yen ($50) penalty fee is deducted 
from his hourly wages. A host who violates the club’s rules will be fired and his pay for 
that month will be confiscated. For a host like Hide who lives in Tokyo and earns a fixed 
wage of only 4,000 yen a night, the fines can be fatal. Those who have little sales with 
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fines typically earn less than $1,500 dollars a month. They have already cut back their 
meals, transportation fees, and other living costs including their rent and everyday 
necessities. So, these penalty fees hurt the lower ranked hosts more than the top ranking 
hosts, whose earnings trivialize the ‘small’ fees. Since there is no room for negotiation or 
mercy from the host club management, the only way to deal with the penalty system is 
either following the rules or increasing sales. Most hosts, who struggle with the latter 
option, have very little choice but to strictly follow the rules.  
These tempo-spatial formations alone do not solely determine hosts’ self-
motivated attitudes as hosts often complain about how much money the club saves out of 
the collection of fines. Hosts are motivated by more tangible rewards, i.e., money, and the 
special recognition that the top-ranking hosts enjoy. The club owner, a former host, 
claims that he knows how host’s psychology works and says, “It is important to use whip 
and candy wisely.” This business management strategy is best illustrated at the 
mandatory monthly meeting scheduled at 6 p.m. on the first day of the month. Starting 
with the club owner’s speech, the highlight of the meeting is congratulating the top-
selling host with a round of applause and rewards. He receives two to three brick-like 
envelopes filled with bundled Japanese yen bills. The envelopes literally stand straight on 
the table. Meanwhile, hosts ranked below the top 20 are not even called to the meeting. 
These hosts are ignored as the ‘remainder’ (nokori no hitotachi). They receive their cash 
payments later. After one meeting, a manager jokingly tosses one of the thinnest envelops 
in the air, saying, “Look, it’s so light it flies in the air like a piece of crap paper!” The 
host tries to catch it but doesn’t, showing his embarrassment. The whole ritual separates a 
handful of winners from a horde of also-rans and revels in the disparity: the victorious 
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individuals are treated with respect and recognition while the rest are treated as worthless 
individuals who deserve humiliation.  
The bifurcated distinction based on results-oriented competition, as well as the 
other forms of club management, provokes and heightens hosts’ self-motivation, desire 
for success, passion for work, and avoidance of humiliation. The backstage arrangement 
of the host club thus works to self-motivate and maintain the status quo via a constant 
renewal and aiming for higher goals. A number one host I interviewed, Keisuke, 
confidently said to me, “I’ve been trying to never be satisfied with the present state and 
always aim at higher goals so as to keep myself highly motivated.” Regardless of rank, 
most hosts I interviewed seemed charged with optimism. “Once I have become a host, I 
aim to become a number one host!” said another host. Despite the fact that most hosts fail 
to sustain a living hosting, the club’s opportunity myth feeds a self-perpetuating cycle of 
competition and self-sacrifice among a seemingly inexhaustible supply of new recruits, 
who collectively generate a surplus profit for the host club. It is laissez-faire capitalism in 
its purest form. 
The club’s management strategy, legitimized by the opportunity myth, also 
encourages hosts to defer their satisfaction and ignore the club’s harsh working 
conditions. Hide, a lower ranking host who makes less than $2,000 a month including 
tips—two-thirds the salary of his previous job—describes his self-sacrifice as follows:  
 
It is now a time [for me] to persevere for the time when a chance 
turns in my favor. Everyone has a chance. You just never know 
when you will have one. So, what I can do now is to do my best so 
as to make my own luck or self-actualize my chances (chansu wo 
mononi suru).  
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Hide regards his current struggles as an investment for his future. For that reason, 
he does not intend to withdraw or challenge the club’s competitive sales ranking system 
because it would ruin his own chances at success, he said. Thus, chance plays a key role 
in hosts’ class struggles by highlighting an imagined bright future within the hyper-
competitive and top-down hierarchical social and club system. Their ethos means 
voluntarily motivating themselves within and sustaining the exploitative nature of the 
system.  
Therefore, the host club is not merely a physical space that externally determines 
the actors’ competitive behaviors and attitudes. It is also an affective space that evokes 
and arouses certain feelings, emotions, and imaginations among the actors, including the 
hosts, the club owner, and the manager. Within that space, the host club embodies ethos, 
logics, and motivations that those actors shape through their physical and affective 
interactions. In particular Fantasy is, as I showed, physically, affectively, and 
imaginatively formed as a competitive yet hopeful site, where individual dreams have a 
chance to be realized. Though each individual dream is slightly different, the similarly 
revolves around making money and becoming a success or winner in the eyes of peers. 
The dream is, as I will demonstrate in the following section, closely related to their 
identity formation that traverses along Japan’s neoliberal market logic and situation in 
which socioeconomic restructuring and market logic functions.  
 
Self-Narrated Entrepreneurs 
Compared to Japan’s dominant salaryman model and corporate system, hosts are 
pioneers in the neoliberal market economy. Though they admit their subordinated social 
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status in comparison to the salaryman, who in many ways embodies the notion of 
modernity itself in the context of globalizing neoliberalism, they don’t feel inferior to 
them, either. Many hosts that I spoke with pity the salaryman, and devalue the 
unreasonable working hours, fixed salary, narrow responsibility, and lack of individuality 
attached to the salaryman ethic. In contrast, they highlight the freedom and potential they 
say they find in the hosting business: a flexible work style, pay based on performance, 
entrepreneurship, acquisition of people and business skills, and individual-based, results-
oriented competition. Countering the built-in limitations posed by Japan’s salaryman-
centric economy, hosts take advantage of their freedom to succeed—or fail—in the club 
and actively construct themselves as self-employed entrepreneurs by narrating 
themselves as such and engaging in non-conventional work ethics.  
Daisuke, a top-10 host at Fantasy and a former bar owner, juxtaposed hosts’ 
experiences against that of the stereotypical salaryman image:  
 
Salarymen in the subway train all look so worn out, don’t they? 
Their unhappiness must come from the routine, working all day long 
every day under someone else. [In contrast] hosts are blessed with 
flexibility and freedom. Hosts are more like self-employed 
entrepreneurs or professional entertainers who simply rent the host 
club space to do their own business.  
 
 
The flip side of the glamorous money-making opportunity and creative freedom 
in the club is a highly competitive and ruthless monthly sales battle. The competition and 
sales ranking system creates a handful of winners while the less fortunate are collectively 
labeled as failures and blamed for their lack of creativity and effort. Lower ranking hosts 
typically make less than $2,000 a month, including tips, which is barely enough to 
survive on in Tokyo. In such cases, while they must continually invest in their appearance 
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and stay up-to-date with the latest fashions and carry the latest cell phones, they usually 
cut back on other necessities. They eat obentō “boxed meals” purchased at convenience 
stores only once a day or at the club when a client orders food. They spend no money on 
their daytime clothes, wearing only suits and pajamas. Most mid-and lower-level hosts I 
interviewed share studio-style apartments with other hosts or friends and own little 
furniture and sometimes no television.  
Despite the hardship they encounter, their strong desire for success and upward 
mobility results in hosts’ subjecting themselves to often desperate working conditions. 
Many of the hosts at Fantasy work near incessantly, staying up into the wee hours chain-
smoking, binge drinking, and entertaining women so that they will make more orders and 
increase their monthly sales. They also provide intensified affective labor in hopes of 
landing wealthy clients and developing a relationship with them. Many hosts I 
interviewed admitted that they never took days off for fear of possibly missing their 
chance to meet such clients. They often worked 265 days a year. And even when they do 
secure a wealthy client, they devote long hours in and out of the club to maintain the 
relationship. In order to increase their sales, they tend to consume dangerous amounts of 
alcohol. A number of hosts have told me that they have suffered or have been suffering 
from health problems such as liver trouble, gastric ulcers, and chronicle depression 
caused by an unbalanced diet, excessive smoking and drinking, an irregular lifestyle, and 
psychological stress. Nonetheless, such health problems are considered self-management 
or personal matters.  
Some might think that hosts’ self-narrated entrepreneurial identity is entirely 
false. But the host club technically treats hosts as self-employed, i.e., contract, workers 
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for tax purposes so as to be exempt themselves from paying pensions, health insurance, 
and other benefits. This arrangement effectively kills two birds with one stone: on the one 
hand, it allows the club to optimize its profit with little employee expenses. On the other 
hand, it provides the necessary imprimatur for hosts’ self-entrepreneurial and self-
actualizing narration. Thus, hosting is a locus and activity whereby hosts potentially 
fashion their body/self as both commodities and entrepreneurs to acquire versatile 
business skills and accumulate human capital. The very potentiality of the body allows 
the host to dream of climbing the social ladder within the capitalist market system, while 
‘voluntarily’ subjecting himself to exploitative working conditions and the expansion of 
capitalist accumulation. As such, hosts, who attempt to seduce women into the affect 
economy, are also seduced into the economy with a devotion that is reciprocated with 
minimal institutional intervention.  
Why don’t hosts challenge or withdraw from the exploitative, profit-seeking 
capitalist system? In essence, challenging the system risks obstructing their own chances 
at obtaining the glory and success they dream of. Withdrawal also jeopardizes their 
legitimacy as socially appropriate male citizens in Japan. Many hosts stress the 
importance of having a workplace (shokuba) to maintain their autonomy. When talking 
about the host club, they typically refer to it as mise (translated as “store” or “shop” in 
English), as if to connote or legitimize their work-ownership. Ryu, a veteran host who 
quit hosting after more than10 years but later came back to work at Fantasy, explains: 
“Men who don’t have or belong to a workplace and financially depend upon women are 
called ‘pimps’ (himo), gigolos (jigoro), sex workers (sekkusu wākā), or social losers 
(shakaiteki haisha). Hosts are professional entertainers and entrepreneurial men who 
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have their own workplace and make their own living.” Ryu differentiates himself and 
other hosts from those socially stigmatized men, and insists that they have validated 
themselves as legitimate male citizens. Noting that it is not issue for a woman to 
financially depend upon a man in Japan, Ryu says that the practice doesn’t apply to men 
because men are traditionally expected to be self-sufficient. This gender norm underlies 
the nagging insecurity felt by many hosts, who fear losing their social legitimacy by 
leaving the club.  
However, if loss of social status were the only downside of losing their 
workplace, hosts might not care so much since they typically prioritize their material 
standing rather than their social reputation. Ryu shares a story about former top-ranking 
host, Akira, who quit hosting in exchange for an apartment and ownership of a bar a 
client provided for him. His client, who had fallen in love with him, did whatever it took 
to please him, including lavishing expensive gifts and catapulting him to the top ranking 
in the club. She sought to monopolize his attention and begged him to quit hosting.  Once 
he did, she became increasingly demanding and no longer attempted to please him. She at 
last broke up with him and Akira lost everything, including his apartment, bar, and 
financial support, and retreated back to the club. Explaining why the power dynamics had 
changed, Ryu said, “Once he quits the job, a host becomes an ordinary man. Women 
won’t pay for men who they can meet easily every day. He needs a stage, i.e., the host 
club, where he can be like a star.”  
Ryu’s comment indicates that the speculative and competitive environment is 
prerequisite for the recognition of the host’s body/self as desirable and the creation of 
surplus value vis-à-vis taking advantage of women’s affect —desire for the scarce 
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product, feelings of jealously, passion, and excitement. Without the environment of the 
host club, hosts know that their human capital is not recognized as such, or worse, they 
are stigmatized as mere sex workers. This vulnerability often shadows the host. They 
usually do not talk to outsiders about the unseemly aspects of their sexual labor in the 
hosting business. Nonetheless, I argue that hosts’ nuanced distinction and justification 
ironically illuminates their vulnerable entrepreneurship and ambivalent social 
positionality, which is closely intertwined with, yet intentionally distinguished from, 
stigmatized sex workers. 
Once they open up about themselves, hosts unexceptionally agree to an extent that 
having sex is unavoidable to maintaining a relationship with their rich clients and for 
stabilizing their monthly sales. Nonetheless they differentiate themselves from male sex 
workers or prostitutes. Yoshi, who describes himself as a “pillow host” (makura hosuto, 
meaning a host who sleeps with his clients), for example, denies that he is a sex worker. 
For him, sex workers have nothing to sell but sex and therefore have no alternatives. In 
contrast, he argues that hosts provide professional entertainment and hospitality, and 
make their own decisions whether to have sex based on their rules and criteria. Yoshi sets 
his bar at the sales amount of one million yen a month: once a client reaches that level he 
will have sex with her at her request. He justifies this as a sound business investment. As 
per any other justification, hosts’ rationale may be asserted retrospectively in their 
narratives. (Sex with women who in the end didn’t pay off wouldn’t likely be narrated.) 
Both are, nonetheless, strategies for hosts who eagerly deny that they are sex workers and 
who wish to maintain their autonomous self-identity. On this point, Mr. Minami, a 
veteran host in his 50s, comments: 
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Hosts try to justify what they do. Otherwise, they can do nothing 
because of guilt and shame. They say various things, but more or 
less all hosts do the same thing: please women romantically and 
sexually to earn money. They just want to put the self aside, outside 
the realm of socially stigmatized views on selling the body, i.e., sex, 
for money.  
 
 
In sum, hosts’ self-narrated identity as entrepreneurs indicates that, as Nancy 
Abelmann states, “class—and social mobility—is not a thing to be catalogued and 
charted but is, rather, a project that happens partly through narrative” (Abelmann 2003: 
20; also see Somers 1997: 87). Class difference is not simply projected onto people or 
inscribed into their bodies; rather it is fashioned, narrated, and negotiated within specific 
contexts of power relations. In the case of hosts, they self-narrate as entrepreneurial 
subjects, who are self-employed, in contrast with the salarymen, who are employed by 
someone else. In similar fashion, hosts defend themselves as self-sufficient male citizens 
by separating themselves from socially shamed, fully commodified sex workers. In either 
narrative, self-autonomy is keyed on hosts’ entrepreneurship: hosts work for themselves, 
not for others, and they commodify themselves rather than being commodified by the 
other. Thus, self-autonomy is the pivot for the host to craft his professional identity and 
entrepreneurial status by strategically referring to neoliberal values and the ethics of 
marketization of labor, calculative choice, and the culvitating of a self-enterprising ethos 
(Hoffman 2006: 552). As Judith Butler (1990) theorizes about gender identity, various 
classification practices such as lifestyle choice, value judgment, and narrativized 
subjectivity are not mere expressions of essentially inherited class identity. The 
signification practice is rather an effect of the discursive practices that individuals 
strategically and perfomatively constitute in specific socio-historical contexts. 
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Hosts are not, however, free agents. Their signification practice —maintaining 
their “autonomous” male identity and “desirable” entrepreneurial status— is also a 
constant negotiation process encumbered with gendered social norms and class-marked 
behavioral ethics. Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, “the social agents … are producers not 
only of classifiable acts but also of acts of classification which are themselves classified” 
(Bourdieu 1984: 467; also see Ferguson 1999: 94). As such, class struggle is not all about 
cultural politics in narratives, lifestyles, and discursive practices, but also the lived 
experience itself that consists of a series of discrepant pursuits and limits on status 
mobility. As Bourdieu argues, status is not entirely determined by economic factors, but 
it both opens and shuts off certain access to economic opportunity, jobs, education, and 
other forms of social resources (Bourdieu 1984: x). Hosts, who have scant social, 
economic, and cultural capital, and have few other employment opportunities, ‘choose’ 
(or are guided to choose) the hosting business in an attempt to enhance their human 
capital. 
The choice opens up an alternative way of earning a living, but also closes off 
social security, working regulations, and recognition as “normal” male citizens. As a 
result, hosts’ entrepreneurial subjects are always already gendered and class-marked. 
Thus, despite their self-narrated autonomy and entrepreneurship, hosts paradoxically 
conjure exploitative working conditions, stigmatized sex work, and illusory “dreams” of 
an unstable, speculative economy.  
Nevertheless, hosts situation does not necessarily mean that they are duped by the 
exploitative capitalist market system. Even though they are aware of the duplicity, they 
oftentimes cannot afford to leave  as Akira’s case demonstrates. Caught in a dilemma —
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being aware of exploitation and yet perpetuating it — hosts tirelessly justify their conduct 
and lifestyle. As such, hosts’ decision to become entrepreneurs is much more complex 
than a mere unequal relationship between the state and the individual or between the 
owners of capital and labor. Their subjectivity is performatively constituted as part of 
multi-layered negotiation processes in which they cope with their own ambition, clients’ 
desires, club management, social norms, and socio-economic trends in Japan and the 
global economy. Within this web of choice, hosts make their own decisions to optimize 
their lives rather than transcend the existing capitalist system.   
It is easy to criticize the objectified reality of exploitation that hosts encounter. 
But such criticism overlooks social actors (who are complexly situated in the 
socioeconomic web) and unintentionally risks projecting the critic’s moral judgment and 
political agenda. From this vantage point, I contend that understanding the complexity of 
subjectivity formation is urgently needed, particularly in light of neoliberal capitalism, 
where the individual (like the host) is encouraged to become the enterprise and 
entrepreneur of oneself.  
 
Speculative Accumulation of Capital 
As for hosts’ subjectivity formation, I discussed how hosts commodify 
themselves and attempt to enhance their human capital —the enterprise and the 
entrepreneur of the self— above. Yoritomo, a popular and charismatic number one host 
on Japan’s media circuit, perhaps best represents this dual sense of the self and the 
commodification process. In his best-selling book, Anata wa Nanbāwan ni nareru: 
“Mouhitori no Jibun” no Tsukurikata (You can Become a Number One: The Way of 
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Creating “Another Self”), Yoritomo asserts that market principle compels hosts to make 
money by satisfying the customer’s needs and stresses that the creation of ‘another self’ 
to meet the customer’s needs is a “prior investment” for the host (Yoritomo 2003: 62; 
99). Yoritomo’s host name is his ‘another self.’ Based on his account, he learned that 
women fantasize a “my prince” type of character who is gentle, kind, and almost 
obtainable, but not quite, as if he were someone in their dreams. In order to become such 
a prince, he has let his hair grow long and practiced stylizing his body movements. For 
example, he practiced gently and carefully scooping a woman’s hand like a prince in a 
fairy tale. He says he repeatedly practices his walk, posture, and affective pauses in front 
a mirror until they look ‘natural’ and become part of himself (Yoritomo 2003: 101-105). 
Like Reiji, the former host who became a club owner, Yoritomo is known only by his 
pseudo first name, which is a reference to Minamoto Yoritomo, a famous 13th century 
shogun who first established Japan’s samurai government after centuries of aristocratic 
rule. Although Yoritomo is an unusual case, it is common among hosts to use their 
pseudo names in the club and attempt to camouflage their personal information. For 
many of their clients, hosts perform fantasy roles that are better served by anonymity.   
While hosting itself does not formally require any special skills or knowledge, for 
many hosts with an ambition to succeed it demands devoted effort and study. “Looking at 
hosts from a distance, wearing nice suits, driving expensive cars, and showing off good-
looking chicks, I thought it was cool. But, I found it was actually not so easy once I 
became a host,” said Yoshi, a 24-year old ex-number one host from Osaka I interviewed 
who had moved to Tokyo to specifically work at Fantasy.  Yoshi stresses every aspect of 
his physical appearance, sculpting his body at a nearby health club, and like other young 
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hosts, he occasionally goes to a nail salon and gets full service treatment. “Women are 
detail oriented,” he says. “They care about these things.” Indeed, his well-cared for hands 
are prominently displayed during his carefully constructed body movements such as 
when he lights a cigarette and grabs an ashtray, gives hand gestures, or simply rests his 
hand on the table. “Dramatization of trivial things is critical since hosting is, after all, a 
job to sell dreams,” Yoshi says, echoing the dazzling image of the club during business 
hours that is a product of space dramatization incorporating music, light, and a lively 
atmosphere. 
Yoshi says he calibrates his body movements to appeal to middle-aged wealthy 
women and please them to increase his sales. Like many other hosts, he says he sets his 
hair back casually and acts calmly so as to project himself as a mature, sincere, and 
reliable man. During his spare time he reads women’s magazines and watches TV dramas 
aimed at middle-aged women so as to better understand how they think and also find 
ideas about how to please them more effectively. “Women care how a man says things 
rather than what he says,” Yoshi said. Although too embarrassed to say and do in his 
everyday life, Yoshi told me that as a host he will look into his client’s eyes and utter 
lines like, “You are so beautiful to me,” or look up at the stars in the sky and poetically 
rhapsodize, “It must be predetermined that you and I are together tonight while there are 
billions of men and women on the earth like these stars in the sky.”  
Yoshi admits that he has struggled with sexual matters, however. He says that he 
has had to overcome an imprinted disgust about ‘old’ women’s sexuality—the image that 
old women’s genitalia are ugly, dirty, and smelly. Yoshi says that early in his hosting 
career he couldn’t bring himself to kiss a wealthy client in her 50s, but finally convinced 
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himself it was his job to have sex with her and a necessary investment in order to become 
a top host. (After they had sex, the woman doubled her spending on Yoshi and quickly 
made him a number one host.) As I will explain further regarding the kind of service 
hosts aim to provide, the emotional management and affective labor of hosts like Yoshi 
intentionally capitalize on client’s desire for praise, romantic yearnings, erotic aspirations 
to entice them into spending more money for their own satisfaction, and for their host’s 
sales promotion. This interaction, I argue, shapes and fuels an affect economy in the host 
club.  
 “Women,” Yoshi says, “have a weakness for something extraordinary. So, hosts 
create an atmosphere of extraordinariness, where women are entranced enough not to 
think twice about what they are doing [spending money in the host club].” Female clients 
I interviewed at Fantasy reinforced his comment, emphasizing that it is worth paying for 
pleasant moments whereby they can escape from their day-to-day stress, retrieve energy 
for the next day, and enjoy themselves with romantic reverie. Some profess that they pay 
because they want their hosts to allow them to dream, whether their dreams are romantic 
fantasy, princess-like treatment, or rich V.I.P.-like cosseting. They said that there were 
moments when they were overwhelmed by a sense of an endless chain of routines or felt 
a void in indistinctive everydayness. Their comments affirm Yoshi’s view too: hosting is 
a job to sell dreams. As such, on one level, women pursue something that they miss in 
their everyday life—i.e., extraordinariness— at the host club, and hosts provide it in 
exchange for money. At this juncture, hosts’ affective labor —beautified body, stylized 
movements, acquired skills, and affective attentiveness — is employed to dramatize the 
scene and generate market value since there are customers who are willing to pay for 
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such affect. Their body in turn becomes a site and vehicle of accumulating human 
capital— capital that is for wide use in the neoliberal service-based economy.  
Capital accumulation based on sensual speculation is no longer a ghettoralized 
economic activity in our global economy. In the era of neoliberal mass consumption, 
David Harvey warns of the accelerated commodification of every aspect of human lives 
including sexuality (Harvey 2005: 165). Other scholars also have highlighted the 
intensified commercialization of ‘intimate’ labor, which would include work done by 
maids, nannies and nurses, as well as labor entailed in contract marriages and baby 
adoptions (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004; Eng 2006). Not only the kinds of 
commodities but also the ways of value making have changed. In their article “Millennial 
Capitalism,” Jean and John Comaroff argue that since the world economy shifted from a 
production-based to a consumer-oriented economy, the fons et origo of wealth has been 
superseded by “less tangible ways of generating values: by control over such things as the 
provisions of service, the means of communication, and above all, the flow of finance 
capital” including the state sponsored casino economy and the so-called occult capitalism 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 295). Anna Tsing (2000) calls these ways of capital 
accumulation “speculator accumulation” and notes: 
 
Spectacular accumulation occurs when investors speculate on a 
product that may or may not exist. Investors are looking for the 
appearance of success. They cannot afford to find out if the product 
is solid; by then their chances for profit will be gone (Tsing 2000: 
141). 
 
 
Likewise, potential buyers make purchase decisions based on the product’s appearance, 
whether it looks attractive and will become successful, and grow in sales. To an extent, 
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aesthetization and dramatization become instruments of value making and capital 
accumulation in speculation, whether it be in financial investments, wagers and bets, or 
the affect economy. 
Japan’s economy is no exception. As I discussed earlier, the government has 
attempted to revitalize the nation’s lifeless economy by expanding financial investment 
opportunities, information technology (IT) development, and service-based industries to 
make profit in less tangible ways. In particular, the expansion of the so-called “service for 
lives” (seikatsu sābisu), an idea closely linked with improving the quality of people’s 
everyday lives has come to be viewed as an untapped reservoir of wealth by the 
government. Intimate and social lives themselves have increasingly become subject to the 
same kind of creative destruction that demands a constant reappraisal of voids and needs, 
as well as potential products and services to feed them. The commodification of hitherto 
public assets and the ‘intimate’ private sphere, Harvey asserts, is a feature of the 
neoliberal project and is spreading globally (Harvey 2005: 106). I would add that the 
commodification accompanies the growth in affective labor that speculates on the need 
for such services.  
Having argued that an affect economy is a form of speculative economics in 
national and global contexts, however, I do not mean that all business activities are like 
that or that every one is now a commodity. Neither do I argue that such an economic 
trend is a direct import from the West and a product of neoliberal globalization. Indeed, 
the concept of self-commodification is peculiar to hosts and other people who make a 
living in some facet of the entertainment business or other person-to-person line of work. 
Nonetheless, affective labor is ubiquitous and has the potential for economic value if 
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someone is willing to pay for it. On this point, the host club and hosts are not just a 
fleeting phenomenon. I argue that they are a constitutive element of Japan’s affect 
economy—an economy rooted in the nation’s postindustrial consumerism that intersected 
with neoliberal globalization—and therefore quite durable.  
One of the characteristics that the postindustrial consumer culture in Japan has 
encouraged is, as I argued in Chapter 2, the performative self, that is, a person who plays 
with signs and performs multiple modes of selves that, like a change of clothes, depends 
upon time, place, and given opportunity. Asano Tomohiko, a leading sociologist who 
studies identity formation among Japanese youth, contends that in the last fifteen years 
social relationships have increasingly become situation-oriented because of diversified 
lifestyles and self-expression in the consumer culture, advancement of communication 
technology, and the flux of the labor market (Asano 2005: 84). As a result, the self is 
inevitably expected to acquire skills that enable performance in multiple modes so that 
he/she can smoothly adjust to the rapidly changing social situations and fluid human 
relationships (Ibid). In this respect, hosts’ multiple modes of self-fashioning —having a 
dual sense of the self and performing a variety of selves and characters for their clients— 
are not an exceptional case in today’s Japanese society. In other words, ‘selling’ a mode 
of the self or a part of the body technically becomes feasable.  
“Dating” for money, notoriously known in Japan as “enjo kōsai” (compensated 
dating), exemplifies this self-commodification. Young Japanese women, mostly 
‘ordinary’ high school girls, sell their dirty underwear, date, and sometimes have sexual 
encounters with mostly middle-aged men. They commodify their sexuality to satisfy 
Japanese men’s erotic fantasy for sexually immature, innocent, and ‘pure’ girls in 
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exchange for money that is typically used to buy designer bags, fashion accessories, and 
clothing. These teenage girls, who were born and raised in the era of Japan’s sign 
economy and have developed flexible, multiple modes of selfhood in order to adjust to 
rapidly changing social situations, are less reluctant than previous generations to 
commodify their sexuality as a merely detachable body part or an exterior (Miyadai 
1994; Ueno 2003). Compensated dating is quite significant not only because it challenges 
sexual constraints and myths projected on young women but also because it allows 
ordinary girls to use their body and sexuality as a means to gain monetary return. In 
essence, they become neoliberal subjects who use their body as an object and a vehicle to 
invest in their economic activities. Thus, their habits reflect how neoliberal reforms have 
become pervasive in Japan to the extent where affective (including sexual) labor is more 
common and of ubiquitous economic value.  
Both in Japan and throughout the global economy, the body as an arena to 
generate one’s own market value has expanded beyond the existing female 
commodification of body to include males who are also coveted for their youth, and this 
has created vast new market niches, exploited especially on the Internet. While 
compensated dating is an illegal and underground activity,17 the host club business is 
legitimized as an entertainment and amusement trade and has created employment 
opportunities for young working-class men. At the same time, such a non-normative job 
—particularly men’s sex-related work— has also created tension in Japan. The editor of 
the influential monthly magazine Seiron, for example has harshly criticized hosts for 
manipulating female customers into spending, writing that they are nothing more than 
                                                
17 Due to widespread compensated dating, the Regulation to Prevent Prostitution and 
Pornography of Minors was established in 1999.  
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“lowlifes who prey on women” (Seiron 2000). Hosts themselves acknowledge that their 
social status lies somewhere between new business opportunity and social stigma. Yoshi, 
a former number one host in Osaka, admits that hosts are looked down upon by Japanese 
society. but is confident that they lie higher up Japan’s pyramid-shaped hierarchy: 
 
If we take a look at the flow of money that is directed toward 
something valuable and desirable in society, hosts’ social position 
reverses. In Japan, salarymen provide financial support to their 
wives and family and spend money on their hostesses, and those 
women spend the money on their hosts. See, the money doesn’t flow 
back to the salarymen, meaning they are the least desirable in 
society. 
 
 
Yoshi’s comments based on the consumption or speculative model reflect national and 
global economic trends and challenges conservative criticism in Japan. While hosting is 
not entirely accepted as a legitimate occupation in Japanese society, it thus mirrors not 
only socio-historical change in the formation of identity and human capital within Japan 
but also the global economics of speculative accumulation of capital. At the nexus of 
these local, national, and global socio-economic practices, commodifying the self has 
become possible for hosts, who otherwise have few other resources to option their 
futures. To ‘invest’ in their own bodies and commodify the body/self becomes a means to 
enhance their market value and achieve of upward mobility through an affect economy 
where affective labor is in high demand (Hardt and Negri 2004: 108).  
 
The Art of Seduction 
Among other speculative economic activities, something significant about an 
affect economy in the host club is that the products are affect and human relationships. 
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The direct and durable interaction between hosts and their clients, who have their own 
desires, ends, and tactics, complicates the process of market exchange and interpersonal 
power dynamics. In particular, their interactions and relationships depend upon monetary 
and affective exchanges whereby both sides attempt to achieve such metonymical self-
satisfaction —satisfying the other to satisfy oneself— wherein hosts please their clients in 
exchange for the monetary reward and clients financially please their hosts to obtain 
better service and fulfill their romantic fantasy or other desire. In addition, their economic 
activity that is inflated by the reciprocated affective labor profits the host club business, 
i.e., the club owner. 
Despite the mutuality that exists among the actors, the exchange and the relation 
is asymmetric. As club management is designed to exploit hosts’ affective labor, the 
host’s governing technology —calculated conducts to govern— tends to undermine 
women’s financial power. Ryu, a veteran host, says, “Hosting is, after all, quintessentially 
a business to make money by getting women to fall in love with and spend money on 
their hosts even though hosts often describe hosting as an occupation that sells women 
dreams. Therefore, hosts enable them to dream, particularly romantic dreams, in order to 
extract monetary return.” Governing such a relationship is called “pseudo romance” 
(gijiren’ai) among hosts. It is pseudo because hosts explain that they do not ‘genuinely’ 
have strong feelings for their clients (although it happens sometimes), but pretend as if 
they were in love with them; some women believe in or try to believe in such love as if it 
were real and some others are confused about whether it is real or commercial. In either 
case, hosts I have interviewed stress that they are able to take advantage of ‘women’s 
psychology’ so long as they cling to any perceived love. Women who do tend to do 
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anything for the men they love, i.e., spend money, and they are usually fulfilled with their 
own self-absorbed devotion.   
Ryu explains that an experienced host can take advantage of women’s psychology 
and seduce his clients to financially please him and self-satisfy themselves.  
 
At first, a host obeys his customer in order to be liked, however, he 
will gradually, yet steadily try to shift the power relation once he is 
assured that she has fallen in love with him. He has to do so in a way 
the customer does not recognize. A capable host can do so and make 
his customer willingly provide whatever he wants—money, cars, 
expensive watches, you name it.  
 
 
His assessment is supported by female customers such as Nakamura Usagi, a famous 
writer and host club patron, who reportedly spent 15 million yen (roughly 150,000 US 
dollars) in 2001 at her favorite host clubs. In an interview with the Japan Times, 
Nakamura said: 
 
With the host, it starts off with you being the one governing the 
relationship but before you know it, he’s the one in control. You just 
don’t know when it shifts. The thing is, if you fall for him, you lose, 
because you want to listen to him so he thinks better of you. … I 
think that although many customers may feel like an odaijin (lord) 
while they’re in the club, they are really more like a servant of the 
host (Japan Times 2003; emphasis added). 
 
 
The reader might wonder if the women’s “falling for” stories in the previous 
chapter are crafted by the pseudo romance. I would say so. For example, Hikaru, whom 
the widow Sachiko had spent more than 600,000 US dollars on at the time of my 
interview in 2005, confided that the relationship was a pseudo one for him. Although he 
said he pretended as if he were in love with her because that is what she dreams of, he 
admitted that he is not sexually attracted to her. Instead, Sachiko is one of his most 
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important clients who has been instrumental in helping him realize his top-ranking status 
and therefore he does have feelings of appreciation and compassion toward her; but, it is 
nothing more than that, he said. Hikaru describes his feelings in this way: 
 
I sometimes feel bad about what I am doing and sympathetic about 
her devotion to me. But, once a host becomes sympathetic, it 
becomes a dead end. It’s hard, but important to remember that it’s 
just a job. Instead I sincerely try to do my best to serve for her and 
provide what pleases her. I receive money in return for the hard 
work.  
 
 
Similarly, Daisuke, who supposedly approached Fumi and confessed his love to her, told 
me that Fumi was his most important client at the moment and he liked her as a client and 
person, but not as a woman. He said that it is his business style to engender an intimate 
relationship, including sexual interaction, so as to justify asking the client for financial 
support as a boyfriend. Thus, both Hikaru and Daisuke manipulate women’s affect and 
are successful in guiding them to believe in their love and in turn spend money on their 
hosts. While the amounts women spend and the forms of affect they desire may vary, the 
host’s affective labor has the potential to maneuver their clients into visiting them in the 
club frequently and participating in the speculative sales competition for their hosts.  
Nonetheless, such business tactics entail hosts’ seduction skills and unflagging 
efforts to please women so as to obscure the line that exists between their commercial 
and noncommercial interaction. This is because, as hosts say, once a woman’s fantasy is 
clearly defined as a target of the host’s economic motives (even though most clients can 
sense it), they start to think twice about spending money for that end. Only when they 
persuade themselves that the spending is meaningful on their own terms will women 
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continue to “use” money for that effect, said Ryu. “Coercive measures never work. You 
can’t force a woman to make a visit unless you let her want to see you.” Subtleness and 
ambivalence are thus fundamental for host’s governance over their clients in the affect 
economy. Hosts’ domination does not mean that they solely seize or possess power, 
however; their domination in the relationship rather depends upon their willingness to 
provide affective labor and subtly guide the conduct of the client in a way that that clients 
can ‘freely’ think, choose, and act. As such, the speculative effect of the affective labor is 
actualized only when the host’s art of seduction is in harmony with the client’s. Although 
I didn’t mean to, I have to admit that my own experience as a client exploited Shin’s 
affective labor since I never revisited him to pay for the labor. Indeed, if we believe all 
labor involves building human relationships and caring for the other in economic terms, 
any kind of work and volunteer activity is potentially a form of exploitation. The inherent 
ambivalence of affective labor, through which one can exploit, and also be exploited by, 
the other, is an effect of the art of seduction.  
Seduction never works unilaterally. It requires interactive feedback. It is most 
effective in cooperative interaction, i.e., mutual seduction. In his book Seduction, Jean 
Baudrillard states, “The law of seduction takes the form of an uninterrupted ritual 
exchange where seducer and seduced constantly raise the stakes in a game that never 
ends. And cannot end since the dividing line that defines the victory of the one and the 
defeat of the other, is illegible” (Baudrillard 1979: 22). Michel Foucault stresses that this 
indeterminacy and ambivalence is an effective form of power. As I pointed out in his 
definition of neoliberal governmentality in Chapter 2, the art of government is neither 
forceful nor one-way. It entails an understanding of the other and then subtly leading, 
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directing, and guiding the “free” conduct of the other(s) with calculation, manipulation, 
and artifice (Dean 1991: 10-11; Gordon 1991: 18). Following his definition, I call hosts’ 
governing technology the art of seduction that involves creative use of an aestheticized 
body, calculated moves, and strategic interactions to produce affect and maneuver the 
conducts of their clients for both the clients’ and the hosts’ ends.  
While I draw from Foucault’s notion of the art of government, I differentiate the 
art of seduction methodologically from his text-centered analysis of political rationalities 
(Foucault 1981: 226 in Lemke 2002: 54-55; Gordon 1991: 3). By the art of seduction, I 
intend to analyze how seduction takes place to lead social actors into (inter)actions and 
what kinds of effects it has on interpersonal power dynamics rather than presuming the 
body as a site of historical inscription and the political rationality as a template of 
individual conducts (Lemke 2002: 54-55; also see Butler 1990: 129). 
Hosts use such non-language centered seduction tactics as seating position and 
body moves to evoke romantic imagination and atmosphere not only to please women but 
also to increase their sales. They also use what is called “mirroring image” (mirāimēji) or 
“mirroring” [movements] (mirāringu) as a seduction strategy. Hosts intentionally yet 
‘naturally’ synchronize their bodily movements, e.g., timing of their laughs, tone of 
voice, pace of drinking, conversational topics, and some gestures, with those of their 
clients. By affecting that such synchrony exists between them, they intend to persuade 
their clients that they are alike—are of the same “feather”— and would make a good 
match. Thus, a series of such moves that is fabricated with affective labor performatively 
creates a feeling of compatibility, intimacy, and comfort. The entire process is part of a 
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calculated seduction that plotted to set the client’s mind for economic activities in the 
name of love.  
Hosts also strategize their actions to evoke and capitalize on women’s 
competitiveness to further their spending. Daisuke says that women’s spending patterns, 
for example, often depend upon how well a host moves from one table to another and 
performs and is perceived as a popular host. If a host remains with a client all the time, 
Daisuke analyzes, the client will tend to spend less because there is no perceived 
competitor. The client becomes assured that he is all ‘hers.’ But, if he leaves her alone 
with the other helper hosts for a while, she then starts to wonder whose table he is visiting 
and if he has another client. To bring him back, she figures that she will need to order a 
new bottle of liquor. If she is naïve enough not to understand how it works, his helper 
hosts will suggest it to her. “Hosting is,” as Daisuke explains, “a popularity business, and 
the more popularity you generate, the more desirable you become and create competition 
among your clients. As a result, clients voluntarily compete over one another for your 
attention and increase their spending without being asked.” Daisuke’s analysis suggests 
that a host’s (performed) popularity invokes a woman’s desire for him and fuels 
competitiveness for his attention. The competitive situation motivates passionate clients 
to speculate in the popular host. Such women’s overt competitiveness and aggressive 
spending might risk their womanhood because, as I discussed in Chapter 2, ideal 
femininity revolves around “unselfish” victory and lovability under the terms of Japan’s 
neoliberal reformation. Their fighting spirit is then reconfigured as an embodiment of 
their self-devotion to their men. In such a way, women’s “masculine” display of 
aggressiveness, financial capability, and selfishness is converted into an expression of 
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ideal femininity. This interaction destabilizes the social assumption that gendered 
behavioral patterns are biological, but also reinforces the host’s view that “women’s 
psychology” is exploitable.   
Along with calculated body moves and carefully enacted popularity, hosts employ 
suggestive speech in order to govern their clients’. Like many other hosts, Yoshi 
indirectly asks his clients to visit him in the club because he says he needs to avoid 
putting himself in the position of being beholden or subordinated to his them. He instead 
will ask over the phone: “How have you been doing? I have missed you since you 
haven’t shown your face recently. Are you all right? Can you just show your face and 
relieve my worry?” When he is desperate to increase his sales, he might ask, “You are the 
only person I can ask. My sales for this month are a bit short. Can you help me out?” 
Yoshi explains that both ways create space for the client to make her own decision about 
her visit and spending. If she blames him for her excessive spending, he says he can reply 
with something to the effect of, “I have never asked you or forced to do so. It’s your own 
decision.” In this way, hosts make their clients responsible for their own choice and its 
consequences. Hosts’ subtle ways of asking serves another function: appealing to 
“women’s mind or psychology” (onnagokoro). Yoshi explains, “Women want to be 
thought of special and therefore, providing attentiveness and showing my weakness 
convinces them that they are special to me and in turn they are pleased even though they 
end up spending money.” While I will discuss women’s perspectives in the following 
chapter, Foucault’s theory of how power in neoliberal governmentality works is based on 
the idea that it is not exercised against the interests of the governed, but rather feeds their 
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interests and allows the governed to ‘empower’ or ‘responsibilize’ themselves as much as 
force them to make ‘free’ decisions on their actions (Lemke 2002: 53).  
The art of seduction is expressed in a common metaphor that hosts share to 
explain the kind of service hosts aim to provide: “kayui tokoro ni pin-pointo de tega 
todoku sābisu,”—literally, service that scratches the precise point where the customer 
feels itchy [on her back]. To paraphrase host Koji, itchiness is a sense that one cannot 
exactly articulate to someone else; so, if a host can locate the exact spot and scratch it 
well, a woman will become enamored with someone who can so precisely please her. But 
if done wrong, a host will end up annoying the client losing her. This common metaphor 
highlights key characteristics of seduction as a governing technology: It requires acquired 
skills and aptitude, i.e., human capital, to detect the ways of appealing to the secucee; it 
takes pleasure as a lure to seduce women into serving for the seducer’s interests; the 
seducer’s intentional avoidance of verbal articulation lets her ‘freely’ make decisions and 
be responsible for their consequences; and the art of seduction allows the seducer to 
indirectly govern relationships and indulge them with the states of dominance. Indeed, 
there is no guarantee that such a governing technology is always fruitful since discrete 
interactions and relationships last only as long as both sides are able to satisfy one 
another enough to carry on the exchanges. Nonetheless, the art of seduction is, I argue, an 
essence of the affect economy, an economy that capitalizes on human feelings, emotions, 
desires, and romantic fantasies to optimize the monetary and affective exchanges.  
While seduction is oftentimes associated with sexual temptation, the affect 
economy is not the only domain where the art of seduction becomes a governing 
technology. The scheme —the use of allusive utterances and gestures to capitalize on 
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another’s affect and entice him/her into acting for the one’s ends— is increasingly 
utilized in a wide range or business, social, and political maneuvers, including but not 
limiting to interpersonal negotiation, advertisement, marketing, and political campaigns 
(Haug 1986; Reiji 2001). This is because, as Gilles Deleuze argues, it introduces the 
notion of “societies of control” whereby social governance has shifted or been shifting to 
a controlling model, away from the discipline and punishment that Foucault theorized in 
the context of the 18th and 19th century Europe (Deleuze 1992: 4). Among other scholars, 
Nikolas Rose also argues that in advanced liberal or neoliberal societies, public 
authorities seek to govern society at a distance by means of persuasion, education, and 
seduction rather than coercion, repression, or intervention (Rose 1996: 50). “To govern 
humans is,” Rose states, “not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and to 
utilize it for one’s own objectives (Rose 1999: 4; emphasis added). Thus, the art of 
seduction is more or less a vehicle for governing-at-a-distance and enables neoliberal 
governance in societies of control.  
Such a form of governance —acknowledging individual capacity and using it for 
collective or institutional objectives— is observed in the socio-economic governance of 
new millennium Japan as well. Not long ago, the Koizumi administration called upon 
“yume to kibou wo moteru shakai” (a society that enables individuals to have dreams and 
hopes) for the nation’s economic revitalization, which later became Japanese government 
policy. The 1999 Economic Council report, for example, stressed that individual 
capacities, particularly chie (knowledge), keiken (experience), and kansei (sensibility), 
are the key sources of corporate profit in the new global economy. The report claims that 
the global economic shift from standardized mass production to diverse knowledge 
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production has undermined traditional Japanese values such as nintai (perseverance) and 
kyōchōsei (group harmony). The ideal stance, the report states, is “to create a socio-
economy where individuals can seek dreams and actively make them come true” (Keizai 
Shingikai 1999). As such, the Japanese government employs the art of seduction — uses 
dreams and hopes as baits to persuade individuals to ‘emancipate’ themselves from 
conventional values and acquire the new ethics— to govern human capital at a distance.  
Nikolas Rose’s account Powers of Freedom responds to such individual-centered 
economic policies as Japan’s and asserts that there is no longer a conflict between self-
interest and patriotic duty: “It now appears that one can best fulfill one’s obligations to 
one’s nation by most effectively pursuing the enhancement of the economic well-being of 
oneself” (Rose 1999: 45). This is because, he argues, individual capacities for self-
realization are obtained only through individual activity, including work in neoliberal 
societies (Ibid). Jaques Donzelot, the author of “Pleasure in Work,” similarly points out 
that work is no longer something assigned to individuals, but rather regarded as a 
productive activity or a site whereby they deploy their personal skills, enhance their 
capacities, and fulfill their potentialities (Donzelot 1996: 252). In this model, individuals 
become the center of and responsible for the project of the self and accumulation of 
human capital, and like consumption, hobbies, and self-help therapy, work itself becomes 
a means and process of self-realization and fulfillment.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the affect economy is an episteme and a constitutive 
element of the global, as well as Japan’s national, economy that has shifted from the 
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production-centered to speculative consumption-oriented economy, e.g., finance, 
information technology, and other related service industries. In the speculative economy, 
future-oriented profitability becomes imaginable and such skills and human capital as 
aesthetization, dramatization, and sensual appeal become instruments, i.e., human capital, 
of value making and capital accumulation. By focusing on neoliberal subjects like male 
hosts, I demonstrated how they attempt to commodify their body/self in order to not only 
sell their labor but also gain a means to produce surplus value in the speculative affect 
economy. For young men like hosts, who are usually hemmed in by their working-class 
backgrounds, self-investment to enhance their human capital and acquire seduction skills 
to entice their clients into speculating on them allows them the opportunity to self-
actualize their upward mobility within Japan’s capitalist market economy.  
Tracing host’s intersubjective relationships, I also illuminated the multiple layers 
of the art of seduction in the case of Japan’s host club. Hosts seduce their clients to spend 
more money on them, but they are also seduced into working hard and enduring the fierce 
sales competition system in the host club. Their hard work feeds their own ambition, 
clients’ satisfaction, and the club’s profit (and by extension Japan’s economy). Thus, I 
argued the art of seduction is the means and process, i.e., the governing technology, in the 
affect economy as a whole. By the art of seduction, I refer to the indirect governance, 
through which the governer/seducer let the governed/seducee ‘voluntarily’ act out for the 
both ends, rendering the dividing line of the victory and defeat or the seducer and seducee 
illegible. As such, it makes social actors responsible for their own conduct despite the 
fact that they are socially situated in gender and class terms and their choice and freedom 
is subjected to existing social norms and inequality. Nonetheless, in this hermeneutic 
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world of the affect economy, the norms and inequalities are simply decentralized as part 
of strategic games in which individuals are supposed to ‘freely’ exercise power in a 
variety of intersubjective settings. The affect economy is by no means top-down 
governance by the state or the capitalist; the art of seduction both enables and disenables 
social actors to get ahead in the world and perpetuates social inequality in the name of 
individual responsibility. In this respect, social institutions, corporations, and the 
government are also in the same boat that is constructed by the art of seduction. As Bruno 
Latour pointes out, “the ‘macro-actor’ is not different in kind from the ‘micro-actor,’ but 
is merely one who has a longer and more reliable ‘chain of command’—that is to say, 
assembled into longer and more dispersed networks of persons, things and techniques” 
(Latour cited in Rose 1999: 5). In the same manner, the macro- and micro-actor alike 
attempt to overcome their vulnerability or take advantage of the other through the art of 
seduction within the postindustrial capitalist system and by doing so perpetuate the 
enigmatic system itself.  
While I have focused mainly on the affect economy in Japan’s host club, the art of 
seduction as a governing technology is not peculiar to this tempo-spatially specific 
setting. Seduction has been the pivot of any commercial enterprise in the modern 
capitalist system. In advanced or neoliberal societies, as Deleuze argued, social 
governance entails control rather than discipline and punishment (Rose 1999; Deleuze 
1992). To reinforce this view, Rose argues, “To govern is to act upon action. … Hence, 
when it comes to governing human beings, to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the 
governed” (Rose 1999: 4). In such a mode of social governance, I argue that the art of 
seduction is an effective way of acting upon the others’ conducts. I also note that it acts 
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as a pivot in the intangible ways of seeking profit in today’s global capitalism. At the 
nexus of societal and market seduction, consumers are no exception. They are also turned 
into, and also ‘voluntarily’ become, social actors who engage in the seductive market 
economy, where they self-fashion their desirable selves and also contribute their 
consumptive labor. I will discuss this aspect further in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE GENDER POLITICS OF PASSIVITY: TRANSGRESSING 
NORMS AND SELF-FASHIONING ‘DESIRABLE’ WOMEN 
 
 
I visit the host club to recuperate the “womanness” within myself 
and recover my self-identity. Romantic excitement inspires women 
to attain total beauty. (Megumi, a 31 year-old mother and part-
time worker) 
 
 Before I became a host, I thought women who got married and 
became mothers were no longer “women”. I now think women are 
eternally “women” and are genuinely interested in men. 
(Anonymous male host) 
 
  
Feminist scholars have long argued that gender and sexuality are not merely a 
reflection of biological attributes of sex differences, but socio-cultural constructs (e.g., 
Butler 1990, Foucault 1990, Ortner 1974, Rubin 1985, Scott 1986). In her book Gender 
Trouble, Judith Butler, for example, provocatively asserts that gender is not a cause but 
an effect of a discursively constituted sex binary system. Therefore, femininity and 
masculinity are not an expression of gender identity, but performatively embodied in 
repetitive speech and body acts (Butler 1990: 140). These scholars have shed light on the 
importance of thinking about gender and sexuality as encompassing maneuvers, i.e., 
constitutive elements of social relations — ideology, political economy, individual 
practices (Scott 1986: 1067). They have, however, tended to focus on conceptual and 
representational impacts on the body, and overlook bodiliness and its transformative 
effect on social practices and relationships. A good example is the Foucauldian model of 
sexuality that focuses on governing rationalities and technologies and reduces the body to 
a site where knowledge is inscribed (Foucault 1979). This kind of poststructuralist 
approach, Thomas Csordas (1994) warns, carries “the dual dangers of dissipating the 
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force of using the body as a methodological starting point, and of objectifying bodies as 
things devoid of intentionality and intersubjectivity” (4).  
The two quotations at the beginning of the chapter vividly underscore these 
theories, which are put to the test every day in Japan’s host clubs. A glittering consumer 
space, the host club is where mostly well-heeled Japanese women pay often exorbitant 
sums of money to have male “hosts” indulge their romantic (and sexual) fantasies. It is 
also a space where gender identities, romantic desires, and sexual relations are performed 
and negotiated in relation to existing social contexts and norms. In the interaction 
between female clients and their male hosts, feminine attractiveness, as well as women’s 
desirable selves and bodies, is constantly put through a process of (re)construction. In 
this respect, commodified romance in the host club provides a window into 
understanding the intersection of the encompassing maneuvers without neglecting 
individual conducts and intersubjective negotiations. In particular, the body is not merely 
an objectified entity in the affect economy at the club. It is rather a central locus for the 
creation and recognition of women’s desirable selves and for optimizing their affective 
exchange with hosts. 
Bodily sentience and sensibility is particularly important to understand selfhood at 
the nexus of postindustrial consumer culture and neoliberal globalization. Among many 
other scholars, Comaroff and Comaroff (2005), for example, assert that consumption is 
now the moving spirit of millennial capitalism and has become a “hallmark of 
modernity” (295; Hardt and Negti 2004; Harvey 2005; Miller 1995: 7). In the 
postindustrial cultural environment, where pleasure, playfulness, and diversity are 
emphasized, the body is a central locus of subjectivity formation (Turner 1996: 2; 
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Shilling 1993; Giddens 1991: 7). The body is, as Anthony Giddens, argues, no longer 
simply a given physical entity; it is a vehicle to cope with external situations and a source 
of feeling pleasure, self-fulfillment, and well-being (Giddns 1991: 58; 99; also Rose 
1990: 110). Thus, given the emphasis on individual needs and desires in contemporary 
consumer culture, the body is closely intertwined with the project of the self.  
The self/body project is further intensified as a work under neoliberal governance 
where the fabric of self-making is emphasized (Rose 1990). In his 1990 book, Governing 
the Soul, Nikolas Rose implores that modern citizens, primarily defined as a consumers 
rather than producers, are urged to make their lives meaningful by “selecting our personal 
lifestyle from those offered to us in advertising, soap operas, and films, to make sense of 
our existence by exercising our freedom to choose in a market” (Rose 1990: 102). The 
effort to maximize ‘quality of life’ is, Rose argues, a new image of the productive subject 
and hence of work itself, and as such the individual is “not to be emancipating from work, 
… but to be fulfilled in work (Ibid emphasis original). As such, Rose emphasizes that 
under neoliberal governance the content and meanings of work might be reformed, yet 
work itself becomes an element of self-fulfillment and self-actualization in the project of 
the self (Rose 1990: 103). The case of female clients, as well as male hosts, in Japan’s 
host club exemplifies this project of self by illustrating that both production and 
consumption are loci for this project—a project of self-fashioning a desirable self via the 
capitalist market economy. In short, production and consumption alike become a work.  
In this context, where postindustrial consumer culture and neoliberal governance 
intersect at the project of the body/self, the individual is encouraged to preserve or 
accumulate their human capital. Their capital is then evaluated by the results of one’s 
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investment in the enterprise and success of the entrepreneurship, whether such capital is 
accumulated through production or consumption. So while Foucault’s methodology that 
tends to objectify bodies and overlook their intersubjective aspects is problematic, his 
description of the neoliberal subject and human capital —an enterprise and an 
entrepreneur of oneself— is useful to understand the selfhood that is constituted through 
consumption in neoliberal capitalism (Gordon 1991: 44). The individual consumer as 
both an enterprise and entrepreneur is vividly demonstrated in the host club sphere, 
where clients like Megumi, the 31-year-old housewife quoted above, often goes to the 
host club because she says she would rather spend money there than at an aesthetic salon 
or clothing boutique so that she can internally “recuperate” her feminine attractiveness 
and recover her self-identity. Here, her body/self becomes a project she projects as an 
entrepreneur. The host club is one of the sites where she “chooses” to work on her 
project. As such, neoliberal governance is conducted via her entrepreneurial ‘freedom’ to 
undertake the enterprise of herself, but not through any overt disciplinary and oppressive 
forces.  
Colin Gordon contends that the idea of one’s life as an enterprise implies that 
there is a “sense in which one remains always continuously employed in (at least) that 
one enterprise, and that it is a part of the continuous business of living to make adequate 
provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one’s own human 
capital” (Gordon 1991: 44). In the host club, both male hosts and female customers 
beautify their appearance and attempt to satisfy their own goals and desires. While hosts 
have a tangible goal — making fast cash and achieving upward mobility, female clients, 
as Megumi typifies, aim at less tangible gains such as recognition of their individuality, 
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flattery from hosts, and extraordinary experience. Their goals reflect Japan’s social 
evaluation system: men’s criteria largely lie in occupational success, whereas women’s 
lie in desirable appearance, personality and romantic/marital achievement (Ogura 2003; 
Sakai 2003). Their different goals and positionalities as producers and consumers in the 
market of the affect economy reflects such gendered valuation. Thus, the neoliberal 
subject is governed through entrepreneurial ‘freedom’ to preserve or accumulate their 
human capital. Nevertheless, what counts as human capital is inseparable from socio-
historical context, and is, I argue, inevitably gendered.  
In the previous chapter, I illustrated how hosts’ subjectivity formation revolves 
around their class struggle, even though they are socially classified in gender and class 
terms. In the quest to accumulate human capital for their social advancement, I 
demonstrated how hosts subject themselves to desperate working conditions, yet their 
subjection paradoxically fuels their desire for entrepreneurial success. In this chapter, I 
focus on female clients and illustrate the ways in which they engage in gender politics 
through such a consumptive activity as hostclubbing. Here, I do not intend to reduce men 
to class and women to gender. I treat both class and gender as social identity categories 
that are not founded on ontological reality, but rather performatively constituted through 
a variety of social practices (Butler 1990; McLintock 1995: 9; Kondo 1997). I also 
contend that these categories do not exist independently. They closely intertwine and 
complexly configure, as well as are configured by, the social actors in relational and 
context-specific ways. In the case of male hosts and female clients, who are situated 
within Japan’s gender and class stratification, both make class and gender matter 
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respectively because they are socially subordinated in those terms and actively negotiate 
from their positionalities.  
 Feminist scholars have argued that neoliberal governance marginalizes or silences 
women in the name of rebuilding national strength in the global economy (e.g., 
Kingfisher 2002; Song 2006). While they successfully shed light on the gender inequality 
and male dominance that underlies neoliberal governmentality, such a theorization 
unintentionally neglects subtle forms of cultural politics— politics that women attempt to 
negotiate from within the patriarchal social system. Criticizing existing feminist 
scholarship, particularly progressive liberal feminism, Saba Mahmood problematizes 
their scholarly approach that imposes a “teleology of progressive politics on the analytics 
of power—a teleology that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being and 
action that are not necessarily uncapsulated by the narrative of subversion and 
reinscription of norms” (Mahmood 2005: 9). In other words, non-progressive or non-
liberal activities are overlooked or dismissed as the driving force behind social 
transformation. 
 A good example of this scholarly assumption is the existing feminist scholarship 
in the field of Japan Studies. It tends to focus on young single women, who have 
disposable income and remain in a liminal time and space, i.e., a premarital status (e.g., 
Kelsky 2001; Kinsella 1995; Ogasawara 1998; Robertson 1998). While feminist work in 
Japan Studies has highlighted these women, its scope has not extended to include married 
women. I argue there is a tacit assumption that once women get married, they inevitably 
confirm and reproduce Japan’s marriage and family system. I will note that passivity and 
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docility does not necessarily reproduce the status quo, but it can function as a guise to 
‘safely’ subvert social norms and systems from within. 
By looking at materiality in the project of the body/self and intersubjective 
relationships in the affect economy, in this chapter I intend to complicate gender politics 
at the intersection of postindustrial consumerism and neoliberal governance in 
contemporary Japan. In particular, I aim to demonstrate how romance has become an 
ambivalent vehicle for both single and married women. Through romance, women 
oppose and escape from the male-centered marriage/family system and sexual double 
standards, but also reinforce market-centered values and aesthetics of the body/self. I 
focus on married women, who tend to be presumed as conformist and are bypassed in 
most feminist scholarship, in order to rethink the progressive feminist assumption in and 
outside of Japan Studies.  
 
Romance as an All-Purpose Means 
Megumi is a housewife and a mother of three sons who lives and works part-time 
as a secretary in her husband’s construction business in Kinshi-chō, a salaryman “bed 
town” suburb northeast of Tokyo. When I first met her, in the summer of 2004, she had 
been visiting Fantasy once a week for about three months, trying hard, she told me, to 
recover her “lost” feminine attractiveness and self-identity. I met her through Koji, who 
at the time was her host and my interlocutor, and interviewed her at a small upscale bar in 
Kabuki-chō before her “date” at Fantasy. Megumi says that once married, women in 
Japan are not treated as individual women. Since her marriage with her high school 
boyfriend more than ten years ago, which she insisted was based on love, Megumi's 
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husband has recently begun to show less interest in her. Her neighbors, she says, call her 
the wife of Mr. So-and-so or the mother of So-and-so, and she feels as if she has lost her 
self-identity. “In the host club,” Megumi confides, “hosts call me by my first name and 
treat me as an individual woman. They pay attention to what I’m wearing, my hairstyle, 
my cosmetics, and give me timely feedback. These comments help motivate me to make 
an effort to become more beautiful because there’s someone who’s always caring about 
me.” Megumi adds, “Re-recognizing my female attractiveness boosts my self-confidence 
in many ways.”  
On the night I interviewed her, Megumi was wearing a dark gray mini skirt and a 
white frilled blouse, her plump body unsteady atop a pair of black high-heeled pumps. 
According to Megumi, she had spent more than two hours preparing for the evening, 
trying on several outfits in order to select the best fit that was neither too sexy nor too 
conservative, and primping in front of her full-length mirror. She meticulously 
embellished her face with cosmetics and set her naturally curly hair straight. She said to 
me, “The time I spend caring for myself — entirely myself — is something I miss in my 
day-to-day life.” She admits that she had neglected her appearance and feminine bearing 
for a long time. “I always took care of my children first and then my husband, and it was 
the last thing to care about myself,” she explained. In contrast to her day-to-day routine, 
she said, “It is a pleasing experience for a woman to have a young attractive man who 
looks into [her] eyes and says, ‘You are so beautiful tonight,’ even if she knows it is only 
a performance or a lie. Women pay for it because they want to be allowed to dream 
(yume wo misasete hoshii).” Megumi said that it was romantic excitement and the near 
constant flattery about her appearance that influenced her to focus on her beauty and 
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repeatedly visit Fantasy. For that reason, she chooses host clubbing instead of spending 
money at an aesthetic salon or on shopping. 
But like Cinderella, the spell that follows Megumi’s date with her host fades at 
dawn’s light. Back home by 5 a.m., the curfew that her husband has set, she begins to 
cook breakfast and prepare obentō boxed lunches for her family trying to catch up on her 
lost sleep. Waking up, she says she feels tired, worn, and haggard. Her daily routine of 
cleaning, laundry, and grocery shopping starts anew. At the supermarket, she buys 
discounted items to save money and works part time at the construction office in order to 
earn extra yen for use at the host club, where she typically spends about 20,000 (roughly 
$200 USD). In spite of her routine, she insisted, “In my mind, I feel full of positive 
energy that makes my life more joyful and meaningful.” She added that her husband and 
children, as well as her friends, have noticed a change in her appearance and attitude and 
have given her positive comments. According to her, the romantic experience does not 
end upon her exiting the extraordinary host club space but has a reverberant, performative 
effect on her self-confidence. 
Individual desires, which are rooted in one’s social environment and derived from 
everyday life, are as different from person to person as are the means to satisfy them. 
Hosts describe women’s diverse desires as, “If there are ten women there are ten 
distinctive colors (junin toiro, literally translated, ‘ten people for ten colors’).” While 
middle-class women like Megumi can spend no more than about $1,000 a month at host 
clubs, enjoying a modest taste of romantic stimulation, upper-class women who can 
afford greater sums play a far more elaborate game of romance. Not only the magnitude 
of the disposable income but also the intensity of desire for special attention affects 
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women’s spending in the affect economy at the host club. Nonetheless, Megumi’s host 
club experience shares some common characteristics with other female clients. Like 
Megumi, women in the host club are not passive recipients but active participants who 
optimize their spending to chance romance, or at the very least, the opportunity to sample 
the extraordinary and re-fashion their lives.  
Consumption at Fantasy is neither simply coded communication nor mere 
expression of needs, wants, and desires. It is a practice of making lifestyle choices, 
reflexively creating the self, achieving well-being, and signifying social distinction 
(Bourdieu 1984; Ngai 2003: 475). In particular, while both male hosts and female clients 
like Megumi beautify their appearances and try to appeal to one another, what they 
signify and attempt to achieve are different, and manifest gendered social expectations: 
the occupationally ‘successful’ man and the ‘desirable’ woman (Sakai 2003; Ogura 
2003). As such, hosts and female customers manifest this gendered ideal. Hosts aim to 
achieve occupational success, whereas women endeavor to (re)assure their feminine 
attractiveness through romantic excitement. As Megumi indicates, a woman’s self-
affirmation and their self-project embeds in Japan’s broader context of marriage and 
family system.  
Japan’s marriage and family system has historically desexualized married women, 
particularly mothers, and bestowed a respectful caretaking role instead (Allison 1994; 
Borovoy 2005: 114; Robertson 1991; Ryang 2006: 95). As such, women’s respect is 
gained at the expense of their sexuality, womanhood, and individuality. To a large 
degree, the desexualized image of married women and mothers is not necessarily 
ontological reality based on their bodily or sexual decay but rather an ideological effect.  
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Japanese feminist scholars have revealed that a romantic love ideology, which 
emerged in early 20th century Japan, has shaped the nation’s modern marriage/family 
system and controlled female sexuality (Ryang 2006; Ueno 1994; Uno 1991). Called 
“romanchikku rabu ideorogi” in Japanese, a direct import from English, the ideology 
conjoins romantic love, marriage, and reproductive sex as the “ideal sequence” of a 
woman’s life, creating the ideal middle-class mother as the modern citizen (Ogura 2003: 
23). In this definition romantic love means a courtship, extramarital romance not 
included. While men have long enjoyed the privilege to pursue extramarital sex (as 
Japan’s well-developed sex industry demonstrates), the sexual double standard attempts 
to channel women’s sexuality into reproduction and enclose them within a de facto un-
eroticized marriage (Allison 1994; 1996; Borovoy 2005; Ogura 2003; Robertson 1997). 
Popular feminist writer Sakai Junko asserts that Japanese women skip womanhood, 
transiting directly from girlhood to motherhood (Sakai 2003: 138). Correspondinly, 
patriarchal social assumptions separate the sexually sealed one from the unsealed one for 
reproductive purposes through the ritual of marriage. As such, these assumptions, in 
tandem with the marriage system, ideologically divide female sexuality into either sexual 
innocence in girlhood or reproductive sexuality in motherhood. This narrowly defined 
sexuality based on a reproductive model discriminates against homosexual activities as 
deviant (McLelland 2000), and pities the unmarried woman as unfulfilled (Sakai 2003). 
While romantic love ideology is still pervasive in Japan, an increasing number of 
Japanese women now avoid the confines of the marriage and family system for jibun no 
jinsei, “a life of one’s own.” Such attitudes of Japanese women are evidenced by the 
recent trends toward late marriage, declining birthrates, and increasing divorce rates in 
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Japan. Starting in the 1980s, however, during the period of Japan’s bubble economy, 
increasing numbers of young single women were hired in newly developing financial, 
service, and leisure industries. With their newfound disposable incomes, Japanese women 
have been able to diversify their lifestyles and pursue greater self-fulfillment, including 
romantic and sexual satisfaction (Kelsky 2001; Ogura 2003; Sakai 2003; Ueno 2004). 
Naturally, the media has picked up on this trend. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, in 
Japanese media and advertising, the individual rather than the nuclear family has become 
the iconic unit of consumption and heterosexual romance, rather than marriage per se, is 
promoted as an ideal avenue for expressing womanhood.  
This shift in emphasis occurred in the early 1990s, coinciding with Japan’s so-
called ren’ai būmu (romance boom). The ren’ai būmu relentlessly promotes romance as a 
means of beautifying everyday life and cultivating aisareru (“desirable” and “lovable”) 
women through self-expression involving fashion, hairstyle, body care, communication 
skill, and the overall presentation of the self. Not only the unmarried, but married women 
like Megumi are to seek romance too — and to seek it outside marriage if their husbands 
cannot oblige (Kameyama 2004). Latent in this discourse, moreover, is the incitement to 
married women to pursue the same goals, even when they exceed the spousal 
relationship. Particularly during the 1990s, Japan witnessed greater numbers of married 
women who yearned for extramarital relationships. Movies like The Bridges of Madison 
County (1995) and Shitsurakuen (Paradise Lost) (1997), for example, became box office 
hits in Japan and the original novels also became best-sellers. Women’s (and men’s) 
fantasy of having an adulterous affair came to be known as the “Paradise Lost 
Phenomenon” (shitsurakuen genshō) (Ryang 2006: 96). The phenomenon further stoked 
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the market economy of romance-related entertainment such as home dramas, movies, 
novels, and soft-core pornography.  
Ogata Sakurako, a freelance reporter and editor for the fashion magazine MORE, 
for instance, contends that women’s extramarital affairs have become “trendy” (Ogata 
2001: 222). Based on a nationwide questionnaire of married women taken in 1998, Ogata 
found that 47.1% of female respondents fantasized having an extramarital romance and 
29.4% actually claimed to have had extramarital sex (Ogata 2001: 218). Following thia 
trend, the term “kongai ren’ai, (extramarital romance or extramarital love) is now 
commonly used in Japan’s mass media. It is, however, conceptually differentiated from 
the conventional meanings and forms of mainly men’s furin (illicit love) and uwaki 
(affairs), both of which carry moral connotations. Men’s illicit affairs are generally 
associated with more sexually driven desires, where women’s extramarital romance is 
largely conceived as a means for women to maintain their youth, beauty, and 
attractiveness (Umesaki 2004). Due to its dissociation from sex, I argue that such re-
conceptualization has helped make “extramarital romance” socially permissible, even 
when it includes sexual contact. 
In this socio-historical frame, where Japanese women’s changing attitudes have 
converged with the romance boom, I argue that heterosexual romance has become a 
market technology to lure both single and married women to pursue new ways of 
fashioning selves and lifestyles (Takeyama 2005). At the same time, married and 
unmarried women, particularly in their 30s and 40s, are also caught in a dilemma 
whereby family-oriented conventional ethics and individual-based postindustrial and 
neoliberal values are constantly competing for their loyalty (Ueno 2004; Kameyama 
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2004). While social and market trends have underlined emergent changes, individual 
women, who are socially situated, still struggle with negotiating and reconciling such 
mixed messages. Thus, the practice of self-fashioning desirable women is deeply woven 
into the fabric of Japan’s changing, yet pervasive gender norms and inequality.  
A popular term, make inu, translated directly as “loser dog,” for example, has 
recently come to describe women in Japan over the age of 30 who have yet to be married 
but still stubbornly cling to office jobs with no future for promotion. Indeed, the 
implication is that no matter how successful these women may be in their professional 
careers, because they have miserably failed to achieve their most important “mission” as 
a woman —being “chosen” by men to marry and procreate—they will always be a loser 
in Japan (Sakai 2003). Sakai Junko, author of the best selling book, Make Inu no Toboe 
(The Barking of the Loser Dogs), points out the double standard that exempts men from 
such valuation because social evaluation criteria for men lie in occupational achievement, 
whereas women’s lie in success in romance, marriage, and childrearing (Sakai 2003: 
174). As a result of Japan’s social rating system, while women in their 30s and 40s today 
have been raised to be equal to or better than men in education and jobs on the one hand, 
they are still held to the model image of the housewife as the feminine ideal (Ueno and 
Nobuta 2004: also Saito and Sakai 2006: 47). For them, heterosexual romance grants a 
pardon for their singledom as a smokescreen for courtship (Sakai 2003). 
Married women are not entirely exempt from this dilemma, either. As leading 
feminist and sociologist Ueno Chizuko chronicles, married women in their 30s and 40s 
came of age during Japan’s bubble economy and experienced diversified postindustrial 
consumer cultures, where they actively pursued greater self-fulfillment, including 
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romantic and sexual satisfaction (Kelsky 2001; Ogura 2003; Sakai 2003; Ueno 2004). 
They cannot easily give up such ‘freedom’ in exchange for their marriage and 
childrearing. At the same time, they must cope with a sexual double standard in order to 
maintain their freedom within Japan’s male-dominated society, where sexually active 
women are stigmatized as “promiscuous” (inran). For them, romance becomes a sugar-
coated passport to a socially permissible level of romantic and sexual excitement for 
maintenance of their youth, beauty, and attractiveness as part of self-fashioning, as well 
as the socially idealized womanhood (Kameyama 2004). 
As such, romance plays an all-purpose means for both single and married women 
to buffer their schizophrenic situations and to pursue new ways of outfitting their selves 
and lifestyles. But at the same time, it further leads women toward becoming a 
“superwoman” who succeeds at all cost in career, family, and romance simultaneously. 
Sakai Junko, the feminist writer, insists that increasing numbers of women pursue success 
in their careers, childrearing, and care of the self (Saito and Sakai 2006: 47). Reinforcing 
Sakai’s view, Kameyama Sanae, who wrote a book entitled, Otto to wa Dekinai Koto 
(Things I Cannot Do With My Husband) based on her interview research, also describes 
how the ideal among middle-aged women typically involves juggling family, career, 
romance and/or hobbies to achieve their self-fulfillment (Kameyama 2004: 24). This 
‘superwoman’ model motivates women to achieve the ideal in order to feel a sense of 
self-growth, personal achievement, and empowerment; at the same time, it intimidates 
them and creates a void (Kameyama 2004: 24). Sakai Junko admits that she is satisfied 
with her career as a popular writer but cannot deny that she also feels an emptiness as a 
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single woman (Saito and Sakai 2006: 47). She claims that every woman potentially has a 
sense of ‘lack’ (ketsuraku kan) due to the unobtainable ‘superwoman’ ideal (Ibid). 
This unachievable ideal and existential void becomes the bait that Japanese 
marketing and advertising firms exploit and hosts take advantage of to cater to women’s 
affect, including fantasy, desire, self-fulfillment, and a sense of healing (Miura 2005: 
114). Yoritomo, the host who has published popular books about hosting and appeared on 
numerous Japanese variety shows, contends that women’s kūkyo kan (void) and 
ketsuraku kan (lack) have become a limitless business opportunity since every woman 
has both in their everyday life (Yoritomo 2003: 158). This business transaction shapes 
and fuels the affect economy that capitalizes on women’s affect to entice them into 
spending money for themselves and also on their hosts.  
 
Pursuit of the “Super Woman” 
Fumi, a single and self-employed sales woman in her mid-40s, is a case example 
of a woman who attempts to fulfill what she says she is missing in her life through host 
clubbing. Fumi is originally from Japan’s northern Tohoku region and has never married. 
She launched her own lingerie business in Tokyo about ten years ago and constantly 
worked until a friend of hers took her to Fantasy after her 37th birthday party. Fumi told 
me that she realized how much she had devoted herself to her career and neglected caring 
about herself. She often wore no cosmetics and usually simply bound her hair in a knot as 
her daily hairstyle. She described herself as looking like an obasan (a derogatory term for 
a middle aged woman). “Before it becomes too late,” Fumi said, “I want to enjoy my 
private life too. I want to get back my thin body. I want to enjoy romance. All of these 
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give me the energy and motivation to work hard.” She now has lightly permed brown hair 
and wears cosmetics and displays a manicure. She also dresses up when she visits the 
host club.  
However, she is not interested in actually getting married because she told me that 
marriage requires too much commitment. It is also technically impossible to commit 
herself to maintaining a serious relationship due to her busy work schedule. So, for Fumi, 
host clubbing is a convenient way to enjoy what she feels she is lacking in her life, i.e., 
care of the self and romance, at her convenience (in exchange for money). Fumi said, 
“Hosts are like buddies to have fun with and like boyfriends to date with. Unlike typical 
friends, they are always there [in the club] for you whenever you feel seeing them. Such 
convenience is valuable for me because my career comes first.”  
 While Fumi’s response is fairly dry, she believes that her host, Daisuke, likes her 
as a woman and tries to reciprocate his feelings and express his ‘love’. Daisuke, for 
example, often visits her office and decorates it up nicely for her. When Fumi invited him 
to go to a fireworks display one summer night, Daisuke spent 100,000 yen on a yukata set 
so that his would match Fumi’s. On that night, Fumi stopped by Fantasy with Daisuke 
and ordered a 600,000-yen ($6,000) bottle of whiskey to show her appreciation. By 
spending lavishly on him, Fumi helps Daisuke maintain his top ranking at the club. 
During my interview, however, Daisuke told me that even though he likes Fumi as a 
person, he pretends as if he were in love with her because she is such a good client who 
can afford expensive bottles of liquor and help boost his sales. He admitted that he 
doesn’t have a “genuine” feeling of love for her. Fumi also confessed to me that she 
actually likes another host, a friend of Daisuke’s, who her girlfriend has designated. To 
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avoid conflict and attain what she wants, however, Fumi maintains the relationship with 
Daisuke. Fumi’s example demonstrates that some women in the host club do not 
necessarily seek a “real” romance but enjoy the touch of it to complete themselves in 
what they feel is a vital aspect of womanhood. In this vein, romance is a means for them 
to care about themselves and elaborate their lifestyles.  
Yuki, a 46-year-old married woman, also pursues the ‘superwoman’ ideal. Yuki is 
a stay-at-home wife of a company owner and mother of three children, living in a newly 
built three-story mansion with a rooftop swimming pool in Shinjuku, Tokyo. But in the 
host club, she tells hosts that she is a single woman and adoptive mother of a baby son, 
and presents herself as a company owner. On average, Yuki spends roughly $10,000 a 
month at Fantasy, she said. On the night that I first met her, in the fall of 2004, her 34-
year-old top-ranking host, Ken, invited me over to sit at her table. (Ken’s helper host, 
whom I interviewed, thought Yuki would be a good informant and arranged the 
introduction.) Her table was covered with expensive bottles of wine and liquor, including 
Remy Martin Louis XIII, an aged cognac costing more than $3,000. Dressed in a Chanel 
open-black dress and wearing a diamond-encrusted wristwatch, ring, necklace, and 
earring combo, Yuki looked like a model from a Japanese fashion magazine. Her 
carefully applied mascara emphasized her large eyes and gave contrast to her pointed 
nose and thin lips. Only her husky voice and the thin wrinkles under her nose betrayed 
her actual age.  
When I met with Yuki later at a nearby coffee shop, she said that she resisted 
being just a housewife who is solely devoted to her family, but instead wanted to remain 
in a perpetual state of romance and maintain her seductive power for as long as possible. 
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Yuki told me that her attitude and look was modeled after Matsuda Seiko and Kuroki 
Hitomi, celebrities now in their mid-40s. (Kuroki is the actress who played the adulterous 
woman in the film Paradise Lost). Matsuda and Kuroki, known in the tabloids for their 
numerous romantic digressions, maintain a kind of youthful mien that Japanese women 
idealize as the epitome of female attractiveness. Their attractiveness is heightened by the 
fact that both are mothers and also career women (as a singer and an actress respectively). 
For Yuki, who is satisfied with her husband’s financial affluence and family life, 
maintaining her (body/self) beauty and seductive appeal is an enterprise that she 
undertakes through an affect economy in the host club. “In my youth,” she said, “without 
any effort men approached me to please me — buying me gifts and treating me at fancy 
restaurants. But today, I have to perform as an attractive woman in order to exercise such 
feminine power.” As part of that performance, Yuki enacts multiples selves — career 
woman, adoptive mother, and attractive woman — reflecting the idealized superwoman 
in contemporary Japan. 
For women like Fumi, Yuki, and Megumi, the personalized service hosts provide 
allows them the opportunity to experience what they are ‘missing’ and be who they want 
to be in exchange for money. In this respect they do not necessarily expect authenticity in 
romance. Fumi’s case exemplifies that a female client believes in a host’s love even if it 
is a false love for the host. By the same token, she enjoys her romantic experience 
without ‘genuine’ feelings toward her host. Megumi also indicates that romance is 
imaginative and romantic excitement has a performative effect on her self-confidence. 
Thus, romance in the host club is not entirely a “state of mind” but a means and process 
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of performatively evoking something extraordinary and pleasant for another purpose such 
as self-fulfillment. Yuki frankly but insightfully insists:  
 
There is no genuine love in a host club. Through my own and my 
friend’s experiences, I am convinced that hosts simply believe in 
rich women as their Bodhisattva savior (bosatsu) for their financial 
‘salvation.’ Most women in the club don’t seriously love hosts. They 
merely fall for themselves — their beautiful and attractive selves, 
under the spell of romance.  
 
 
Yuki explains that bodily excitement she gains through romantic experience is all 
about performance. To intensify her romantic excitement, she pretends as if she loves 
Ken, although she actually doesn’t care about her romantic partner all that much. (She 
says that she just picked a top-ranking host in the club who happened to be Ken.) For her, 
romance is a conduit of mutual seduction to (re)assure her beauty and attractiveness. “If 
you perform as a man’s favorite ‘girl’,” Yuki said, “he treats you better.” She dresses up, 
gazes at men, and pretends to be a weak woman so as to appeal to men. In her 
relationship with Ken, she quit smoking when she learned that Ken doesn’t like a woman 
who smokes. She also orders expensive bottles of whiskey and wine to increase his 
monthly sales even though she doesn’t drink alcohol at all. In return, she savors the 
seductive masculinity Ken displays wearing his Armani suits, and the chivalrous attention 
he lavishes on her. He takes her to high-end hotel lounges and fancy restaurants to elevate 
the romantic atmosphere and enjoyment. In his cell phone text messages to Yuki, he 
expresses how much he loves her. Such mutual seduction, Yuki says, helps strengthen her 
seductive aura and also beautifies her daily life.  
As Yuki and Megumi suggest, a female client’s self-identity as a “woman” — an 
attractive woman — is less an attribute of biological sex or substantial entity than a 
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constant striving to maintain self-confidence and achieve self-fulfillment. Thus, gender 
identity is performatively constituted in, and also constitutes, the realm of culturally 
idealized womanhood — youth, beauty, and attractiveness, where heterosexual romance 
plays the starring role for both married and single women.  
Particularly, married women’s pursuit of self-identities as “women” via 
extramarital romance is, I argue, not just a signification practice but also a negotiation 
process with their gender ideal, romantic desires, familial obligations, and social ethics. 
For example, Megumi and Yuki both play the role of wife and mother in order to justify 
their nightlife activities. “The host club doesn’t have a good reputation, but it is not a sex 
industry,” Megumi explained. Her husband assumes that nothing seriously sexual or 
intimate would happen within the club and permits her to go as long as she follows a 5 
a.m. curfew and the rule that she is forbidden to have any affairs. So far, Megumi says 
she has complied with her husband’s restrictions and is able to finish her house chores 
without letting her hostclubbing intervene. In addition, Megumi argues that she has 
contributed to raising the children and managing the family finances to build their new 
house, and is therefore now entitled to enjoy herself with money she has saved. Similarly, 
Yuki plays the role of a “good” mother, devoting herself to her children’s education, 
well-being, and life in general. “My husband is so impressed with my devotion to 
childrearing that he has no clue that I have a relationship with a host,” Yuki says. Even 
though he knows that she visits a host club, she suspects that he thinks her ‘bad’ 
girlfriend has tempted her to go along with her. Furthermore, Yuki cleverly justifies her 
hostclubbing as not only for herself but also for her husband, saying, “I keep house and 
maintain my beauty to please my husband. Husbands in Japan want their wives to be 
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attractive so that they can show off and gain credit for that. They just don’t want their 
wives to have affairs. So, I simply keep it hidden.” In their own minds, Megumi and Yuki 
justify their conduct and minimize their sense of guilt. They also take advantage of their 
perceived docility as mothers to court their romantic excitement outside marriage.  
While they actively engage in extramarital romance, both Megumi and Yuki do 
not intend to destroy their family. In order to “protect” their family life, they choose the 
host club and hosts instead of seeking romance somewhere else with “ordinary” men. 
They unanimously stress that hosts are “professionals,” convinced that “since hosting is 
their profession, hosts won’t mess with their client’s family lives,” Megumi said. 
Nevertheless, Megumi does not deny the potential exists for sexual relations with Koji, 
and says that if she succumbs she will simply keep the matter secret. In essence, Megumi 
makes ethical judgments and strategically pursues her extramarital romance within the 
scope of her spouse’s understanding and social tolerance, while taking advantage of his 
misperception and Japanese society’s inherent secrecy surrounding extramarital 
relationships. In Yuki’s case, she admits that she has had sexual relations with Ken, but 
she denies that it is sinful because she has never traveled or stayed overnight with him 
like an ordinary couple. In other words, she has never selfishly neglected her family and 
therefore her behavior is excusable. Her explanation doesn’t make sense to onlookers like 
me. Nonetheless, such nuanced ethical distinctions refers to the social expectation of the 
ideal mother, who prioritizes the family over herself, simultaneously reinforcing the 
gender norm in her narration and destabilizing it in her deeds. Hence, the performative 
ambivalence is a way for her to reconcile her desires, conjugal trust, and social 
expectations.  
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Hostclubing for married women like Yuki and Megumi therefore is not merely 
about the phantasmal experience of liminal tempo-spatiality that helps sustain existing 
social structures and functions. Neither is it a practice of passively inscribing social 
norms and expectations onto their bodies. It is a negotiation process, in which individual 
intentionality, strategic performance, and intersubjective negotiations are played out in 
sometimes coherent and, at other times, contradictory ways. In the negotiation process, 
these married women contest Japanese social norms surrounding gender and sexuality 
such as extramarital relations (as a male prerogative) and desexualized womanhood in 
marriage.  
Keeping their extramarital affairs secret, housewives like Megumi and Yuki 
might not appear to challenge the male prerogative. However, a closer look provides a 
more nuanced picture. Megumi and Yuki are actually armed with the gendered 
assumption that allows them to safely violate the sexual double standard. For example, 
both keep house and perform as “good” wives/mothers to disguise their extramarital 
romance from their husbands. They also take advantage of the societal rule of secrecy. In 
so doing, they justify their activities, and secretly, yet boldly, act out violation that in turn 
helps undermine the double standard. Such nonverbal, yet bodily acts of contestation are 
not an isolated incident in the host club but a symptomatic marker of rapidly changing 
erotic life in contemporary Japan. This nonverbal, but bodily claim manifests the recent 
Paradise Lost phenomena, within which extramarital affairs have become ‘trendy.’  
The host club is one market niche where married women pursue extramarital 
romance in exchange for money. Through romance, housewives like Megumi and Yuki 
attempt to prolong their “womanhood” and maintain their attractiveness. Since 
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womanhood in Japan is conceptualized as a mere transition period from sexually sealed 
girlhood to desexualized motherhood (Allison 1994; Robertson 1998), their attempt 
potentially undermines the discriminatory compartmentalization of female sexuality in 
Japan based on age and maternal status. In addition, they might gain seductive feminine 
power to further manipulate men and by extension, male-centered social norms.  
In the same way, however, female seductiveness also depends for its 
acknowledgement on the male gaze in heterosexual romance. Consequently, married 
women voluntarily posit their physical attractiveness as an important disposition and 
objectify their bodies for an extended period. Thus, neither de-sexualization in 
motherhood nor re-sexualization in romance leads them to a self-identity or social 
practice autonomous from male-centered heterosexual logic. As Judith Butler asserts, the 
transcendental model is culturally unimaginable and politically impracticable (Butler 
1990: 30). This is because the patriarchal heterosexual system hinges upon both Japan’s 
family institution and romance economy on the one hand and crisscrosses gender, 
sexuality, and self-identity on other. In this sense, I argue that the institutionalized family 
system and capitalized romantic fantasy are two sides of the same coin because fantasy is 
rooted in and derived from always and already male-centered social contexts and 
practices.  
 
The Gendered Logic of Romantic Love 
The affect economy in the host club, nonetheless, complicates individual 
experiences of romance, which are visceral, sensual, sentimental, and imaginative. 
Experiences are neither transparent nor coherent. They are oftentimes contradictory and 
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ambivalent. In particular, the affect economy, which is founded on a speculative 
accumulation of capital, blurs the discreteness of money, labor, and romantic love in the 
project of the self. Some female clients at Fantasy enjoy the “taste” of romance; others 
eagerly seek romance and experience the paradox: they selflessly devote themselves 
financially to their hosts as an ‘investment’ to satisfy their sense of self-fulfillment. The 
resultant paradox echoes the gendered logic of the ideal woman as a chosen or ‘beloved’ 
one as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is important to carefully scrutinize further the 
interplay among money, love, and labor to understand the gendered logic of romantic 
love and subjectivity formation in contemporary Japan.  
At the intersection of postindustrial consumer culture, particularly within the so-
called ‘romance boom’ and neoliberal values of individuality, competitiveness, and 
entrepreneurship, as I discussed earlier consumption has become a work of the self. In the 
speculative affect economy, consumption also has become a form of labor that creates 
greater surplus value. Even performatively presented popularity and desirability, for 
example, creates competition among female clients and boosts the market value of hosts’ 
services. Miranda Joseph asserts that the labor of the consumer, i.e., the consumptive 
labor, consists of non-organized and non-disciplinary forms of consumption activities, 
e.g., ‘free’ choice and the purchase of commodities to satisfy their personal needs. Unlike 
productive wage labor, such consumptive labor contributes “the greater share of surplus 
value, an unlimited share since it is based on signification and not on human labor 
capacity within the twenty-four-hour day” (Joseph 2002: 43; 41). In the affect economy 
at the host club, women’s consumptive activities are closely intertwined with their 
desirable selfhood. In this way, Joseph also argues, “consumptive labor is produced and 
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exploited through active subjection in the expression of needs, desires, self, [and] 
identity” and therefore is not necessarily external to or oppositional to capitalist 
production (Ibid: 43). The women’s consumptive labor in the host club may very well be 
the elaboration of Japan’s affect economy, which has the gendered division of labor. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that despite the apparent inversion of gender roles 
evidenced by hosts’ symbolic subordination and eagerness to please women, over time 
gender relations at Fantasy underscore gender power dynamics through the art of 
seduction. So far in this chapter, I discussed how Japan’s gendered social evaluation 
system idealizes the ‘desirable’ woman and the ‘successful’ man—ideals on display in 
the host club. Women’s self-identity in Fantasy is illuminated by the notion of the 
‘desirable’ (super)woman, whereas hosts’ masculine self-identity is crafted through the 
concept of the occupationally ‘successful’ man. Consequently, romance becomes a means 
for both sides to satisfy their sense of self-fulfillment and self-affirmation. For the host, 
romantically pleasing women for monetary return puts them in an apparently 
embarrassing and subordinated position, whereas for the client, their eager romance 
seeking ‘voluntarily’ subordinates themselves to the hierarchical gender order.  
Akemi, a woman in her early 40s, exemplifies an extreme case of a female 
customer enabling her host. She divorced her husband, an ex-host, after falling in love 
with a younger host, and became a sex worker in order to financially support him. She 
spent more than 100 million yen (nearly $1,000,000) on him over eight years and helped 
elevate him to the top echelon among hosts at his club. I met her through her current host, 
who worked at Fantasy, and interviewed her.  
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Akemi told me that her first host club visit occurred almost 20 years ago, when 
she was working as a hostess in Shinjuku. She and her designated host both succumbed to 
a case of love at first sight and soon got married. Akemi became a housewife, but she 
said that she quickly became bored. Before long Akemi began sneaking out of their 
Tokyo apartment to visit a nearby host club and met her new host, Seiya. She got 
divorced and became a hostess again to afford going to the club. At this point, Akemi told 
me that she had the same feelings with Seiya that she did for her ex-husband and wanted 
to get married. She felt an overwhelming devotion to him. So when Seiya approached her 
and said, “You are the only person I can honestly tell that I am in trouble achieving my 
sales goal this month,” Akemi couldn’t help spending more money to save him. When 
she learned that his dream was to open his own host club, she decided to become a sex 
worker in order to increase her monthly spending in the club. “I believed that I could 
hasten the process whereby both his and my dreams — opening a new club and getting 
married — would come true,” Akemi explained. From her perspective, her “choice” to 
support him and achieve her own goals were aligned with her notions of love. “For me 
love means that I would do anything for the one [I love].” 
Nevertheless, she said the choice she made based on her notion of love was fated 
to accompany hardship. She told me that she wanted to help Seiya elevate his sales 
ranking and secure more of his personal attention, and so attempted to spend more money 
than anybody else in the club. “It was my rival spirit against his other clients and my 
feelings toward him that motivated myself to find better paying sex work,” Akemi said. 
She started off working in a “pinku saron” (pink salon, where female sex workers 
perform hand or oral sex and take in $25 to $35 per client). She graduated to prostitution 
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at a “sopurando” (soap land, where female sex workers have sex and earn $85 to $110 
per client) and eventually pressured herself to take on more customers. Akemi reflexively 
explained that the more she earned, the more she spent on Seiya and the more she desired 
to monopolize him. “My spending went through the roof,” she said. “One month I earned 
$5,000 and spent $3,000 on him. The next month I made $10,000 and spent $8,000.” She 
also regularly bought him expensive bottles of hard liquor, several $5,000 Versace suits, 
and a specially ordered $20,000 Frank Miller wrist watch on his birthday.  
Thus, she had a double shift of labor work: her sex work to earn the money and 
her consumptive labor to spend the money on her host in the host club. Her speculative 
consumption helps Seiya create surplus value on his commodified body/self, and increase 
the club’s profit. Her seemingly selfless devotion, however, paradoxically fulfills her. “It 
was painful to take on more customers, but it was ai no kurushimi (pain for love)” Akemi 
said. “Seiya’s smiling face and special attention toward me made it all worthwhile, and 
the harder things got, the more love I felt for him and the more strength I sensed within 
myself.” Here, labor, money, and love are all intertwined in her project of the desirable 
self. The labor and money she provides Seiya signifies both her love to him and her 
strength to herself. Akemi admits that Seiya has never told her what to do. As she stated 
earlier, his indirect speech and body acts such as embodied in his troubled confession and 
‘special' treatment, as well as her desire to get married to him, prompted her to ‘choose’ 
to do anything for the one she loves. For Akemi, the “princess-like” treatment 
(ohimesama atsukai) that she felt she got in the club satisfied her self-worth. Akemi 
recalled the time when Seiya and she were walking together on the street, and he 
unexpectedly picked her up off the ground as if he were a prince in order to ‘protect’ her 
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from a puddle in her way. In retrospect, she admits that her experience with Seiya was 
both painful and pleasurable, hollow and self-fulfilling at the same time. Her ambiguous 
and contradictory feelings are reflected in her simultaneously active and passive role in 
her consumptive labor. On the one hand, Akemi said, “I was proud of my achievement 
making him number one and also enjoyed being treated like a V.I.P. in the club.” On the 
other hand, her active role inverted to passive one when it came to her romantic pleasure. 
“I enjoyed the sense of superiority of being the chosen one (erabareta hito) by the 
number one host [as his ‘princess’],” Akemi said.  
Her active/passive status in the affect economy, I argue, echoes the gendered 
ideal, the ‘superwoman’ model. Akemi’s financial power, quantified and visualized in 
numerical forms such as Seiya’s rank and monthly sales, helped her to enjoy a sense of 
achievement. The feeling was reinforced by her being treated like a V.I.P. Her labor in 
the host club—the consumptive labor or love’s labor—is recognized by herself and the 
others in the club as if it were a career achievement. But at the same time, her monetary 
power over the one she loves undermines her desirability as a woman. As a result, she 
emphasizes her passivity by highlighting that she was wanted and chosen by a man who 
is regarded as occupationally successful, i.e., the ideal one. These two are inseparable in 
the affect economy because without her consumptive labor, she wouldn’t be treated as 
she wanted to be. At the same time, the man, who chooses her, has to be the ideal one. 
Otherwise, the legitimacy of her desirability is undermined. Thus, Akemi puts her 
passivity forward in a way that helps maintain her feminine attractiveness by 
overshadowing her aggressive economic activities that masculinizes her in relation to her 
male host.  
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In doing so, Akemi buttresses the idealized image of desirable women in romantic 
discourses. As I brought up in Chapter 2, in the popular Japanese discourse on romantic 
love, the idea that an “ordinary” woman can instantly become a princess by fate, i.e., by 
simply encountering her ‘fated partner’ (unmei no hito), is the quintessential Japanese 
Cinderella story, which hosts exploit. Indeed, the fantasy of Cinderella is so potent that it 
mystifies the plot: In the host club space, the entire scenario —becoming a ‘chosen’ 
woman as a desirable and seductive one—is already embedded. It only requires money to 
enact the scenario, within which she plays a role of the heroine with the prince played by 
the host.  
Nakamura Usagi, an expert on Japan’s sex industry and a host club patron, argues 
that women’s self-devotion in romance is a social issue. In Ai to Shihonshugi (Love and 
Capitalism), a popular novel based on her own host club experiences, Ryo, a male host 
and protagonist, asks: “Why do women believe love is something requiring self-sacrifice 
for others, particularly for the men whom they love? Whose value is that?” (2002: 102-3). 
Nakamura suggests that it lies in how Japanese society evaluates women based largely on 
the success of the men in their lives. Female customers such as Nakamura Usagi, a well-
known writer and host club patron, typify this. In an interview with The Japan Times, 
Nakamura describes the connection between female clients’ devotion to their hosts and 
hosts’ success in monthly sales competitions. Despite her popularity and success as a 
writer, Nakamura says: 
  
I always live with anxiety about my position in the world [because] I 
cannot numerically express my value as a woman, or what I do 
professionally … I was projecting myself onto my host [in the sales 
competition game]. And when he was moving upward it made me 
feel as if my own value was rising as well (Japan Times 2003). 
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Nakamura deftly captures how male-centered social structures confer a subsidiary 
status on the value of women and their work. Within such structures women are 
encouraged to devote themselves to men and live vicariously through projecting 
themselves onto their men. 
Akemi, who has committed herself to her host and vicariously experienced a 
sense of achievement, continued her financial largesse, paying all that she could to secure 
her own sense of victory as the “chosen” woman. When Seiya opened his own host club 
and broke up with her, she finally realized that his love was, after all, a pseudo-love. 
Because she spent all of her income on him and has no savings, she still lives in a tiny 
one-room studio apartment in Shinjuku and works in the sex industry. Despite these 
drawbacks, Akemi doesn’t regret her relationship with her host or the money she spent. 
“Although I spent so much money on him, he never asked me to do so. I voluntarily did 
it. I did it in order to satisfy mainly myself” she admitted. Akemi hasn’t given up 
believing in romance, either. For the next round of the “game,” she says, “I think it is 
important to seduce a man instead of you becoming infatuated with him, because the one 
who falls in love loses.” Akemi’s lesson does not challenge the gendered logic of 
romantic love — the desirable women as ‘chosen’ and love as selfless devotion. 
Reducing the gendered logic of aisareru (desirable or lovable) women to a merely 
strategic issue, she depoliticizes gender difference and inequality to a personal issue.  
To be sure, not only Seiya’s manipulation but also Akemi’s complex situation — 
her personality, past experiences, unmarried status, and individual desires — has 
cumulatively impacted on her “choice.” But as Akemi’s experience also illustrates, 
 
 211 
female clients’ choice is largely embedded in Japan’s socio-economic and gender system, 
which caters to desire primarily by unlocking their tremendous spending power in the 
guise of promoting their ideal image of the ‘chosen’ woman. In this respect, women’s 
choice is mostly predetermined. Women’s financial power and their craving for 
desirability and lovability subsume them to the gendered logic of romantic love and the 
social evaluation system, that is, aisareru women are idealized and highly valued.  
The gendered logic of romantic love rationalizes women’s devotion to men. As 
Akemi’s case shows, a woman’s selfless (but not unselfish) devotion in romantic love is 
not relinquishing the self but actually reassuring the sense of self. It is also an investment 
for a future high return: elevating herself as an ideal woman and vicariously attaining 
higher social status through their men’s potential success. Such an investment, however, 
unintentionally reinforces male-centered social structures that relegate women to a 
dependent position. Knowing this, clever women like Yuki might deploy their seductive 
power and make the best possible use of it. Nonetheless, I argue that women voluntarily 
subordinate themselves to the passive position within the gendered romantic love and 
self-affirmation modality — idealization of the ‘chosen’ and ‘beloved’ woman. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The host club is a consumer space, where women in Japan can escape from social 
constraints and seek an alternative life of their own. The social constraints are, however, 
different from one woman to another in the age where competing discourses on what an 
ideal women is or should be is constantly transmitted through marketing, advertising, and 
other forms of media. In this postindustrial consumer age with its emphasis on neoliberal 
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individuality and entrepreneurship, subversive acts are rather sporadic than teleological. 
At Fantasy, female clients (who have disposable income yet lack stable social status), 
fantasize self-fulfillment through romantic experience. I argued that these desired selves 
are inevitably gendered because their fantasy and desires root in Japan’s existing social 
expectations and valuation system based on gender differences.  
In this chapter, I focused on female clients’, particularly married women’s, self-
identity and demonstrated how romance has become the pivot of identity formation and 
its double-edged nature: women employ it to refine the self and explore their own 
romantic (and sexual) pleasure, while simultaneously (re)producing culturally idealized 
womanhood — youth, beauty, attractiveness, and passivity. In addition, the married 
women I introduced in this chapter pursue their extramarital romance by way of playing 
the role of the respectful mother figure and exhibiting desirable female passivity. It is, 
however, problematic to assume that female passivity merely reproduces Japan’s gender 
and sexual status quo. This is because the equation of submissiveness to lack of human 
agency overlooks non-organized or non-verbal subversive acts. As I demonstrated, 
female clients in Fantasy arm themselves with socially defined norms and assumptions in 
order to covertly challenge such double standards as extramarital romance as a male 
entitlement and the image of the desexualized mother figure in the family system. Thus, 
individual conducts are not merely “inscribed” and “governed.” They are also 
constitutive elements of collective effects on social transformations of existing systems 
and norms. The new social currency, “extramarital romance,” itself is an example of how 
much women’s subversive pursuits have gradually become socially permissible, 
transforming Japan’s gender and sexual norms.  
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From the vantage of subversive aspects of individual enactments, I highlight the 
importance of the nuanced contextual difference between the “norms” that individual 
actors employ as a guise and the norms that they subvert under the guise. Thus, social 
norms that consist of multiple layers need to be contextualized. Non-verbal, yet bodily 
displays should be also taken into account as a form of subversive enactment. Otherwise, 
as feminist literary critic Gayatri Spivak (1988) argues, subalterns, whose voices are 
muted, would be dismissed as those who cannot and do not speak to authority despite 
their secretly, yet boldly acted out subversion. In this respect, women’s agency lies in, as 
feminist anthropologist Saba Mabhood argues, the “capability for action,” which is socio-
historically shaped and conditioned (Mahmood 2001: 210). Following Mahmood’s notion 
of agency, I also argue that agency is not only embodied in vocally contesting authority 
or intentionally organizing collective movements. Agency is, rather, an effect of a variety 
of ambivalent conducts. Thus, I warn that focusing on verbal articulation and dismissing 
actual enactments risks reifying existing power relations of heteronormative patriarchy.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
One late evening in the summer of 2005 as I neared the completion of my field 
research on host clubs, I saw soap bubbles floating in the air. I had just met with Yuki, a 
female host club client and interlocutor, to have coffee and talk at a Shinjuku family 
restaurant. As we both ascended the stairs to the restaurant, I caught Yuki, who was 
wearing a vivid yellow shirt and a pair of white pants, against a background of children 
playing late at night, blowing bubbles that dissolved in the darkness around her body. It 
was a surreal, yet prescient moment. It turned out that this was to be a night when my 
research conviction was shaken.  
“Everything is a performance and a lie. It’s just like a bubble,” said Yuki that 
night. After many conversations, formal and informal interviews, and extended time 
spent with her over a three-month period, Yuki confided that all she ever did with her 
husband, children, host, friends, neighbors, and children’s schoolteachers was merely 
bubble-like performance and lying. Once I realized that I wasn’t an exception to her 
duplicity and that she was likewise performing for me, I felt as if her trustworthiness, our 
relationship, and the legitimacy of my research itself had crumbled. Although I had 
theoretically studied about performativity, the postmodern condition, and the problematic 
western tradition of rationality, I realized that knowing something and actually being 
involved in it were two different things. I started to ask myself: Have I just collected a 
bunch of lies? Is this research no more than shoveling, breaking, or playing with bubbles? 
What does it mean to study transitory and shifting subjectivity, relationships, and the 
world itself?  
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I gradually came to understand that this project was about the fluidity and 
incoherency between trustworthiness and distrust, instrumentality and emotionality, and 
reality and fantasy in a Tokyo host club and by extension Japan’s affect economy. The 
affect economy, as I defined in the Introduction, is a service-based industry and business 
enterprise that takes a form characterized by highly personalized interaction that 
optimizes the exchange of money for affective labor. Such an economy is, I argued, 
rapidly developing at the intersection of Japan’s postindustrial consumerism and 
neoliberal reformation. In this economy, personal care, intimate life, and human 
relationships have increasingly become commercialized. This trend is not unique to Japan 
but is now a typical feature of neoliberal globalization. While some scholars have 
theorized the interplay that exists between the shift to postindustrial consumerism and the 
increase of affective labor, microanalyses of subjectivity formation, the interrelationship 
between service provider and recipient, and the cultural politics that the interaction 
results in and impacts upon have yet to be undertaken. I have situated the host club scene 
as a unique portal into the social processes of formation of neoliberal subjects, the 
reconfiguration of gender power dynamics, and class struggle in Japan’s affect economy. 
In order to historicize how affect that is not originally produced as a commodity 
has reached commodity status, I explore how the postindustrial capitalist system, gender 
relationships, and subjectivity formation have enabled the commodification of affect such 
as romance in Chapter 2. Overall, I demonstrated how the sign economy in postindustrial 
consumer culture has fragmented gender, class, and national identity and also the body, 
romantic feelings, and social relationships. Alongside this socioeconomic fragmentation, 
the body has become a neoliberal site where individuals cultivate the self of the socially 
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valued. I also illustrated that changing gender relationships influenced by Japan’s 
romance boom of the 1990s paradoxically idealizes women’s subjectivity — women as 
competent and competitive individuals and unselfish and lovable women. Romance has 
thus become a means and a process of making the ideal woman. At this socio-historical 
juncture of postindustrial consumerism and neoliberal subjectivity formation, affect such 
as romance has become commodifiable. Like identity in the postmodern condition, affect 
has been increasingly scripted through messages and imageries and performatively 
constituted. As a result, affective labor has economic value when it meets market 
demand. The romance boom has created the demand and the host club has become a site 
where host’s affective labor fosters a romantic atmosphere and a feeling of intimacy in 
exchange for money.  
While the commodification of affect might be viewed as part of the normal 
economic activity of production and consumption, I argue that the participants, who are 
socially situated in gender and class terms, strategize their acts and therefore complicate 
this simplistic view. In the host club, young men of working-class background and 
women with money and status engage in a cooperative interaction that spawns romantic 
relationships and optimizes their self-motivated monetary and affective exchanges. Host 
offer their affective labor in the hopes of making high incomes and self-actualizing their 
chances for upward mobility, whereas their customers are on the receiving end of hosts’ 
attentiveness and provide their consumptive labor as a token of their lovability and as a 
display of ideal femininity, i.e., self-devoting, desirable women. Throughout this project, 
I illuminated how social differences and inequalities such as gender and class were 
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discursively embedded in their desires, interpretations, and Japan’s social environment. 
As such, the interactivity in the host club shapes a form of cultural politics.  
In Chapters 4 and 5 I raised the question: How and why do hosts and their clients, 
who are cognizant of social inequality and gender as a social construct respectively, 
perpetuate class and gender hierarchies rather than challenge them? I argue that the 
paradox —awareness of social inequality and the reproduction of it— is emblematic at 
the junction of the postindustrial sign economy and neoliberalism. As I argue in Chapter 
2, class and gender identities are increasingly signified by the sign of differences rather 
than determined by social strata and sex differences. The sign economy enables class and 
gender performativity within the postindustrial information-based economy. In addition, 
the neoliberal global economy increasingly emphasizes the kind of speculative 
accumulation of capital that attracts young working-class men in Japan. The myth of 
opportunity in the host club in turn seduces youth with limited employment potential into 
taking a chance and voluntarily subjecting themselves to laissez-faire competition and 
exploitative working conditions. From this perspective, host’s ambition and the results-
oriented neoliberal economy go hand in hand, reproducing social inequalities. On the 
other, the performativity of ideal femininity not only deconstructs essentialized gender 
identity and the patriarchal family system but also invites individual women to engage in 
the enterprise of the self and cultivate desirable selves, i.e., neoliberal subjects. In this 
regard, both hosts and their clients are products and producers of the interrelation 
between Japan’s postindustrial sign economy and neoliberal globalization.  
Another question I raised in this dissertation was: How do people and social 
institutions like the host, their clients, and the host club establishment (who have different 
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motives and goals) cooperatively interact and satisfy one another on non-functionalistic 
terms? In order to unravel this question, I have theorized the art of seduction based on 
Michel Foucaul’t notion of the art of government and Michel Hardt’s term of affective 
labor. The art of seduction is a form of governing technology. It consists of highly 
calculated, yet suggestive speech and body acts that capitalize on the other’s affect and 
entice him/her into ‘voluntarily’ serving for the other’s favor and ends. The art of 
seduction is about subtle governance of the other’s conduct in an asymmetric, yet 
reciprocal way: understanding the seducee’s fantasies, desires, and goals, and providing 
the right affective labor to produce a feeling of satisfaction, well-being, and intimacy so 
as to guide the seducee to ‘freely’ think of and devote to the seducer. For example, hosts 
provide their affective labor, through which they feed women’s romantic fantasy and 
create an aura of intimacy, in order to seduce them to spend more money. Similarly, 
female clients make an effort to financially please their hosts in order to be thought of 
better and as special. In such an unintentionally coordinated way, both sides seduce one 
another to achieve self-satisfaction. As I addressed above, this mutual seduction 
constitutes a component of the multilayered affect economy: transaction between the host 
and clients, the host club management, and the affect economy in Japan, writ on a global 
scale. 
The art of seduction has the potential to undermine the fixity of social knowledge, 
norms, and ethics through strategic use of ambivalence and manipulative inversion of 
tacit knowledge to artfully produce and manipulate affect. Nonetheless, the potential is, I 
argue, enabled by and only within the postindustrial capitalist system. I argued how the 
postindustrial society emerged in the 1970s to “overcome” the limit and loss that 
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industrial modernization created. Since then, the postindustrial information-based 
economy has played a role to debunk essentialized identity politics and challenge the 
status quo for the ‘freedom’ of individual consuming subjects in the 1980s. The consumer 
culture, as I argued, has paved the road to neoliberal reformation and commercialization 
of affect that further imbricates the body and the self per se into the logic of flexible and 
speculative accumulation of capital. Thus, postindustrial capitalism itself has been 
safeguarded against self-demolition and in turn perpetuated due to its malleability. I 
argue that the art of seduction recently has been promoted as a dream machine, through 
which everyone has the potential to become an agentive seducer and keep dreaming of 
constantly renewed goals, in Japan’s affect economy.  
Having said that, however, I do not intend to generalize that everyone and 
everything evolves around the logic of seduction. Neither do I mean that all activities are 
now within the realm of the affect economy. What I wanted to highlight here is the 
general trend of a conceptual and economic shift toward the econo-emotive activities at 
the convergence of postindustrial consumer culture and neoliberal reformation, a shift 
pointing toward further intensification of the service-based economy. I suggest that it is 
worth critically examining the affect economy to foreground the postindustrial capitalist 
system without losing the micro-analysis of subjectivity formation, social relations, and 
power dynamics. Because of its malleable and enigmatic nature, it is difficult to pin down 
and define what is problematic about the affect economy. As I attempted to reveal the 
complexity of hosts’ ‘voluntary’ subordination to exploitative working conditions, for 
example, I contest that the exploitation itself needs to be redefined not only in a Marxist 
sense but also in econo-emotive terms. This econo-emotive motive is, I argue, the key to 
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unraveling the rapidly globalizing information-based consumerism and neoliberalism. 
The motive affords individual social actors and institutions alike the opportunity of 
capitalizing on one another’s affect to realize their dreams, while simultaneously 
underscoring gender subordination, social inequality, and the exploitative nature of the 
affect economy in Japan.  
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